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INTRODUCTION 
Over half a century ago, the Puerto Rico legislature legalized 
casino gambling in an effort to promote tourism to the island.1 To 
help ensure that the local population would not overindulge in this 
particular vice, however, the legislature at the same time provided 
that “[n]o gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or other-
wise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.”2 Thirty years 
later a casino operator challenged the statutory advertising ban 
and its implementing regulations as violating the freedom of speech 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.3 Although the Superior Court 
of Puerto Rico agreed with the casino that the regulations—which, 
among other things, had barred the use of the word “casino” on 
matchbooks and even interoffice or external correspondence—were 
“capricious, arbitrary, erroneous and unreasonable, and ha[d] pro-
                                                                                                                       
1.  Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 (codified as amended at 15 P.R. LAWS ANN. §§ 
71-79 (1999)). The Act’s Statement of Motives explained that the Act’s purpose was “to contribute 
to the development of tourism by means of the authorization of certain games of chance which 
are customary in the recreation places of the great tourist centers of the world.” § 1 (codified as 
amended at 15 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 71 (1999)). 
2.  § 8 (codified as amended at 15 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 77 (1999)). 
3.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court had held Puerto Rico subject to the First 
Amendment Speech Clause in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 314 (1922). 
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duced absurd results which are contrary to law,”4 it refused to in-
validate the statutory advertising ban. Instead, it issued narrowing 
constructions of the statute and regulations to prohibit “advertise-
ments . . . in the local publicity media addressed to inviting the 
residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casinos.”5 The Puerto Rico Su-
preme Court upheld the lower court and the casino appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Puerto Rico courts by a 5-4 decision writ-
ten by then-Justice Rehnquist.6 First applying the mid-level scru-
tiny for regulations of commercial speech that it had announced in 
its Central Hudson decision six years earlier,7 the majority deter-
mined that the regulations, as narrowed by the Puerto Rico courts, 
passed muster because they directly advanced a substantial gov-
ernmental interest in reducing demand for casino gambling by the 
residents of Puerto Rico and were no more extensive than necessary 
to serve that interest.8 Second, and seemingly in the alternative, 
the majority explained that “the greater power to completely ban 
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban adver-
tising of casino gambling.”9 
The four liberal Justices dissented in two separate opinions. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, spent 
the bulk of his dissent arguing that the majority did not faithfully 
apply Central Hudson.10 Observing first that the legislature permit-
ted Puerto Rican residents “to engage in a variety of other gambling 
activities—including horse racing, ‘picas,’ cockfighting, and the 
Puerto Rico lottery—all of which are allowed to advertise freely to 
                                                                                                                       
4.  Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 334 (1986) (“Posadas”) (quoting 
App. to Juris. Statement 29b). 
5.  Id. at 335 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement 38b-40b). 
6.  Id. at 328. 
7.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566-71 (1980) 
(“Central Hudson”). According to the four-part Central Hudson test:  
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the 
First Amendment. [1] For commercial speech to come within that provision, it 
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2] 
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more ex-
tensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 
United States v. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. 418, 424 (1993) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 477 
U.S. at 566, and inserting numbering). 
8.  Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs., 478 U.S. at 340-44. 
9.  Id. at 345-46. 
10. Id. at 351-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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residents,”11 Brennan concluded that the government had failed to 
show that a substantial interest supported the advertising ban. But 
even assuming otherwise, he continued, the government also failed 
to show either that the advertising ban directly advanced its “inter-
est in controlling the harmful effects allegedly associated with ca-
sino gambling,”12 or that its interests could not be advanced in a 
manner more solicitous of speech interests—as by “establish[ing] 
limits on the level of permissible betting, or promulgat[ing] addi-
tional speech designed to discourage casino gambling among resi-
dents.”13 
Justice Stevens, also joined by Justices Marshall and Black-
mun, responded to the majority’s use of the greater/lesser reason-
ing. Although observing that “[w]hether a State may ban all adver-
tising of an activity that it permits but could prohibit—such as 
gambling, prostitution, or the consumption of marijuana or liquor—
is an elegant question of constitutional law,”14 Stevens contended 
that it was not a question “appropriate to address . . . in this case 
because Puerto Rico’s rather bizarre restraints on speech are so 
plainly forbidden by the First Amendment.”15 In particular, Stevens 
identified at least three defects arising from the fact that Puerto 
Rico did not actually ban all advertising of casino gambling: the 
regulations “plainly discriminate[d] in terms of the intended lis-
tener or reader,” singling out “Puerto Rico’s residents . . . for disfa-
vored treatment in comparison to all other Americans”;16 “estab-
lish[ed] a regime of prior restraint”; and were “hopelessly vague.”17 
While Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun were will-
ing to leave open whether, as the majority had asserted, a state’s 
greater power entirely to ban an activity entailed the lesser power 
to permit the activity while entirely banning its advertisement, 
academic commentators were not as restrained. Philip Kurland’s 
brief but impassioned critique in the Supreme Court Review is no-
table.18 Although arguing at some length that the majority’s appli-
cation of the Central Hudson test was indefensible,19 Kurland 
                                                                                                                       
11. Id. at 353. 
12. Id. at 355. 
13. Id. at 356-57. 
14. Id. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 360. 
17. Id. at 359. 
18. Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: “ ‘Twas Strange, ‘Twas 
Passing Strange; ‘Twas Pitiful, ‘Twas Wondrous Pitiful,” 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
19. Id. at 8-12. 
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frankly acknowledged that that aspect of the opinion was of rela-
tively little significance. “If the Posadas opinion had done no more 
than patently to misapply its own established commercial speech 
doctrine to what is concededly an idiosyncratic set of facts,”20 Kur-
land admitted, it would warrant little attention. The greater/lesser 
analysis is what really drew his ire. This bit of reasoning, he con-
cluded, “is violative of every notion of what the Free Speech Clause 
has stood for.”21 That is strong language. But over the fifteen years 
since Posadas was decided, the sentiment has garnered near-
universal scholarly agreement.22 
                                                                                                                       
20. Id. at 12. 
21. Id.  
22. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17 (1989) (de-
scribing Posadas as “highly illogical” and “a terrible decision”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 903 (2d ed. 1988) (“At the very least, the ‘greater power including the 
lesser power’ form of analysis seems singularly inappropriate in the first amendment context.”); 
Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 43 n.190 (1995) (denouncing Posa-
das’s use of the greater/lesser as “lethal”); Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 
77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 938-43 (1992); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial 
Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 290-91 (1987) (Posadas “mocks 
the constitutional status of commercial speech”); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and 
Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 37 (1989) (Rehnquist’s ap-
proach amounts to “a basic affront to human dignity”); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of 
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 42 n.195 (2000) (“It is remarkable that after a decade of 
commercial speech decisions, Rehnquist was able to assemble a Court for [the greater/lesser] 
approach.”); Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
589, 604 (1996) (“The greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning, when relied upon to justify reducing 
constitutional protection of speech advocating commercial conduct to the level of protection af-
forded the conduct itself, is contradicted by constitutional text, theory and policy.”); Jef I. Rich-
ards, Clearing the Air About Cigarettes: Will Advertisers’ Rights Go Up in Smoke?, 19 PAC. L.J. 1, 
31 (1987) (Posadas was not merely “wrongly decided,” but “poorly decided”); Ronald D. Rotunda, 
The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Commercial Speech and State 
Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L. REV. 917, 928 (1987) (concluding that “[i]f the 
case really means that states can ban advertising in an effort to dampen demand for a legally 
offered product, then Posadas is another example of unprincipled decision-making”); The Su-
preme Court, 1995 Term, Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 216, 222 (1996) [hereinafter Leading 
Cases] (Posadas’s reasoning was “misguided”); Symposium, Commercial Free Speech in the Mar-
ketplace of Ideas, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 739 (1989) (comments of Floyd Abrams) (disagreeing 
with argument “that because casino gambling could be banned, it therefore followed that the 
advertising of it could be banned” and stating that argument “is, simply and totally, an inversion 
of first amendment theory . . . [and] plain wrong”); id. at 731 (comments of C. Michael Carvin) 
(“The overwhelming response of the commentators and scholars was to denounce [Rehnquist’s 
use of the greater/lesser] as plainly inconsistent with basic first amendment jurisprudence . . . .”); 
William Van Alstyne, Quo Vadis, Posadas?, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 505, 514-28 (1998); Brian J. Wa-
ters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of 
the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1639 (1997) (de-
scribing Posadas as “infamous”). Additional commentaries that also reject Posadas’s use of the 
greater/lesser, albeit somewhat less ardently, include ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 900-01 (1997); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Profes-
sional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 857-
58 (1999); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 
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In only a short time, the Court came around to the prevailing 
scholarly view. It took a first step in that direction in the 1995 case 
of Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., which involved a challenge to a fed-
eral statute that, in order to prevent strength wars, prohibited beer 
labels from displaying the beer’s alcohol content.23 Two years ear-
lier, in a challenge to federal statutes that prohibited broadcast of 
lottery advertising by radio broadcasters licensed to nonlottery 
states, the Court had pointedly refrained from addressing the issue. 
Having concluded that the statute passed the Central Hudson test, 
the Court in the earlier case, United States v. Edge Broadcasting 
Co., had deemed it unnecessary to decide whether “the greater 
power to prohibit gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to 
ban its advertisement.”24 In Coors Brewing, in contrast, a unani-
mous Court determined that the labeling ban failed Central Hud-
son.25 Relying on Edge Broadcasting, the government urged that the 
labeling ban should survive on the strength of Posadas notwith-
standing Central Hudson. But the Court rejected this contention in 
a footnote, explaining merely that, although “Posadas did state that 
the Puerto Rico Government could ban promotional advertising of 
casino gambling because it could have prohibited gambling alto-
gether . . . the Court reached this argument only after it had al-
ready found that the state regulation survived the Central Hudson 
test.”26 
The clear implication that the greater/lesser reasoning in 
Posadas was not only an alternative ground, but an incorrect one as 
well, was reinforced the following year in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, in which the Court again unanimously invalidated a 
commercial speech regulation.27 The Court’s decision striking down 
a forty-year-old Rhode Island law that prohibited the advertisement 
of retail prices for alcoholic beverages is known mostly for the wide 
diversity of views it expressed regarding the proper test for regula-
                                                                                                                       
627, 648-49 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Pur-
chasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1173 (1999); 
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 
344-45 (1991); and David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 
CAL. L. REV. 359, 436-39 (1990). 
23. 514 U.S. 476, 478-81 (1995). 
24. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 (1993). 
25. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 483-91. Justice Stevens agreed with this conclusion but con-
curred separately to opine that the “commercial speech doctrine” was inapplicable because the 
regulation was not animated by concerns related “to the special character of commercial speech,” 
and therefore should fail any standard of review. Id. at 491-92 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
26. Id. at 482 n.2. 
27. 517 U.S. 484, 515-16 (1996). 
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tions of commercial speech.28 Just as interestingly, though, Justice 
Stevens took the opportunity to address the “elegant question” he 
had posed a decade earlier. Formally writing only for himself and 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, Stevens explained “that 
the ‘greater-includes-the-lesser’ argument should be rejected for the 
. . . important reason that it is inconsistent with both logic and 
well-settled doctrine.”29 He concluded that “the entire Court appar-
ently now agrees [that] the statements in the Posadas opinion [re-
garding the greater/lesser analysis] are no longer persuasive.”30 
Although this statement came in a part of the principal opin-
ion that only three other Justices formally joined, it is consistent 
with both Coors Brewing and the fact that no other opinion in 44 
Liquormart even addressed the greater/lesser argument—an argu-
ment which, if correct, would have required upholding the chal-
lenged regulation. Accordingly, lower courts and commentators 
writing in the wake of 44 Liquormart generally agreed that the 
greater/lesser doctrine was now dead.31  
Any doubts that may have remained were put to rest by two 
commercial speech cases decided the very last week of the 2000 
Term.32 One case, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,33 involved chal-
                                                                                                                       
28. In a part of the principal opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, Justice Ste-
vens intimated that prohibitions against truthful, nonmisleading advertising for a lawful product 
warranted strict scrutiny or something close to it. Id. at 501-04. In response, Justice O’Connor, 
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Souter and Breyer, concurred specifically to remark on 
the inappropriateness of addressing “whether the test we have employed since Central Hudson 
should be displaced.” Id. at 532 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Also without passing on the general 
validity of Central Hudson, Justice Thomas concurred to argue that a governmental interest in 
“keep[ing] legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the 
marketplace . . . is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of ‘commercial’ speech 
than it can justify regulation of ‘noncommercial speech.’ ” Id. at 518, 523 n.5 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Scalia wrote separately to express sympathy with Justice Thomas’s “discomfort” 
with Central Hudson, as well as doubt that, absent more briefing regarding historical practice, 
the Court had “the wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong—or at least the wherewithal to 
say what ought to replace it.” Id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a more detailed examina-
tion of 44 Liquormart, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The 
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123. 
29. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511. 
30. Id. at 513.  
31. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 341 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (Politz, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); Halberstam, supra note 22, at 785 
n.58; Merrill, supra note 22, at 1173-75; Redish, supra note 22, at 599-604; Van Alstyne, supra 
note 22, at 521-28; Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 222. 
32. Lorillard Tobacco bolstered the already growing perception that conservatives are more 
protective of commercial speech than are the liberals. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Figures of 
Speech, A.B.A. J. Aug. 2001, at 30, 31 (citing statements by Professor Eugene Volokh). For previ-
ous statements, see, for example, David G. Savage, The Shifting Sands of Free Speech, A.B.A. J., 
Dec. 1996, at 42, 42-44 (1996); Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech 
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lenges to Massachusetts restrictions on tobacco advertising and 
therefore fell naturally within a family of commercial speech cases 
including Posadas, Edge Broadcasting, Coors Brewing, and 44 Li-
quormart. Although the Court divided on the constitutionality of 
various state regulations of smokeless tobacco and cigar advertis-
ing, not a single Justice went so far as even to mention the 
greater/lesser thesis, if only to rebut it.34  
That the greater/lesser approach has fallen out of the range 
of legitimate legal argument was dramatically reinforced by the 
2000 Term’s second major commercial speech decision, United 
States v. United Foods, Inc.35 Four years earlier, in Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliot, a 5-4 Court had upheld a federal rule that, 
as part of an elaborate scheme regulating the growing and market-
ing of California tree fruits, compelled growers, handlers, and proc-
essors to pay for generic advertising of the California fruits.36 
United Foods involved a similar forced assessment imposed on 
mushroom producers. This time, however, the compulsory advertis-
ing rule was not part of a more comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
One might think the constitutionality of the latter rule would follow 
a fortiori from the constitutionality of the former. The greater 
power to enact a system of regulation that includes minimum-price 
and maximum-output rules in addition to compelling payments for 
generic advertising would include the lesser power to enact a less 
intrusive scheme that included only the compelled payments for 
generic advertising. Instead, the United Foods Court struck down 
the advertising rule as a violation of mushroom growers’ rights of 
commercial speech. The decision was six to three, Justices Stevens 
and Kennedy from the Glickman majority now joining the Glickman 
dissenters. Remarkably, though, neither Justice expressed doubt 
about his vote in the earlier case. Instead, in a striking inversion of 
                                                                                                                       
Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 941-42 (1993). As Posadas demonstrates, it was not always 
thus. 
33. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
34. The Court first held, 5-4, that Massachusetts’s regulations of cigarette advertising were 
preempted by federal law. Id. at 540-51. A majority also held that, although the state’s regula-
tions of advertising for smokeless tobacco and cigars were not preempted, they violated the First 
Amendment. Id. at 566-67 (O’Connor, J.) (invalidating regulations under Central Hudson); id. at 
570-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 572-73 (Thomas, J., concurring) (invalidating regulations 
under strict scrutiny). The dissenters would have held the regulations not preempted and would 
have remanded for trial on the question whether the advertising regulations satisfied Central 
Hudson’s fourth prong. Id. at 590-91 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 590 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
35. 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
36. 521 U.S. 457, 474-77 (1997). 
2002] COMMERCIAL SPEECH 701 
the greater/lesser doctrine, each viewed the government’s failure to 
impose the additional onerous restrictions on the mushroom grow-
ers that it had imposed on the fruit growers as a constitutionally 
aggravating factor.37 
In sum, then, Posadas’s much-derided greater/lesser reason-
ing appears to have no hold on the present Court. Unfortunately, 
though, its death has not put commercial speech doctrine on a more 
secure footing. To the contrary, the prevailing view today, as it has 
been for decades, is that the Court’s commercial speech jurispru-
dence is confused and unstable.38  
This Article arises from a belief that the present unsatisfac-
tory status of commercial speech doctrine and the flat rejection of 
the greater/lesser approach are related—in particular that the doc-
trine is in disarray largely because the Court and its commentators 
have been far too quick to dismiss the instinct, as applied to regula-
tions of commercial advertising, that the greater does include the 
lesser. To be sure, this is not a logically valid deduction. But that 
does not mean it has no value as an inference. This Article will ar-
gue that, properly understood, it has an important role to play in 
the jurisprudence of commercial speech. Each of these two separate 
qualifications is important. First, the greater/lesser thesis has a 
role to play only when we correctly identify precisely what is the 
greater power, and what is the lesser. Second, even when properly 
understood, the greater/lesser argument has only a role to play; it is 
not dispositive. In other words, the critics of Posadas have erred in 
frequently misconstruing precisely what lesser power Posadas said 
flowed from the supposedly “greater power” to ban the commercial 
activity, whereas the Posadas majority erred in assuming that that 
lesser power necessarily followed. 
The plan of this Article is as follows. Part I develops the af-
firmative case for Posadas. That is, it aims to show that the 
greater-includes-the-lesser intuition has substantial force as a jus-
tification for a ban on casino advertising. Part II reviews the most 
common objections to the Court’s use of the greater/lesser rationale 
in Posadas and shows that they do not carry the weight the critics 
have claimed for them. Although the reasoning then-Justice 
Rehnquist explicitly employed is too broad—any implication that a 
“greater” power to ban an activity necessarily entails a “lesser” 
power to permit that activity while banning advertisements of it is 
false—the familiar criticisms do not substantially undermine the 
                                                                                                                       
37. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 414-16 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
38. See infra note 240; see also supra note 28 (noting fractured opinions in 44 Liquormart). 
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twin judgments that seemingly form the core of the majority’s invo-
cation of the greater/lesser argument. Those twin judgments are 
first, that the advertising ban was constitutional, and second, that 
it was constitutional in substantial part because Puerto Rico could 
have prohibited casino gambling. These two statements are proba-
bly true. 
Having said enough to throw common wisdom about the 
greater/lesser approach into doubt, the Article pauses in Part III to 
identify the different sets of interests that speech regulations, 
“commercial” or otherwise, implicate—namely, interests of the 
speaker, the audience, and the citizenry. Although I think this is 
uncontroversial, making these interests explicit helps to structure 
the analysis. The task, I suggest, is to examine how the advertising 
ban at issue in Posadas affects these three sets of interests. 
Speaker interests are considered first, in Part IV. The pri-
mary complaint a speaker might have is that he is coerced not to 
speak (or to speak). When the speech regulation is the lesser por-
tion of a greater power to regulate or prohibit the speaker’s con-
duct, however, it will often turn out not to be coercive. Contrary to 
the greater/lesser approach’s most intemperate critics, that is a 
meaningful conclusion.  
Contrary to its most uncritical supporters, however, it is not 
dispositive, because the fact that a given speech regulation is not 
coercive does not resolve whether it nonetheless violates constitu-
tional interests held by the speaker’s intended audience or by the 
citizenry as a whole. To simplify a bit, audience interests are chiefly 
measured on the dimension of regulatory effects: the audience’s 
concern lies with how the governmental action affects the amount 
and character of communication to which they are exposed. In con-
trast, citizen interests are most prominently captured on the di-
mension of purpose: the systemic concern is that the government 
not act in order to suppress truthful information. Part V provides 
reasons why the advertising ban at issue in Posadas should not be 
held unconstitutional by reason of its effects, and Part VI does the 
same with respect to its purposes. 
Part VII puts these pieces together to sketch out one way 
that doctrine could respond to these diverse interests—speaker, au-
dience, and citizenry—and the corresponding three dimensions of 
constitutional violation—means, effects, and purposes. Having 
started by focusing on Posadas and the greater/lesser reasoning, 
this last part advances a surprising conclusion. A principal criti-
cism of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence is 
that there exists no coherent way to define the category of “com-
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mercial speech” that, under Central Hudson, receives a reduced 
level of constitutional protection. Often, the conclusion is supposed 
to follow that restrictions of commercial speech should receive strict 
scrutiny, which would most often prove fatal. Part VII shows how a 
more nuanced, multipart test for content-based regulations of 
speech can result in significant latitude for government regulation 
of (some sorts of) commercial speech, even without requiring differ-
ent doctrinal tracks. Put another way, if the argument of this Arti-
cle is on target,39 it turns out that Posadas is the key, not just to 
understanding any so-called vice exception to commercial speech 
jurisprudence,40 but also to a wholesale abandonment of any sepa-
rate doctrine for “commercial speech,” married to a significant revi-
sion of the free speech doctrine that would then generally apply to 
commercial and noncommercial speech alike. Under that revision, 
regulations of speech that is related to a speaker’s commercial in-
terests would tend to face a less stringent burden of justification 
than regulations of speech that is not similarly related to the 
speaker’s commercial interests. This disparity would arise, how-
ever, not because the doctrine assigns different value judgments to 
the two different sorts of speech, but because the regulations of the 
two sorts of speech will tend to assume different structures in ways 
made relevant by the logic of constitutional reasoning. 
Due to the present political salience of the issue, one impli-
cation deserves mention up front: this revised doctrine would grant 
government broad constitutional authority to regulate, and even 
ban, advertising for tobacco products.41 That is not a telos to which 
this partial rehabilitation of the greater/lesser thesis is directed. 
But it is a consequence—one that should be taken seriously. 
I. POSADAS AND THE GREATER/LESSER ANALYSIS:               
THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE 
Because the greater/lesser reasoning in Posadas is so widely, 
even fervently, condemned,42 we are likely to gain a fresh perspec-
tive by striving to understand it sympathetically at the outset. This 
part develops that sympathetic reading. Its objective is to examine 
what can be said, not for the argument that the greater includes the 
                                                                                                                       
39. As will become apparent, one can accept this predicate without agreeing that, all things 
considered, Posadas was rightly decided. 
40. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513-14 (1996) (principal 
opinion) (rejecting a “vice” exception).  
41. See infra text accompanying notes 289-94. 
42. See supra note 22. 
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lesser as some abstract proposition of logic or law, but rather for its 
specific deployment in Posadas as a route to the conclusion that 
Puerto Rico’s ban on casino advertising was constitutionally per-
missible. It is a testament to the surface plausibility of Rehnquist’s 
intuition that the task is not difficult.43  
Although the Court did announce (perhaps too cavalierly) 
that “the greater power to completely ban casino gambling neces-
sarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gam-
bling,”44 that was not the entirety of its reasoning. Seeking to dis-
tinguish previous cases in which the Court had struck down regula-
tions banning the advertising of condoms45 and abortion services,46 
the majority explained further: 
[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibi-
tion of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the 
less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through re-
strictions on advertising. It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners 
such as appellant to gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise their 
casinos to the residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the legislature into 
banning casino gambling by residents altogether. It would just as surely be a 
strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the author-
ity to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to 
forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on 
behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand.47 
As William Van Alstyne observed in a recent essay highly 
critical of Posadas, “[t]he straightforward idea here . . . might be 
thought to be so obvious, as hardly to be worth spelling out.”48 
Nonetheless, Van Alstyne did proceed to spell it out, and did so in 
                                                                                                                       
43. As Justice Stevens emphasized in his dissent, see supra text accompanying note 17, the 
actual Puerto Rico advertising ban raised concerns about vagueness, prior restraint, and dis-
crimination against Puerto Rico residents that a flat ban on casino advertising might not. Posa-
das de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 359-63 (1986). To simplify discussion, the 
analysis that follows proceeds as though the regulation barred all casino advertising, or even all 
domestic casino advertising. Cf. id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven assuming that ap-
pellee will now enforce [the regulations] in a nonarbitrary manner, I do not believe that Puerto 
Rico constitutionally may suppress truthful commercial speech in order to discourage its resi-
dents from engaging in lawful activity.”). My undefended intuitions, though, are that the prior 
restraint and discrimination arguments are red herrings, and that worries about vagueness are 
legitimate, though almost certainly surmountable. 
44. Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 345-46. 
45. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977). 
46. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821-30 (1975). 
47. Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 346. 
48. Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 516. Although this Article cites to Van Alstyne’s essay at 
various points, the readers should be aware that the published version of that essay contains 
several errors in editing. A corrected version of the essay is available from Professor Van Al-
styne. 
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terms cogent enough to warrant being quoted at length. “[N]o one,” 
he explained,  
is forced to get into the casino trade . . . and insofar as one understands that the 
legislature closely regulates this particular (prohibitable) trade in a certain way 
(including, as here, by providing that no advertising thereof is permitted by or on 
behalf of one who engages in that trade), one may conclude that, in light of the re-
striction, it is not worthwhile, that is, that one would be better off pursuing some 
other line of business (namely, one not subject to this particular restraint). And so 
one is perfectly free to do. What one may not do, however, is to suppose that one 
may take up the business of the casino trade, and then simply disregard one of the 
clearest restrictions of all: namely, that while engaged in this trade, one will ab-
stain from all advertising related thereto. Given that this is a business the legisla-
ture could forbid outright, if one nevertheless wants to pursue what one thinks 
may well be a lucrative business notwithstanding the restrictions, one is welcome 
to do so. But when, as here, it is a business the legislature could altogether forbid, 
to quote Justice Rehnquist (from still a different case), “a litigant in the position of 
the appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.”49 
Maybe the argument ultimately fails, as Van Alstyne himself 
argues.50 But it would be ungenerous, perhaps disingenuous, to 
deny that Rehnquist has made out a rather plausible prima facie 
case. As another critic of the greater/lesser reasoning acknowledged 
in a pre-Posadas article, “[t]he durability of the argument that the 
greater includes the lesser is a tribute to its prima facie intuitive 
appeal. Even defenders of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
have been apologetic in their criticism of the argument.”51  
                                                                                                                       
49. Id. at 516-17 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opin-
ion)). Rehnquist’s position in Arnett was that government was not obligated to provide any pro-
cedural due process protections for public employees beyond the procedures that it established 
when creating the job at issue. 416 U.S. at 163-64. A majority of the Justices rejected that analy-
sis in Arnett itself and formally repudiated it in Cleveland Board of Education. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 540-48 (1985). 
50. Although Van Alstyne dismisses the greater/lesser as employed in Posadas, he had en-
dorsed a different instantiation of the argument elsewhere. The case of City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance that 
barred commercial newsracks while permitting noncommercial ones. A majority of the Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Stevens, applied the Central Hudson test and held the policy unconstitu-
tional. See id. at 416-31. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, objecting that the decision “places 
the city in the position of having to decide between restricting more speech—fully protected 
speech—and allowing the proliferation of newsracks on its street corners to continue unabated. 
It scarcely seems logical that the First Amendment compels such a result.” Id. at 445 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). Van Alstyne agreed with the dissent, noting that “[i]t not only ‘scarcely seems 
logical,’ but scarcely seems credible (i.e., plausible).” William Van Alstyne, Essay, Remembering 
Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1642 
n.24 (1996). To be sure, Van Alstyne’s acceptance of Rehnquist’s use of the greater/lesser in Dis-
covery Network is not logically incompatible with his rejection of Rehnquist’s use of the 
greater/lesser in Posadas. The two forms of the greater/lesser are not the same. See infra note 
130. Nonetheless, one would have hoped for some mention of the precise grounds upon which 
Van Alstyne would effect the reconciliation. 
51. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (1984). Professor Kreimer goes on to argue that “[s]uch 
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Indeed, the case for Posadas becomes more plausible still 
once one considers the history behind the 1948 legislation that si-
multaneously legalized casino gambling in Puerto Rico and barred 
its advertisement to local audiences.52 As it happened, various 
Puerto Rico interests, including hoteliers and others in the tourist 
industry, had lobbied strenuously for the legalization of casino 
gambling for decades. During this time polls continually reflected 
that a substantial majority of Puerto Ricans opposed casino legali-
zation for a variety of reasons. Some opponents, for example, ex-
pressed fear that casinos would bring organized crime, prostitution, 
and other evils in their wake. Others, believing that gambling was 
simply immoral, refused to concede that the fact that Puerto Rico 
already permitted some of its forms justified making the affirma-
tive decision to cater further to this vice. Still others argued that 
casino gambling was worse than traditional Puerto Rican forms of 
gambling, such as cockfighting, because they believed it would 
prove seductive to more people and more likely to be addictive. 
They also speculated that the actual mechanics of casino gambling 
made it especially easy for players to lose large sums of money in 
short periods of time. Remaining critics objected that casinos would 
siphon off gambling dollars that otherwise would be spent on the 
official lottery for the benefit of public schools. Faced with this 
strong and consistent opposition, the casino movement failed ever 
to garner more than limited legislative support. 
In 1947, however, the Puerto Rico Hoteliers Association con-
ceived the idea of promising not to engage in any domestic casino 
advertising if casinos were legalized. Working through sympathetic 
sponsors in the legislature, they drafted a bill that would permit 
applicants to operate gambling casinos on the condition that they 
                                                                                                                       
deference is unwarranted, for . . . the argument in defense of government’s unbridled prerogative 
to condition allocations is deeply flawed.” Id. Note, though, that at this stage we need not exam-
ine whether government’s power to condition benefits that it may withhold is “unbridled,” for 
nothing depends upon that being true. Our narrow concern here is whether greater-includes-the-
lesser reasoning has argumentative weight on the facts of Posadas. In that respect, it is worth 
reconsidering views expressed by Laurence Tribe. Although Professor Tribe was unambiguously 
critical of Posadas’s use of the greater/lesser, see TRIBE, supra note 22, at 902-04, he did observe 
in a footnote that “the proposition that, where a state has determined that an activity is intrinsi-
cally harmful and should be stopped but would be too impractical or intrusive on privacy to ban 
altogether, the state may choose to ban advertising that would directly encourage the activity to 
go on” constitutes a “plausible basis for reconciling Posadas” with Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (“Virginia Pharmacy”), an 
earlier case that had invalidated a state ban on the advertising of pharmaceutical prices. See id. 
at 904 n.92; see also Symposium, supra note 22, at 735 (comments of C. Michael Carvin). 
52. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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not advertise (and so long as they satisfied various other eligibility 
criteria). At the same time, associations representing the tourism 
industry mounted a media blitz designed to sway public opinion. 
The theme was to concede legitimacy to many of the expressed con-
cerns, while urging that the advertising ban would effectively meet 
them. The media campaign proved successful, tipping popular sup-
port in favor of casino legalization and winning the bill a bare ma-
jority of votes in the Puerto Rico legislature. This bill became the 
law challenged over thirty years later in Posadas. 
In truth, I have made up this story. But it could have hap-
pened like this. For all I know, perhaps it did.53 Whether historical 
fact or fancy, however, merely being able to imagine a process like 
this should reinforce the intuition that Puerto Rico’s power to ban 
casinos entirely ought to include the power to permit them on the 
condition that they not advertise. For one thing, the potentially 
Pyrrhic character of the outcome the casino sought in Posadas ap-
pears rather more profound than the Court conveyed. The Puerto 
Rico legislature might choose, not just to “ban[ ] casino gambling by 
residents altogether,” but to order the casinos to close shop com-
pletely.54 And while public choice theorists might suspect that, dec-
ades into the casino experiment, this is not really a live option, it 
would be a bizarre doctrine under which the casino operators’ con-
stitutional claims grow in strength in proportion to the amount of 
time they wait to press them.55 Finally, no matter what the Puerto 
Rico legislature’s response, striking down the advertising restric-
tions could well prove Pyrrhic for casino interests elsewhere, for the 
                                                                                                                       
53. And, in fairness, whether it did might be relevant to a full-bore equitable analysis—at 
least if the complaining casino had been party to the original deal. It is not clear, though, that a 
sensible constitutional doctrine designed to cover a large number of commercial speech cases 
ought to depend upon the results of a legislative history inquiry of this sort. Note, accordingly, 
that the prominent criticisms of Posadas examined in Part II would appear to dismiss this his-
tory, even if true, as constitutionally irrelevant. 
54. Donald Lively seems to misunderstand the Court’s point when objecting that its refer-
ence to Pyrrhic victories “is misleading” because “[t]he first amendment has never been read to 
safeguard advertisement of an illegal activity or false or misleading expression.” Lively, supra 
note 22, at 299 n.64. 
55. Even if the critical factor is not the passage of time per se, but rather a change in pre-
diction due to the entrenchment that comes as a consequence of time’s passage, much more needs 
to be said in order to establish that predictions concerning how the government would in fact 
respond to disallowance of the advertising restriction are constitutionally significant. Unconsti-
tutional conditions theories that turn on “predictive baselines,” see Kreimer, supra note 51, at 
1351-96; Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 289, 311-17 (1989), have generally been thought inadequate. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coer-
cion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 13-14 
(2001) (citing criticisms); id. at 46 n.168 (explaining how my approach to coercion compares to 
the predictive-baseline analysis). 
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result would be to preempt their efforts in other noncasino states to 
propose just this sort of compromise to avoid an outcome—the con-
tinued prohibition of casino gambling—that all relevant parties 
might conceivably agree is socially suboptimal. Rejecting the 
greater/lesser rationale, in other words, would have had the effect 
of making a casino’s First Amendment right to advertise effectively 
unwaivable: any purported waiver of a right to advertise as a condi-
tion for receiving a casino license would be unenforceable. To be 
sure, that could be the correct reading. But it would be that out-
come—not the one Rehnquist engineered—which should strike us 
as the more remarkable. 
II. THREE COMMON OBJECTIONS 
Part I demonstrated that the greater-includes-the-lesser in-
tuition has enough force as applied to the facts of Posadas to shift 
the argumentative burden to its critics. Given all the scorn heaped 
upon that case, one might suppose that its critics have marshaled 
numerous and powerful counterarguments. In fact, almost all of the 
criticisms in the scholarly literature fall into one of two categories:56 
first, that the greater/lesser reasoning does not apply because a 
speech ban is actually more intrusive than the corresponding con-
duct ban; and second, that the greater/lesser reasoning proves too 
much, for it would allow the state to ban all commercial advertis-
ing. 
This part examines each of these arguments. Before doing so, 
though, it briefly addresses another objection frequently leveled 
                                                                                                                       
56. A third common charge is that the majority misapplied Central Hudson—the principal 
complaint Justice Brennan had voiced in dissent. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text; 
see, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 411, 488-91 (1992); Kurland, supra note 18, at 6-12; Lively, supra note 22, at 300-
03; Richards, supra note 22, at 23-29; Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architec-
ture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 n.1 (1988); Albert P. Mauro, Jr., 
Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate 
Sheep’s Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931 passim (1992). But see John M. Blim, Comment, Free 
Speech and Health Claims Under the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990: Applying 
a Rehabilitated Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 733, 751-57 
(1994) (concluding that Posadas is largely consistent with Cental Hudson). I will put this charge 
aside because its force depends upon assuming what, in a very real sense, is precisely in issue—
namely, whether Central Hudson is the appropriate test for regulations of commercial advertis-
ing. Put another way, we have just seen that Posadas’s use of the greater/lesser has strong intui-
tive force. If we cannot show why the greater/lesser argument fails for reasons that do not de-
pend upon acceptance of contingent Court-created doctrine (and doctrine of recent vintage at 
that), then any inconsistency between the result in Posadas and the Central Hudson test is more 
likely to indict the latter than the former. 
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against greater/lesser reasoning, even though it has not played a 
prominent role in the literature on Posadas in particular. The con-
tention, in short, is that the greater includes the lesser fails deduc-
tively: greater powers do not always include the lesser. This part 
demonstrates that, alone or collectively, these criticisms utterly fail 
to demonstrate that Posadas erred in concluding that the 
greater/lesser analysis warrants upholding the ban on casino adver-
tising. 
A. The Greater Does Not Necessarily Include the Lesser 
Consider first the Court’s assertion that “the greater power 
to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser 
power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”57 As Brooks Fuden-
berg has observed, it is not clear what to make of this claim, for it 
may be an extremely narrow argument i.e., one specific power A includes another 
specific power B. To the extent the argument is case-specific (this specific power 
includes this other specific power), it is difficult to refute by either analogy or gen-
eral principles (to show that Q does not include R does not disprove a claim that S 
includes T). To the same extent, however, the argument is then “tautological.” 
(That is, if Q includes R because I say it does, and not for any reasons broader 
than that, my argument lacks substance.)58 
For this reason, “[t]he hard questions concern an argument meant 
as something broader than that, and yet less broad than ‘all powers 
to deny include all powers to condition.’ ”59  
The most plausible reading, I think, is something like this: 
(1) greater powers necessarily include lesser powers; 
(2) the power to ban casinos is greater than the power to ban 
advertising of casinos; 
(3) therefore, the power to ban casinos includes the power to 
ban advertising of casinos. 
The conclusion follows from the premises. Therefore, if this is the 
implicit structure of Rehnquist’s argument, a critic is compelled to 
deny either premise (1), or premise (2), or both. 
The obvious move is to deny the major premise. And, in fact, 
the logical invalidity of the claim that greater powers necessarily 
                                                                                                                       
57. See supra text accompanying note 9 (emphasis added). 
58. Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability 
Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 435 n.245 (1995). Much of my argument in this section draws 
on Fudenberg’s astute analysis. See id. at 432-41. 
59. Id. at 435 n.245. 
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entail lesser ones has long been established.60 But, as many com-
mentators have remarked, so what? Consider John Garvey’s argu-
ment designed to illustrate that the deduction fails: “If I can lift 100 
pounds, it does not logically follow that I can lift fifty pounds. (Per-
haps my muscles only respond to big challenges.)” This is true but, 
as Garvey noted, “not very satisfactory.”61 Imagine that, having just 
seen me move a heavy sofa, you ask for my assistance in moving a 
chair. Were I to object that your request was predicated on a logi-
cally invalid inference, you’d no doubt think me a jackass: in as-
suming I had the power to help, you were not relying on logical de-
duction, but on your experience of how the world (including human 
physical capacities) tends to work. And if I then refused, I venture 
you would feel pretty confident in attributing my failure to help to 
unwillingness, not inability. 
The point, of course, is that Rehnquist does not need the 
claim of necessity.62 As Justice Holmes, one of the great judicial 
proponents of the greater/lesser approach,63 said when upholding a 
state law that, instead of prohibiting the sale of alcohol statewide, 
left the issue for local determination under procedures that favored 
prohibitionists: “It is true that the greater does not always include 
the less. . . . But in general the rule holds true, and it does here.”64 
Following Holmes, Rehnquist could reformulate the syllogism as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                       
60. The deduction was first disproved in Thomas Reed Powell, The Right to Work for the 
State, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 99, 106-12 (1916). Other worthwhile contributions to the literature 
include, in addition to those otherwise cited in this section, Michael Herz, Justice Byron White 
and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 238-49; Robert M. 
O’Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REV. 443, 
456-63 (1966); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1428-56 (1989); Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on 
the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 745-53 (1981); Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric 
of “Rights,” 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 1010-18 (1986); and John D. French, Comment, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234, 236-48 (1961). 
61. John H. Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of Government, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209, 
215-16 (1989). 
62. See Fudenberg, supra note 58, at 434 & n.244. 
63. Holmes’s attraction to this argument is discussed in Kreimer, supra note 51, at 1306-14 
and Sullivan, supra note  60, at 1459-60. 
64. Rippey v. Texas, 193 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1904); see also United States v. O’Neil, 11 F.3d 
292, 296 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The principle that the grant of a greater power includes the grant of a 
lesser power is a bit of common sense that has been recognized in virtually every legal code from 
time immemorial.”); Kreimer, supra note 51, at 1311 n.54 (“Although . . . writers have demon-
strated that the greater and lesser argument fails deductively, the argument is not left without 
any force; it may work inductively or as a persuasive analogy. Such forms of reasoning, though 
invalid in formal logic, predominate in legal and practical argument.”). 
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(1') there is a strong presumption that a greater power in-
cludes its lesser powers; 
(2) the power to ban casinos is greater than the power to ban 
advertising of casinos; 
(3') therefore, there is a strong presumption that the power to 
ban casinos includes the power to ban advertising of ca-
sinos. 
This syllogism, like the first, is logically valid. Moreover, it seems 
entirely consistent with the way we sought to rehabilitate Posadas 
in Part I, for that discussion did not seek to rely on logical deduc-
tion. That is, it did not endeavor to prove that the greater/lesser 
reasoning is always true or even ordinarily true. It simply demon-
strated that there is a strong intuition behind its use in Posadas.65  
Now, how is the critic to respond? Professor Garvey’s hypo-
thetical makes premise (1') look secure. Consequently, the critic has 
two options: to attack the conclusion by denying premise (2) (per-
haps the power to ban casinos is not greater than the power to ban 
their advertising), or to accept the conclusion but provide reasons 
why the presumption is overcome. Because talk of “greater” and 
“lesser” powers in this context is just metaphorical, however, these 
two moves amount to the same thing: the same reasons can be ad-
vanced for believing either that the conduct ban is not “greater” 
than the advertising ban in the relevant sense or that, although the 
conduct ban is greater, it does not “include” the advertising ban. All 
depends upon whether the reasons are persuasive. 
B. The Conduct Ban Is Not Less Intrusive 
The first effort to rebut the Posadas majority’s use of the 
greater/lesser analysis—once that argument is softened to abandon 
claims of logical necessity—comes from Justice Brennan’s Posadas 
dissent. Although Brennan concentrated his fire on the majority’s 
application of the Central Hudson test, he did not entirely ignore 
the majority’s use of the greater includes the lesser. Responding 
directly to the pivotal passage quoted earlier,66 he disagreed “that a 
ban on casino advertising is ‘less intrusive’ than an outright prohi-
bition of such activity. . . . Thus, the ‘constitutional doctrine’ which 
                                                                                                                       
65. The strategy of this Article, then, follows that set forth in Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too 
Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1205-08 
(1988), where Professor Lowenstein advocates an inductive, rather than deductive, approach to 
assessing the Court’s commercial speech cases. 
66. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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bans Puerto Rico from banning advertisements concerning lawful 
casino gambling is not so strange a restraint—it is called the First 
Amendment.”67  
Influential commentators have approved this response.68 I 
find it rather too condensed to be helpful. After all, the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is notoriously vague. The ques-
tion is whether it should be interpreted to forbid states from ban-
ning advertising of an activity that they could prohibit. Without 
providing a reason why the advertising ban is not less intrusive 
than the corresponding conduct ban that does not depend merely 
upon citing the First Amendment itself, Brennan’s argument bor-
ders on the circular. 
The root idea behind Brennan’s somewhat cryptic charge, 
however, has been fleshed out by others. David Strauss, for exam-
ple, explains that  
a lie—and, by extension, a manipulative restriction on access to information—is a 
different kind of affront from outright coercion. . . . For the government to frus-
trate the desire to gamble . . . is different from the government manipulating the 
flow of information so that some people who would otherwise have developed that 
desire never do so. Which imposition is worse may depend on the facts of the spe-
cific case. But the restriction on information imposes a different kind of control on 
people. That is enough to answer the “greater includes the lesser” argument.69 
Well, yes and no. It is enough to answer the argument that 
the power to ban casino gambling necessarily includes the power to 
ban casino advertising.70 But that we already knew. It is not enough 
to answer the revised claim that the (greater) power to ban casinos 
should as a legal matter be held to include the (lesser) power to ban 
casino advertising. Strauss acknowledges, after all, that “[w]hich 
imposition is worse may depend on the facts of the specific case.” 
And on the facts of this case, that a ban on casino gambling would 
be the more intrusive seems very hard to deny. This is because a 
legislative prohibition of casino gambling is not truly an alternative 
to a legislative prohibition of casino advertising. Rather, as a prac-
                                                                                                                       
67. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 355 n.4 (1986) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). 
68. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 22, at 903 (commenting that Brennan’s retort “is only slight 
exaggeration”). 
69. Strauss, supra note 22, at 359-60. 
70. Cf. Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 387, 391-92 (1997) (“The most common critique of greater-includes-the-lesser 
arguments is that the two types of state action being compared are not a ‘greater’ and a ‘lesser’ 
variant of the same power but are qualitatively different powers.”). For thoughtful reactions to 
this sort of argument, see generally Fudenberg, supra note 58, at 448-54. 
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tical matter, actual imposition of a gambling ban encompasses an 
advertising ban.71 
There are two reasons. First, the Court has held that the 
First Amendment does not foreclose the government from prohibit-
ing advertisements for illegal activities,72 a premise with which 
even Posadas’s critics appear to agree.73 Second, even if the Court is 
wrong on this, there is little if any reason to advertise products or 
services that are illegal to provide.74 Consequently, if the state were 
to ban casino gambling, it would essentially ban gambling and ad-
vertising about gambling. So to insist that a ban on advertising is 
more intrusive than a ban on gambling is not to the point. Surely a 
ban on casino advertising is not more intrusive than a compound 
ban on casino gambling as well as casino advertising. Put in 
Strauss’s terms, the greater power to ban casino gambling both 
“frustrate[s] the desire to gamble . . . [and] manipulat[es] the flow 
of information so that some people who would otherwise have de-
veloped that desire never do so.”75 Therefore, the fact that advertis-
ing bans create a different type of intrusion does not provide a 
weighty reason against Rehnquist’s argument that, because Puerto 
Rico could ban casinos, considerations of type and magnitude of in-
trusion still suggest that Puerto Rico should be able to permit casi-
nos on the condition that they not advertise.  
                                                                                                                       
71. See, Fudenberg, supra note 58, at 460. Indeed, the whole of Fudenberg’s solution to the 
unconstitutional conditions problem follows from conceding that a casino advertising ban is 
“included” within a casino gambling ban in this sense, but then arguing that this inclusion is all 
but irrelevant for constitutional purposes: 
[T]he only answer is that, where the government seeks to separate powers 
along constitutionally suspect lines, heightened scrutiny should be re-
quired. . . . Thus, where the government seeks to separate the lesser power to 
deny speech rights (as in Posadas) . . . heightened scrutiny should be required. 
The focus is not on the greater power, nor on the lesser, but on the separation 
of that lesser. 
Id. at 463-64. Unfortunately, despite his very cogent criticisms of the greater/lesser literature, 
this proposed solution does not succeed. For one thing, Fudenberg’s solution has the ring of ipse 
dixit about it. This is his answer, but why the only one? More fundamentally, even as only one 
possible answer, it is not a very persuasive one, for the result would be heightened scrutiny in 
every “unconstitutional conditions” case—which would require a striking reconfiguration of con-
stitutional law. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 135-137. 
72. This is made clear by Central Hudson’s first prong. See supra note 7; see also, Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). 
73. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 436 n.4 (1993) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring).  
74. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 208 (1993). We can imagine 
counterexamples—a manufacturer might advertise an illegal product as part of a campaign to 
make it legal—but they would be the exception, not the rule. 
75. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
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As an implicit, perhaps subconscious, concession to this 
point, most critics of the greater/lesser argument as a justification 
for commercial speech regulation couch their counterargument 
slightly differently. Representative is the reasoning Justice Stevens 
advanced when, in 44 Liquormart, he came to revisit the question 
he had tabled in his Posadas concurrence: 
Although we do not dispute the proposition that greater powers include lesser 
ones, we fail to see how that syllogism requires the conclusion that the State’s 
power to regulate commercial activity is “greater” than its power to ban truthful, 
nonmisleading commercial speech. Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas, 
we think it quite clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more intru-
sive than banning conduct. As a venerable proverb teaches, it may prove more in-
jurious to prevent people from teaching others how to fish than to prevent fish 
from being sold. Similarly, a local ordinance banning bicycle lessons may curtail 
freedom far more than one that prohibits bicycle riding within city limits. In short, 
we reject the assumption that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than ac-
tions, or that logic somehow proves that the power to prohibit an activity is neces-
sarily “greater” than the power to suppress speech about it.76 
Justice Stevens was entirely right to “reject the assumption 
that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or 
that logic somehow proves that the power to prohibit an activity is 
necessarily ‘greater’ than the power to suppress speech about it.” 
And yet this rejection has no bearing on the propriety of the 
greater/lesser analysis as it applied to Posadas (or to 44 Liquormart 
for that matter). The governments of neither Puerto Rico nor Rhode 
Island had claimed that the greater power to ban an activity—
casino gambling or alcohol sales, respectively—entailed the lesser 
power to ban speech “about” that activity. They claimed that the 
greater power to ban the activity entailed the lesser power to per-
mit it on the condition that those who engage in the activity not 
advertise it. Consequently, it is wholly unwarranted to attribute to 
the Posadas majority “the assumption . . . that banning speech 
[cannot] prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.” What 
Rehnquist had characterized as less intrusive than a conduct ban 
was an advertising ban.77 He nowhere said that a ban on nonadver-
tising speech “about” casino gambling was less intrusive than a ban 
on the underlying conduct, nor did he so much as hint that such a 
ban would be constitutional for any other reason. Tellingly, Stevens 
was markedly more careful in his Posadas dissent than he was in 
                                                                                                                       
76. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996). Notice that, although he 
ultimately disagrees with the greater/lesser analysis of Posadas, in one respect Stevens conceded 
to that approach more validity than it deserves: as a “syllogism,” “the proposition that greater 
powers include lesser ones” fails. 
77. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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44 Liquormart. In the earlier opinion he more accurately described 
the “elegant question” that the majority answered (but that he did 
not) as “[w]hether a State may ban all advertising of an activity 
that it permits but could prohibit.”78 If that is the question—as in-
deed it was—then his ruminations about how speech in general can 
prove more valuable than conduct (and, concomitantly, on how bans 
on teaching people to fish or bicycle are more intrusive than bans 
on fishing or bicycling)79 do not entail any conclusions about the 
greater/lesser reasoning as it was implicated in Posadas. 
The importance of this point can hardly be overstated, for in 
devastating a form of the greater/lesser argument that relies on an 
entirely different “lesser power” than is contemplated in Posadas, 
Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart stands in 
crowded company. Martin Redish, one of the more dedicated Posa-
das detractors, puts his argument this way:  
The fallacy of the greater-includes-the-lesser rationale as a justification for speech 
suppression can be demonstrated by examining its conceivable application in the 
noncommercial speech context. Government clearly has the power to prohibit at-
tempts at violent overthrow; indeed, it actually has prohibited such conduct, by 
making it criminal. Yet the Supreme Court has nevertheless extended substantial 
First Amendment protection to the advocacy of violent overthrow. Under the 
greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning, of course, the government’s “greater” power 
to suppress the conduct of violent overthrow would logically subsume within it the 
supposedly “lesser” power to suppress advocacy of that conduct. Thus, First 
Amendment doctrine has long been shaped on a rejection of the overly simplistic 
logic of the greater includes the lesser. While one might seek to distinguish reli-
ance on this precept in the realm of commercial speech regulation from its use in 
the noncommercial speech context, no reason exists to believe that the logic is 
somehow more compelling as a rationale for commercial speech regulation than for 
noncommercial speech regulation. Either one proceeds on the assumption that 
government’s power to prohibit conduct subsumes within it the power to prohibit 
advocacy of that conduct, or one rejects such reasoning. The commercial nature of 
the expression in no way increases the force of this logic. Hence, attempts to rely 
on the greater-includes-the-lesser rationale are just as unacceptable as a justifica-
tion for commercial speech regulation as when used to rationalize noncommercial 
speech regulation.80  
Professor Redish might be right that “[e]ither one proceeds 
on the assumption that government’s power to prohibit conduct 
subsumes within it the power to prohibit advocacy of that conduct, 
                                                                                                                       
78. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
79. For different criticisms of these examples, see Merrill, supra note 22, at 1173 n.108. 
80. Redish, supra note 22, at 600. He advanced essentially the same point some years ear-
lier. See Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expres-
sion and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1441 (1990); see also 
Redish, supra note 22, at 616 (“[T]he Court in Posadas employed the highly dubious reasoning 
that the greater power to regulate conduct logically includes within it the lesser power to regu-
late advocacy of that conduct.”). 
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or one rejects such reasoning. The commercial nature of the expres-
sion in no way increases the force of this logic.” But as far as Posa-
das is concerned, he, like Justice Stevens, is attacking a straw-
man—the very same strawman assailed time and again in the lit-
erature.81 Suppose, for example, that Puerto Rico had barred the 
local news media from covering the casinos or from running editori-
als “advocating” that residents patronize the casinos because casino 
gambling is more humane than cockfighting and pays out at a 
higher rate than the lottery. Under the 44 Liquormart/Redish char-
acterization of Posadas, that Court would have upheld the ban as a 
lesser power entailed by the state’s greater power to prohibit casi-
nos entirely. But nothing in Posadas suggests that would be so. 
These arguments, therefore, have no bearing on the precise struc-
ture of the greater/lesser rationale as used in Posadas. Put another 
way, because Rehnquist was referring to one type of “speech about” 
an activity—namely, advertising—critics have not demonstrated 
that the power to regulate that type of speech does not follow from 
the power to regulate the activity in question just by showing that 
other types of speech about the activity cannot be regulated, so long 
                                                                                                                       
81. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 22, at 649 n.74 (contending, pace Posadas, that 
“it is not clear that the power to regulate a specific economic activity necessarily comprises the 
power to regulate speech about that activity”); Law, supra note 22, at 938 (“Justice Rehnquist’s 
claim that the state can suppress speech advocating conduct that it could prohibit is flatly incon-
sistent with a settled body of First Amendment jurisprudence that protects speech that advo-
cates prohibited actions.”); Neuborne, supra note 22, at 37 (“Justice Rehnquist’s argument in 
Posadas that it is a lesser intrusion into human behavior to ban speech about an activity than to 
ban the activity itself is wrong.”); cf. McGowan, supra note 22, at 437 (“The government’s 
‘greater’ power to control the conduct of elections and counting of ballots never would be con-
strued to include the ‘lesser’ power to regulate speech made in contemplation of an election.”). 
It is noteworthy that this error does not appear in an important early article—which pre-
dated and was cited by the Posadas majority, see 478 U.S. at 340 n.7—that had argued against 
extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin 
Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 
1 (1979). Like Rehnquist following them, the lesser power Jackson and Jeffries refer to, see id. at 
34-36, is only the power to ban “advertising,” not the power to ban other types of communication 
relating to the commercial transaction. Indeed, insofar as Jackson and Jeffries endorse the Su-
preme Court’s definition of advertising as “speech that does ‘no more than solicit a commercial 
transaction,’ ” id. at 34 (quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 762, which itself quoted Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)), the lesser power they envision may be even narrower than 
the lesser power I discuss here. In fact, I think that the structure of their argument—which 
depends upon the state’s power to prohibit solicitations for illegal transactions—requires that 
they do rely on that narrow definition. Consequently, what their use of the greater/lesser argu-
ment does not appear to accommodate, but mine does, is an outcome in which the state could bar 
Phillip Morris from running advertisements that declare, “Smoke Marlboros. Be Happy,” even 
though the clear and present danger test of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), would 
protect the company were it to urge instead, “Smoke Marijuana. Be Happy.” 
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as there exists a principled basis upon which to distinguish the two 
types of speech. If such a basis exists,82 then no argument advanced 
in this section rebuts the greater/lesser analysis as it was employed 
in Posadas.83 
C. The Greater/Lesser Analysis Produces Absurd Results 
Perhaps the most widely espoused criticism of Posadas relies 
upon a reductio ad absurdum advanced first, and most forcefully, by 
Professor Kurland. “If the activity was subject to government ban 
but was not banned,” he explained,  
advertising of that activity could be subject to ban, because advertising was only a 
lesser included part of the whole activity. The grossness of this perversion of First 
Amendment law may be realized through the recognition that, since the death of 
“substantive due process,” there is almost no area of economic activity which is not 
subject to government regulation. Presumably, then, under Posadas, there is no 
advertising that is not subject to government censorship.84 
To put the point another way, if the greater/lesser argument is 
right, it would entirely supplant Central Hudson as the test govern-
ing regulations of commercial advertising.85 Unpacked, the argu-
ment runs like this: 
(1) Posadas relies upon the proposition that the state should 
be allowed to ban advertising of whatever activity it could 
ban outright; 
(2) the state is allowed to ban almost any commercial activ-
ity; 
                                                                                                                       
82. As the coercion analysis undertaken in Part IV will make clear, it does. 
83. To reiterate, I am referring to the greater/lesser argument as used in Posadas with the 
qualification that any references to logical or legal necessity are dropped. See supra text accom-
panying notes 64-65. 
84. Kurland, supra note 18, at 13; see also, e.g., Fried, supra note 22, at 43 n.190 (“Because, 
after the rejection of Lochner, the legislature might forbid virtually any activity not independ-
ently covered by a constitutional protection (say, abortion services), the Posadas principle would 
have effectively eliminated the protection of commercial speech.”); Kozinski & Banner, supra 
note 22, at 649 n.74; Lively, supra note 22, at 300; Mary B. Nutt, Trends in First Amendment 
Protection of Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 205 (1988); Redish, supra note 80, at 
1441; Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 521 n.52; Steve Younger, Comment, Alcoholic Beverage 
Advertising on the Airwaves: Alternatives to a Ban or Counteradvertising, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1139, 
1172 (1987). 
85. See, e.g., P. Cameron DeVore, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company of Puerto 
Rico: The End of the Beginning, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 579, 580 (1988) (arguing that 
Posadas “simply cannot be squared with Central Hudson”); Rotunda, supra note 22, at 925 (argu-
ing that “Posadas cannot mean that the government has the power to ban all advertising for a 
product or service if the government also has the power to make the product or service illegal” 
because such a reading “would overrule Central Hudson”); Schauer, supra note 56, at 1182; The 
Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 173 (1986). 
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(3) therefore, Posadas would permit the state to ban adver-
tising of almost any commercial activity; 
(4) therefore, Posadas is wrong. 
But if this is the structure of the argument, at least three 
possible moves are open to those who would resist the final conclu-
sion. First, and most conspicuously, proponents of this argument 
tend to provide little reasoning to move from conclusion (3) to con-
clusion (4); that the consequence Posadas entails is absurd is as-
sumed to be self-evident. One response, then, is simply to affirm 
that, constitutionally speaking, “there is no advertising that is not 
subject to government censorship.” Indeed, for thirty years the Su-
preme Court construed the “freedom of speech” protected by the 
First Amendment as not to encompass commercial advertising.86 
Perhaps, in short, Central Hudson ought to be abandoned. That the 
states are constitutionally free to regulate or ban advertising does 
not, after all, mean that they would do so. 
Although this is the most obvious move, it is not one I prefer 
to endorse. I am willing to assume, arguendo, that conclusion (3) is 
unacceptable, and hence would, if true, entail conclusion (4). But 
conclusion (3) is itself vulnerable in two respects. First, the absurd-
ity of conclusion (3) might be attributable to premise (2). This is 
Richard Epstein’s position: “[T]his larger problem, and the horribles 
it suggests, would disappear if we returned to the older cases on 
occupational freedom requiring the state to show a strong justifica-
tion before banning any ordinary commercial activity.”87 In other 
words, that the second premise is an accurate statement of consti-
tutional doctrine at the turn of the twenty-first century does not 
compel one to accept that it is correct. 
The second route to challenging conclusion (3) runs through 
premise (1). There is no question that this premise finds support in 
language from the majority opinion. Rehnquist thought it “a 
strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legisla-
ture the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to 
the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for 
the product or activity through advertising.”88 But, of course, the 
result in Posadas does not depend upon such a doctrine, despite its 
                                                                                                                       
86. For a very brief review of the history, see infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text. 
More comprehensive histories of commercial speech jurisprudence appear in many places. A fine 
recent summary is Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 
MD. L. REV. 55, 58-72 (1999). 
87. EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 210. 
88. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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apparent strangeness, never holding true. It depends only upon the 
claim that, because the legislature is constitutionally authorized to 
ban casino gambling, it may permit the gambling but forbid the 
stimulation of demand for such gambling through advertising. To 
be sure, one might worry that there is no principled way to main-
tain this proposition without at the same time affirming the 
broader proposition—premise (1)—upon which Kurland’s reductio 
ad absurdum relies. But this worry ought not be overstated, for 
fact-bound intuitionism is central to the common law methodol-
ogy—including as employed by the Supreme Court in its develop-
ment of constitutional law.89 As an illustration (though not one I 
favor), one could avoid the force of the reductio by affirming the 
greater/lesser argument only with respect to activities that long-
standing American historical practice proscribed as vices.90 
In sum, notwithstanding the substantial scholarly literature 
attacking Posadas, it remains unclear why Puerto Rico’s constitu-
tional authority to ban casino gambling ought not to entail its au-
thority to permit gambling yet ban its advertising. If we take the 
greater/lesser intuition more seriously than scholarly commentators 
have tended to do, and if we take the limits on the greater/lesser 
reasoning more seriously than Posadas itself did—that is, if we 
take the holding of Posadas as seriously as critics have taken its 
dicta—perhaps we can articulate a sensible middle ground. Absent 
an explanation of why the greater never includes the lesser, a more 
satisfactory and nuanced constitutional rule would enable us to 
identify when a state’s constitutional power to ban an activity does 
entail the power to ban advertising about it, and when it does not.91  
III. ONE STEP BACK: IDENTIFYING FIRST                
AMENDMENT INTERESTS 
Before directly engaging that task, it will be helpful to think 
about why in the first place we should be concerned about govern-
                                                                                                                       
89. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999); Fudenberg, supra note 58, at 439 n.261; Lowenstein, supra note 65; 
Post, supra note 22, at 18. One lesson, of course, is that we ought not always demand that the 
Court announce the fully articulated rule under which the case falls. But, furthermore, if the 
Court does happen to announce a rule, we should not necessarily reject the result just because 
that rule proves too broad. This is why Part I focused on bolstering case-specific intuition, not 
abstract principles. 
90. This is suggested in, for example, Merrill, supra note 22, at 1174; EPSTEIN, supra note 
74, at 210, and intimated by Justice Scalia in his 44 Liquormart concurrence. See 517 U.S. at 
517. 
91. See Fudenberg, supra note 58, at 436-37. 
720 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:693 
 
ment regulations that affect speech. If there is a standard blueprint 
for commercial speech scholarship, it involves a critique of existing 
doctrine, followed by a review of the values the First Amendment is 
designed to serve—that is, the “theories of the First Amendment”—
and concluding by measuring “commercial speech” against them. 
Consistent with this (perfectly reasonable) strategy, scholars have 
argued, for instance, that because the First Amendment principally 
serves interests in self-government and individual self-fulfillment 
(of the speaker), commercial speech does not merit First Amend-
ment protection;92 or that precisely because the First Amendment 
serves interests in individual self-fulfillment (of the listener), com-
mercial speech merits full First Amendment protection;93 or that 
because the First Amendment serves to protect the search for truth, 
commercial speech deserves intermediate First Amendment protec-
tion.94 
This is not quite my approach. I am disposed to believe that 
many supporting values—centering on those just mentioned95—
combine to provide partially overlapping support for expressive 
freedom. But this view already has its able defenders96—and de-
tractors97—and would, in any event, require an article of its own for 
adequate treatment. Accordingly, instead of exploring what inter-
ests the First Amendment protects, I will take the less contentious 
                                                                                                                       
92. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 81. 
93. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630-35 
(1982); cf. Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 802 (1998) (noting that the First Amendment protection of commercial speech 
is designed to ensure the free flow of truthful information to consumers and thereby contribute to 
market efficiency); Robert T. Cahill, Jr., Note, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: 
Towards Heightened Scrutiny for Truthful Commercial Speech?, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 225, 252 
(1994). 
94. See, e.g., Nutt, supra note 84, at 205-06 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is appropri-
ate to protect the free exchange of ideas in the marketplace). 
95. For a review of values often thought to underlie the Free Speech Clause, see generally 
Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989). 
96. The most prominent proponents of this view include Professors Frederick Schauer and 
Steven Shiffrin. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 13-14 
(1982); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1303-04 (1983); 
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983); see also Eberle, supra note 56, at 417, 442-
54 (concluding that Virginia Pharmacy “relied upon a web of interlocking values to fashion broad 
support for commercial speech”). 
97. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1 (1984) (advocating “self-
realization” as the fundamental value underlying freedom of speech); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of 
the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 964-90 (1978) (speaking of indi-
vidual self-fulfillment as the major justification for freedom of speech); Robert Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
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tack here of identifying whose interests it protects—or, less conten-
tious still, whose interests it potentially protects. 
Abstracting from the problem of commercial speech, and 
even from the First Amendment, it is natural to suppose that con-
stitutional rights are somehow animated by a purpose in safeguard-
ing interests held by the individual right-holder—that is, the agent 
whose freedom of action, or freedom from interference, the right 
nominally or most immediately protects. The Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, for example, seems 
most directly geared to protecting the physical and dignitary inter-
ests of persons against whom such punishment might otherwise be 
applied. This is no more than common sense. 
But while this narrowly individualistic focus is no doubt part 
of the story, it is not a complete account of the purposes underlying 
constitutional rights. First, some constitutional rights might be 
thought to serve interests of persons other than those whom the 
right most directly or immediately shields. The Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial, for instance, can be conceived as guarding not 
only the personal interests of the criminal defendant, but also in-
terests of the victim and the community in gaining information and 
catharsis.98 Second, as Akhil Amar has famously argued at length, 
constitutional rights perform a structural function in checking the 
aggrandizement of government power, thereby serving the citi-
zenry’s long-term interests in limited government.99 This is self-
evident in the cases of the Second100 and Third101 Amendments, as 
well as the First Amendment’s Press Clause.102 
In sum, and very generally, constitutional rights can be un-
derstood as serving interests of the right-holder herself, of other 
individuals who could be expected to benefit from the right-holder’s 
enjoyment of her right, and of the citizenry as a (more or less) un-
differentiated whole. Put another way, we can understand constitu-
                                                                                                                       
98. See Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 
72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 886 n.118 (1995). The main theme of this thoughtful article is to ex-
plore how the Takings Clause can be understood in similar terms. 
99. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998). For earlier arguments in a 
similar vein, see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Gov-
ernment, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclu-
sionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994). 
100.  U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
101.  U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”). 
102.  Whether the Press Clause retains any content independent of the Speech Clause is 
an increasingly vexed question. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 429 (2002). 
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tional rights across at least three discrete dimensions—an individ-
ual protection dimension, a public goods dimension, and a struc-
tural check dimension. Very possibly, some constitutional rights are 
most usefully conceptualized on one or two of these dimensions, but 
not all three. That is plainly untrue, however, of the freedom of 
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.103 
Because even the most cursory review of landmark speech 
cases would reveal the Court’s sensitivity to the diverse (yet often 
overlapping) interests of speaker, audience, and citizenry, illustrat-
ing the point with a survey of cases would be more tedious than 
enlightening. Justice Jackson’s moving and eloquent opinion for the 
Court in West Virginia State Board v. Barnette,104 can, therefore, be 
pressed to do triple duty. Barnette, of course, overruled a three-
year-old precedent105 to hold compulsory flag salute laws unconsti-
tutional. Given its cardinal place among decisions striking down 
state action designed to promote political orthodoxy, Barnette is 
understandably read as validating a systemic concern in checking 
governmental power. And, to be sure, Justice Jackson’s stirring and 
oft-quoted conclusion—“If there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein”106—supports this reading.107 At the same time, 
though, in explaining that “scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual” is necessary to ensure that we not 
“strangle the free mind at its source,”108 Jackson affirmed the im-
portance to the individual of choosing whether, and how, to express 
herself. And in adding that “we can have . . . the rich cultural diver-
                                                                                                                       
103. Here I am elaborating upon, and I hope sharpening but perhaps just modifying, obser-
vations made by others. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Gov-
ernmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 423-27 (1996) (distin-
guishing between speaker-oriented and audience-oriented conceptions of the First Amendment, 
and proposing a third conception focused on governmental reasons); David A. Strauss, Rights 
and the System of Freedom of Expression, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197 (distinguishing between a 
“rights-based” justification grounded in speech’s value to the speaker, and a “structural justifica-
tion” which is based on the value of the system that free speech supports). 
104. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
105. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
106. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
107. The canonical cite for the structural importance of freedom of speech, though, is proba-
bly New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the Court famously described the 
“central meaning” of the First Amendment as entailing that, as Madison put it, “ ‘the censorial 
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.’ ” Id. at 
275 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794)). 
108. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. 
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sities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occa-
sional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes,”109 he evinced sensitiv-
ity to the public goods dimension of expressive freedoms as well.110 
This single great First Amendment decision, in short, exemplifies 
how freedom of speech respects all three basic dimensions of consti-
tutional rights. 
The question of whether commercial speech in particular im-
plicates as wide a variety of interests as other forms of speech do 
has played a central role in the development of commercial speech 
doctrine.111 In its first commercial speech case, decided just one 
year prior to Barnette, a unanimous Court suggested that none of 
these interests was at stake. Valentine v. Chrestensen112 involved a 
challenge to a municipal ordinance that, for reasons of litter con-
trol, barred the distribution of commercial handbills. Even though 
Chrestensen had craftily affixed a protest against the ordinance to 
the back side of his advertisement, the Court dismissed First 
Amendment objections by deeming it “clear that the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely com-
mercial advertising.”113 By the time it decided Virginia State Board 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.114 over 
thirty years later, however, the Court was prepared to take the 
matter more seriously.  
Virginia Pharmacy concerned a state law barring the adver-
tisement of prescription drug prices. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Blackmun began by noting the variety of interests potentially 
at stake: 
                                                                                                                       
109. Id. at 641-42. 
110. A more recent case that especially emphasized audience interests is United States v. Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), where the Court struck down a federal 
law that broadly prohibited federal employees from accepting any compensation for making 
speeches or writing articles. Although the Court did note that the ban burdened expressive in-
terests of the employees themselves, it highlighted the “significant burden” imposed “on the 
public’s right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said.” Id. 
at 470. 
111. For one useful history that emphasizes the dynamic between speaker interests and lis-
tener interests, see Halberstam, supra note 22, at 779-92. As intimated above, see supra notes 
92-93 and accompanying text, the academic debate over commercial speech has often pitted 
scholars (such as Edwin Baker) who downplay the autonomy-style interests of commercial 
speakers, against those who play up the informational interests of the consumer (such as Martin 
Redish and Burt Neuborne). 
112. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
113. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. For a history of commercial speech regulations prior to Valen-
tine, see generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commer-
cial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993). 
114. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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The question first arises whether, even assuming that First Amendment protection 
attaches to the flow of drug price information, it is a protection enjoyed by the ap-
pellees as recipients of the information, and not solely, if at all, by the advertisers 
themselves who seek to disseminate that information. Freedom of speech presup-
poses a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protec-
tion afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.115 
But in finally bringing straightforward commercial advertisements 
within the First Amendment, the Court seemed ultimately im-
pressed by the interests of listeners. “[T]he particular consumer’s 
interest in the free flow of commercial information,” Justice Black-
mun explained, “may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his in-
terest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”116 The law, as a 
consequence, was held unconstitutional. 
Today, after another quarter-century of cases, constitutional 
protection for commercial speech remains mostly predicated on the 
listener interests emphasized in Virginia Pharmacy.117 And yet, as 
Justice Souter has recently observed, the issue cannot be quite that 
simple. For “so long as self-interest in providing a supply is as le-
gitimate as the self-interest underlying an informed demand, the 
law could hardly treat the advertiser’s economic stake as ‘utterly 
without redeeming social importance’ and isolate the consumer’s 
interest as the exclusive touchstone of commercial speech protec-
tion.”118 
At this stage in our reexamination of Posadas and the 
greater/lesser approach, it would be premature to try to resolve this 
debate. It seems doctrinaire to insist, categorically, that commercial 
speech does not implicate the interests of one or another of these 
familiar First Amendment interest-holders—the speaker, the audi-
ence, or the citizenry. This is all the more true given repeated wor-
ries that the precise contours of the category of “commercial speech” 
are impossible to articulate.119 The most promising way to assess 
                                                                                                                       
115. Id. at 756. 
116. Id. at 763. 
117. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334, 2346-47 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing cases); Halberstam, supra note 22, at 779 (“As a basis for First Amendment 
protection, the Court has settled on the idea that commercial communications are valuable to the 
listener.”); Post, supra note 22, at 14 (“Commercial speech doctrine . . . is sharply audience ori-
ented.”). 
118. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 479 (1997) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976)). A majority of the Court seemed to grant this point in last Term’s Lorillard Tobacco 
decision. See 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (“[S]o long as the sale and use of tobacco is lawful for 
adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in communicating information about its 
products and adult customers have an interest in receiving that information.”). 
119. See infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text. 
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Posadas, then, is to consider directly how the casino advertising 
ban affected the interests of the casinos themselves, the local audi-
ence for casino gambling, and the general public, that might war-
rant constitutional solicitude.120 That is the strategy behind the fol-
lowing three parts. Part VII reaps the dividends of this systematic 
inquiry by turning attention from Posadas itself toward the prob-
lems and possibilities of commercial speech doctrine more gener-
ally. 
IV. SPEAKER INTERESTS AND THE PROBLEM OF COERCION 
The effort of Part III has one obvious payoff. As deployed in 
Posadas, the greater/lesser reasoning seemed to focus heavily on 
the interests of the would-be speakers. The thrust of the Court’s 
argument was to render incredible the notion that the advertising 
ban could give casino operators anything to complain about given 
that Puerto Rico could have barred the casino operations entirely. 
From this speaker-oriented perspective, Brennan’s claim that the 
advertising ban is the “more intrusive” rings false.121 However, one 
possible rejoinder is now apparent: the greater/lesser analysis indi-
cates, at most, only that the casino operators have no grounds for 
complaint. But the audience for the casino operators’ speech—the 
actual and would-be casino gamblers—also has an interest that 
must be taken into account.122 Perhaps, then, the greater/lesser ap-
proach fails because the advertising ban imposes constitutionally 
cognizable harm upon persons who would want exposure to the ca-
sino operators’ advertising. We will consider this possibility in Part 
V. This part takes on the greater/lesser argument closer to its heart 
by examining whether, despite initial appearances, the casino op-
erators might actually have cause for complaint on their own be-
half. 
                                                                                                                       
120. Accord Henry P. Monaghan, Some Comments on Professor Neuborne’s Paper, 55 BROOK. 
L. REV. 65, 69 (1989) (“Any adequate theory of the First Amendment will necessarily be a com-
plex one. This means that it will take into account a wide range of factors, including the interests 
of the speaker, the interests of the audience, and the interests of third parties who are not the 
intended audience of the speech.”).  
121. Even Professor Redish concedes this. See Redish, supra note 22, at 599 (“Certainly, 
viewed exclusively from the perspective of tobacco producers and sellers, a ban on advertising 
actually is a less restrictive measure than a complete ban on sales.”). 
122. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 22, at 437-38. 
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A. The Greater/Lesser Analysis                                                       
and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
Fruitful investigation begins with an argument I took pains 
to develop in Part II.123 There I argued that the lesser power ap-
proved in Posadas was not, as so many have represented, the power 
to ban “speech about” casino gambling, but rather the power to ban 
the advertising of casino gambling. We can now make clearer why 
this distinction matters. Advertising of casino gambling is a nar-
rower category than speech about casino gambling in two respects. 
It is narrower, first, with regard to the content or character of the 
speech. Speech about casino gambling can bear all sorts of relation-
ships to the activity—descriptive, evaluative, predictive, etc. Adver-
tising assumes a particular attitude towards the subject, one of pro-
motion or “advocacy.” It is narrower, second, with regard to the 
speaker. Anyone can “speak about” casino gambling, even “advo-
cate” it, but only casinos themselves can advertise it.124 
Of these two differences, the latter is the more salient. We 
can now understand the advertising ban at issue in Posadas as es-
sentially a conditional offer made by the government to parties who 
might wish to operate a casino.125 The default rule, the government 
can be understood to say, is that casinos are illegal. Nonetheless, 
you may operate one if you agree not to advertise it (and so long as 
you meet any other reasonable eligibility requirements).126 In other 
                                                                                                                       
123. See supra Part II.B. 
124. Although dictionary definitions are often broad enough to allow for “advertising” by 
those without a financial interest, see, for example, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 31 (1993), it is suitably clear that the Posadas Court used the term in its primary 
and narrower sense. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (de-
scribing as a “strange doctrine,” a constitutional rule that would “deny to the legislature the 
authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on 
behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand”) (emphasis added). This is appro-
priate given that the type of “advertising” the Puerto Rico statute barred was only such as might 
be conducted by the casinos themselves. See supra text accompanying note 2. According to this 
view, speech promoting casinos by parties with only a derivative interest in the success of casi-
nos—say, bars or taxicabs—would not be “casino advertising.” The distinction between advertis-
ing and other speech about a given commercial activity emerges also in Halberstam, supra note 
22, at 851-57. 
125. This perspective was suggested earlier. See supra text accompanying note 59. I now 
make it explicit. 
126. Critics often describe Posadas as posing the question whether Puerto Rico could have 
barred casino advertising even though it decided not to bar casino gambling. See, e.g., Van Al-
styne, supra note 22, at 519 (“Whether or not a legislature may forbid an activity (a question it 
will be time enough to consider if and when the legislature presumes to do so), when it has not 
done so (i.e., when it has not exercised that power, such as it may be), there is no reason to sup-
pose its power to restrict or forbid speech providing information pertinent to that activity is at all 
the same as though it had exercised that power.”). From the conditional-offer perspective, 
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words, the Supreme Court’s assertion that “the greater power to 
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser 
power to ban advertising of casino gambling”127 could just as well 
have been phrased as: “[T]he greater power to completely ban an 
individual or entity from operating a casino necessarily includes the 
lesser power to authorize the operation on the condition that the 
casino not advertise itself.”128 Of course, I do not mean to imply that 
merely recasting the issue in these terms resolves the problem; this 
reformulation of the greater/lesser argument is no more valid than 
any other. The point is that a prohibition against anyone’s speaking 
about casino gambling—or even “advocating” it—simply lacks the 
same conditional-offer structure that a ban on advertising can as-
sume. 
Conceptualizing Puerto Rico’s ban on casino advertising as a 
conditional offer is a first step toward glimpsing the path we will 
need to travel if we are to arrive at a conclusion that the ban 
wrongs the casino operators, for there exists a variety of contexts in 
which a conditional offer of a benefit that the offeror is free to with-
hold nonetheless is understood to aggrieve the offeree herself. Out-
side of constitutional law, the crime of blackmail provides the ca-
nonical example.129 The adulterer would have little grounds for 
complaint if a neighbor were to reveal his infidelities to the adul-
terer’s wife. But we do think him aggrieved if the neighbor offers 
the benefit of her silence for a fee. 
Within constitutional law, we are in the land of the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine.130 The unconstitutional conditions 
                                                                                                                       
though, this way of viewing the matter is not unproblematic. The proposition that, “when it has 
not exercised that power in respect to a particular activity, and insofar as the activity is permit-
ted, the First Amendment applies to prohibit the legislature from presuming to forbid those 
lawfully engaged in it to provide public information in respect to that activity,” id. at 520 (em-
phasis added), has no force if the activity is permitted precisely “insofar as it’s not advertised.” 
127. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
128. Any complications that might be thought to arise insofar as the advertising ban was en-
forced by sanctions (such as fines) other than automatic withdrawal of the establishment’s gam-
bling license can, I think, be safely ignored. I assume that a casino that repeatedly flouted the 
advertising restriction would be forbidden to operate. 
129. The “paradox of blackmail” has generated a substantial literature. Representative con-
tributions are presented in Symposium: Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1565-1989 (1993). 
For my views along with additional citations to the literature, see Mitchell N. Berman, The Evi-
dentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1998). 
130. In his classic attack on Posadas, Professor Kurland observed that the majority’s use of 
the greater/lesser “bears a great similarity to that long since rejected under the rubric of uncon-
stitutional conditions.” Kurland, supra note 18, at 13. I am urging, instead, that the majority 
used the greater/lesser in precisely the manner that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
rejects. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1415 (explaining that the unconstitutional conditions 
problem implicates the question whether “the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser 
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problem is said to arise whenever government conditions a “benefit” 
upon the offeree’s waiver of a constitutional right.131 It appears in a 
multitude of contexts, as when the state conditions a zoning vari-
ance on the property owner’s conveying a public easement without 
insisting on her Fifth Amendment right to just compensation;132 or 
when it offers a business license to a foreign corporation on the 
condition that the corporation waive its federal right (protected by 
the Supremacy Clause) to remove suits to federal court;133 or when 
a state prison conditions family visitation privileges on an inmate’s 
waiver of his right, protected by the Free Exercise Clause, not to 
participate in a religiously oriented substance abuse program.134  
In all of these cases the courts have held the proposal uncon-
stitutional, thereby rejecting the government’s claim that the 
greater power to withhold the benefit (a land use variance, or do-
mestic corporate privileges, or family visitation) includes the lesser 
power to condition the benefit on the offeree’s waiver of a constitu-
tional right. Furthermore, in none of these cases can the offer’s un-
constitutionality be most sensibly attributed to its impingement on 
interests of third parties. In each, the intuition is that notwith-
standing the supposed greater power to withhold the benefit, the 
state’s conditional offer wrongs the right-holder. 
                                                                                                                       
power to impose a condition on its receipt”). Yet this does not get Kurland as far as he would like, 
for, as I have explained elsewhere, all that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine rejects is that 
the state’s constitutional power to deny a benefit necessarily entails the authority to condition its 
receipt. See Berman, supra note 55, at 3; see also, e.g., Merrill, supra note 98, at 859. So observ-
ing that Posadas raises an unconstitutional conditions problem (as many commentators have, 
see, for example, EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 206; Fudenberg, supra note 58, at 382; and Sullivan, 
supra note 60, at 1462-64) no more tells us whether it was rightly decided than does recognizing, 
see supra Part II.A, that the lesser power can never be logically deduced from the greater. 
It bears emphasis that I do not claim that the greater/lesser argument is synonymous with 
the conditional-offer problem at issue in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. I am saying 
only that the particular type of the greater/lesser argument which was invoked in Posadas is the 
one to which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine responds. Different varieties of the 
greater/lesser were implicated when the United Foods Court distinguished Glickman, see supra 
notes 35-37 and accompanying text, and in Discovery Network, see supra note 50. Justice Scalia 
appealed to yet a fourth variety in his Romer dissent. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual con-
duct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely 
disfavoring homosexual conduct.”). I offer no thoughts regarding how the greater-includes-the-
lesser intuition is most usefully typologized. 
131. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1421-22. Although I problematize this definition 
elsewhere, see Berman, supra note 55, at 8-12, for most purposes, it is a perfectly adequate 
statement of the issue. 
132. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-36 (1987). 
133. See, e.g., Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922). 
134. Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054 (1997). 
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Perhaps then the casino operator in Posadas is like the adul-
terer or the property owner or the foreign corporation or the in-
mate. On the other hand, if these cases demonstrate (again) that 
the Posadas majority was wrong to suppose that the greater power 
to withhold the benefit logically (or “necessarily”) entails the power 
to offer it on condition, they do not yet demonstrate that the major-
ity’s bottom-line conclusion was wrong. Put another way, these ex-
amples do not demonstrate that the greater power to withhold a 
benefit never entails the lesser power to offer it on condition. To the 
contrary, a vast number of constitutional cases suggest that it gen-
erally does. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a state 
may condition welfare benefits on the recipient’s waiver of her 
Fourth Amendment right not to be subjected to warrantless 
searches without particularized suspicion,135 that it may condition a 
reduced criminal charge on the defendant’s waiver of his right to 
put the government to its burden of proof at trial,136 and that it may 
condition Medicaid funds on the recipient hospital’s waiver of its 
right to perform abortions.137 Although one might reasonably dis-
agree with any particular decision, the overall trend of these cases 
should not be too surprising, for the principle that the greater 
power to withhold a benefit generally does include the lesser power 
to offer it on condition holds true outside of constitutional law as 
well. Indeed, blackmail has proven so puzzling to legal scholars—as 
well as to economists138 and moral philosophers139—precisely be-
cause it exists against a deeply entrenched background rule that 
the power to withhold a benefit usually does entail the power to of-
fer it on condition. 
The challenge, then, is to elucidate the principle that ex-
plains all of the above cases and then to determine how the casino 
operator in Posadas fares against it.140 
                                                                                                                       
135. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971). 
136. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). 
137. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1989). 
138. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 
667 (1988). 
139. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 240-58 (1988); ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-87 (1974). 
140. I am far from the first to perceive an important linkage among blackmail, the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine, and the greater/lesser reasoning. To the contrary, the organizers of 
an important symposium on blackmail introduced the topic by observing that “one cannot think 
about coercion, contracts, consent, robbery, rape, unconstitutional conditions, nuclear deterrence, 
assumption of risk, the greater-includes-the-lesser arguments, plea bargains, settlements, sexual 
harassment, insider trading, bribery, domination, secrecy, privacy, law enforcement, utilitarian-
ism and deontology without being tripped up repeatedly by the paradox of blackmail.” Leo Katz 
& James Lindgren, Instead of a Preface, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1565 (1993). My claim, in the 
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B. Of Penalties and Coercive Offers 
The answer, I think, is that in all of the foregoing cases in 
which the conditional offer of a putative benefit is thought to ag-
grieve the offeree, the offer constitutes the wrong of coercion.141 Be-
cause I have developed this argument at length in other places,142 a 
summary will here suffice. 
At its core, coercion is the wrong of manipulating a person to 
act in a certain way by placing wrongful pressure upon her alterna-
tives.143 Paradigmatically, it takes the form of a biconditional pro-
posal—“if you don’t do x then I will do y; if you do x then I will not 
do y”—in which x is the conduct the maker of the proposal desires, 
and y is the sanction he threatens to impose or allow to obtain. The 
proposal is coercive if and only if the maker of the proposal would 
be engaging in a wrong were he to carry out the threat of y. Thus, 
the gunman’s proposal—“if you don’t give me your wallet, I’ll shoot 
you; if you do give me your wallet, then I won’t shoot you”—is coer-
cive (as a matter of conventional morality) because it would be 
(morally) wrongful for him to shoot you. Contrariwise, the fishmon-
ger’s proposal—“if you don’t give me $8.99, then I won’t give you a 
pound of tilapia; if you do give me $8.99, then I will give you a 
pound of tilapia”—is not coercive if (as I assume) it is morally per-
missible for her to withhold the fish. 
What makes blackmail interesting is that although the 
blackmailer has the legal and (generally) moral right to disclose the 
information she threatens, the case turns out to be akin to the 
gunman case, not the fishmonger’s. The key factor is the eviden-
tiary value of the conditional proposal itself. 
There are two significant features of the types of acts with 
which a blackmailer threatens his victim.144 First, they cause cogni-
zable legal harm. (The disclosure of one’s infidelities, for example, 
                                                                                                                       
smallest of nutshells, is that the prima facie wrongfulness (within any normative system) of 
threatening to penalize the exercise of what that normative system considers a right is the core 
insight necessary to understand, and therefore to rationalize, blackmail, unconstitutional condi-
tions, and the commercial speech doctrine. 
141. For the thought that Posadas was wrongly decided precisely because it overlooked the 
casino operators’ constitutional interest in not being coerced to relinquish their speech rights, 
see, for example, Fudenberg, supra note 58, at 387 (suggesting this argument without endorsing 
it). 
142. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 
LEGAL THEORY 45 (2002); Berman, supra note 55;.  
143. See Berman, supra note 142, at 52.  
144. I first advanced this argument in Berman, supra note 129. This summary is drawn from 
Berman, supra note 142, at 81-82. 
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can result in both reputational injury and emotional distress.) Sec-
ond, they are morally indeterminate in the particular sense that 
they are often undertaken with bad motives, but other times with 
good.145 This latter feature is critical. The supposition that, as a 
matter of empirical fact, persons who perform such actions fre-
quently have good motives for doing so makes it difficult or impos-
sible to generalize that such acts are morally bad. This moral inde-
terminacy provides a sufficient (if not necessary) reason not to 
criminalize the types of acts that are generally leveraged into 
blackmail proposals (here, truthfully unmasking an adulterer).  
A conditional threat to perform such an act, however, affects 
our beliefs about the nature of the act threatened. It suggests (al-
beit not conclusively) that the threatener would lack the good mo-
tives that would be required to justify his undertaking the action he 
threatens. The threat tends to reveal, in other words, that in this 
case the act would be morally wrongful. And if performance of the 
act would be morally wrongful, so too is the threat. That is, the 
threat wrongs the blackmailee by coercing him. Furthermore, be-
cause most theories of punishment permit criminalization of mor-
ally blameworthy, harm-threatening conduct, blackmail’s criminali-
zation is justifiable as well as explicable. We might put it this way: 
Insofar as blackmail is defined as a threat to perform a legal act, it 
necessarily follows that it is not criminally coercive. However, be-
cause the blackmailer would (most likely) be acting in a morally 
wrongful manner were he to carry out his threat, the threat itself is 
morally coercive. The threat is criminal, finally, not because it is 
coercive as a criminal matter (i.e., threatens a criminal wrong), but 
because it is coercive as a moral matter (i.e., threatens a moral 
wrong), and because moral wrongfulness is a sufficient basis for 
criminalization. 
The analysis in the unconstitutional conditions context pro-
ceeds similarly, although here we need to introduce another con-
cept, that of a penalty. Much simplified, constitutional rights either 
permit the rights-holder certain liberties of action (such as liberty 
to speak, or to worship, or to legislate) or authorize her to make cer-
tain demands of the state (such as just compensation for a taking or 
a jury trial preliminary to adjudication of guilt). But constitutional 
rights need not be exercised. Though I could place a placard on my 
                                                                                                                       
145. Very possibly, a third-party’s revelation of one spouse’s infidelity to the other spouse 
might be motivated by the beliefs that (a) such disclosure will encourage the “innocent” spouse to 
divorce the adulterous scoundrel, (b) such spouse will be happier after the divorce; and (c) any 
adverse effect on the adulterer counts for less in the moral balance because of his wrongdoing. 
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front lawn declaring “Save Social Security,” or “Don’t Save Social 
Security,” or even “I don’t care whether you save Social Security or 
not,” I could choose to refrain from communicating on the matter.146 
And if the state condemns my backyard for a freeway, and then 
pays me just compensation, I could choose not to cash the check. 
Suppose, though, that I choose not to waive my rights—that is, for 
example, I do post a placard or cash the check. Could the State of 
Texas fire me from my job at the University of Texas? Could it bar 
me from using the state highway system? Of course not; constitu-
tional rights would be virtually meaningless if it could.  
One might be inclined to suppose, then, that every constitu-
tional right by its very nature entails a claim-right that the state 
not discriminate in the distribution of benefits against those who 
have chosen to exercise a constitutional right—or, correlatively, 
that the state has a constitutional duty not to discriminate on this 
basis. But surely this is too broad. I suppose I have a constitutional 
right not to bathe: the state may not forcibly wash me. Nonetheless, 
and notwithstanding any other qualifications I might have, the 
state may choose not to employ me on account of my stench. More 
prosaically, each state has a right, valid against the federal gov-
ernment, to legislate or not legislate as it sees fit, so long as such 
legislation (or the lack thereof) is consistent with the Constitution 
and valid federal law. Nonetheless, courts have consistently upheld 
federal law that conditions federal Medicare funds on a state’s pro-
viding services to undocumented aliens.147 
A revision is therefore necessary: Every constitutional right 
entails a claim-right that the state not penalize the exercise (or 
nonwaiver) of the constitutional right itself in the sense of imposing 
(or allowing to obtain) consequences upon the right-holder that are 
                                                                                                                       
146. It is tempting to characterize this alternative as an exercise of my First Amendment 
right not to speak. But if I have views on the subject that I choose not to express because of lazi-
ness, it seems more perspicuous to describe this as a decision not to exercise my First Amend-
ment rights. In a similar vein, the right not to vote recognized in the United States is not quite 
the same as the right, recognized in many European countries, to cast a blank ballot. 
147. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666-67 (5th Cir. 1997); California v. 
United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28-29 
(2d Cir. 1996); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 466-67 (3d Cir. 1996). A more well-
known example would be South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987), where the Court 
upheld federal law that conditioned highway funds on each state’s enacting a minimum drinking 
age no lower than twenty-one. I argue elsewhere, though, that the spending condition was in fact 
coercive and, therefore, that Dole was wrongly decided. See Berman, supra note 55, at 36-42; see 
also Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Viola-
tions of Intellectual Property Rights: How To “Fix” Florida Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1037, 1143-46 (2001). 
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adverse relative to the consequences that the state would impose (or 
allow to obtain) but for the state’s purpose in having the right-holder 
experience the consequences as disagreeable. That is largely what it 
means to have a constitutional right.148 It follows that the withhold-
ing of what seems to be a “benefit” is in fact a “penalty”—and hence 
is unconstitutional—if undertaken for the purpose of punishing or 
discouraging exercise of a right. And a conditional proposal is coer-
cive (in the constitutional sense) if the state threatens to impose a 
penalty for the refusal to waive a constitutional right. 
This account of how a government’s conditional offer of a 
“benefit” that it is presumptively permitted to withhold can be coer-
cive, and therefore presumptively impermissible, might seem hope-
lessly arcane. In fact, I believe, it is simply a reasonably careful ar-
ticulation of common intuition.149 Moreover, it finds reflection in 
Supreme Court case law, such as the Court’s 1987 decision in Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission.150  
The Nollans, owners of a beachfront lot, sought to demolish 
their existing bungalow and to replace it with a three-bedroom 
house. California law required, however, that they obtain a devel-
opment permit from the state coastal planning commission before 
proceeding with construction. The Commission granted the permit 
but only on condition that the Nollans convey a public easement 
across a portion of their private beach to allow beachgoers to travel 
between a public park a quarter mile to the north and a public 
                                                                                                                       
148. I develop this argument in Berman, supra note 55, at 32-36. 
149. I am reminded of the story basketball great Bill Walton has told of legendary college 
coach John Wooden. Walton was a center for the UCLA Bruins basketball team in the early 
seventies. He also had a reputation as something of a free spirit. Wooden did not. As best I recall 
the story, Walton showed up at practice one year with long hair, and Wooden told him to get it 
cut. When Walton refused, and Wooden threatened to drop him from the team, Walton defended 
his coiffure as an important expression of personal and political values. “Tell me if you really feel 
that way,” Wooden pressed, “because I would not demand that you act against your scruples.” 
Walton insisted that he did. “Well Bill,” Wooden rejoined, “you’re a tremendous asset to this 
team. We’re going to miss you.” 
Assuming arguendo a constitutional right to wear one’s hair long, but see Kelley v. Johnson, 
425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976), one might wonder whether Coach Wooden (as a state actor) threatened 
to penalize Walton’s expressive rights. On the analysis in text, it depends. According to Walton, 
Wooden explained years later that he insisted that players wore short hair for safety reasons. 
Long hair could get in a player’s eyes, causing—well, precisely what harm it would cause is not 
entirely clear, but presumably something really bad. If this really was his view, then the condi-
tional proposal (you may play on my team if and only if you cut your hair) did not threaten a 
penalty, hence was not coercive: taking Walton’s decision as a given, Wooden really would prefer, 
for safety reasons, that Walton not play. Then again, Wooden did not win a record ten NCAA 
championships without knowing something about psychology. Walton showed up for practice the 
next day, his hair trimmed short. 
150. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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beach some comparable distance to the south. The Nollans objected 
to the imposition of the condition as an unconstitutional taking, and 
the Supreme Court agreed in a five-to-four vote. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
condition could not stand because it was not germane to the legiti-
mate purposes the Commission could have for refusing the re-
quested permit. Assuming that the Commission might constitution-
ally deny the Nollans a permit in order to advance a legitimate 
state interest in, among other things, the public’s visual access to 
the beach, Justice Scalia reasoned, the Commission could not 
threaten to withhold the permit in order to secure lateral access for 
the public to cross the beach.151 When the “essential nexus” between 
the purpose of the condition and the purpose of the prohibition is 
eliminated, the Court explained, 
the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a 
crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to 
the state treasury. While a ban on shouting fire can be a core exercise of the 
State’s police power to protect the public safety, and can thus meet even our strin-
gent standards for regulation of speech, adding the unrelated condition alters the 
purpose to one which, while it may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain the ban. 
Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a $100 tax contribution in order to 
shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban, it would not pass 
constitutional muster. Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the condition and 
the original purpose of the building restrictions converts that purpose to some-
thing other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtain-
ing of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without pay-
ment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of “legitimate state inter-
ests” in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them. In short, unless 
the permit-condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development 
ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an out-and-
out plan of extortion.152 
Many ideas underlie this passage. The first is that, even 
though the granting of an exemption from the development ban is 
in one sense a benefit that the state is not constitutionally com-
pelled to provide, the Constitution does constrain the state’s pur-
poses for withholding it. More particularly, the state may not with-
hold it for the purpose of pressuring property owners into waiving 
their Fifth Amendment rights to just compensation. (In my termi-
nology, the state may not penalize a right-holder for standing on 
her constitutional rights.) Second, a threat to withhold a benefit for 
that proscribed purpose is itself proscribed, as constituting extor-
tion. (In my terminology, the threat to impose a penalty is unconsti-
tutionally coercive.) And third, if the exaction demanded of the 
                                                                                                                       
151. See id. at 836-42. 
152. Id. at 837 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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property owners would not serve the same legitimate purpose that 
the state claims lies behind the land use ban, then the refusal to 
grant an exemption to the ban is not really motivated by that pur-
ported legitimate purpose, hence the withholding of the benefit is a 
penalty, and the conditional proposal constitutes coercion. That this 
third step might be too rigid (as I have in fact argued)153 should not 
distract us from the importance of the first two: Nollan confirms 
that it is unconstitutionally coercive for the state to threaten a pen-
alty.154 
C. The Casino Advertising Ban Was Not Coercive 
If all of this is correct, then the casino operators subject to 
the Puerto Rico advertising ban are more like the welfare benefici-
aries subject to the warrantless search condition and the criminal 
defendant offered a plea bargain than either the Nollans or the in-
mate threatened with loss of visitation privileges.  
We assess whether the conditional offers involve a threat-
ened penalty by imagining whether withholding the offered benefit, 
upon noncompliance with the demand, would advance legitimate 
state interests beyond preserving the benefit’s capacity to induce 
behavior by others. The answer is pretty clearly no in the inmate 
case. And a majority of the Court concluded that the same was true 
in Nollan as well. In both cases, then, the proposal threatens to im-
pose a penalty and so is coercive. In the welfare case and the plea 
bargain, in contrast, the answer is very possibly yes. If the welfare 
department feels itself without adequate means to confirm that the 
applicant does not live with another adult, it prefers not to give 
benefits designed for single-parent households; if the criminal de-
fendant will not spare the state the risk and expense of trial, the 
state has no reason to grant a discount from the otherwise appro-
priate sentence in the event the defendant is convicted.155 In these 
                                                                                                                       
153. See Berman, supra note 55, at 91-94. 
154. Similar views have cropped up elsewhere in the unconstitutional conditions case law. 
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (“If a law has ‘no other purpose . . . than 
to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, 
then it [is] patently unconstitutional.’ ”) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Jack-
son, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968))). 
155. This analysis assumes that the sentence the state threatens—and not the one it offers—
is the “appropriate” one, taking into account only constitutionally legitimate considerations. 
Whether this is so is most likely undiscoverable in any given case, which is why the courts 
should probably circumscribe the plea bargaining process with more prophylactic-style rules 
designed to protect defendants from coercive plea offers. See Berman, supra note 55, at 98-103. 
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latter cases, then, withholding the offered benefit would not consti-
tute a penalty, so the conditional proposal is not coercive. 
Although these matters are necessarily speculative, it seems 
plausible to view the Gaming Act of 1948 as manifesting the follow-
ing preference hierarchy. The legislature’s highest preference was 
for legalized casino gambling that attracted tourists but not locals, 
but if that combination was unattainable, it preferred to do without 
casinos entirely. Therefore, because the legislature assumed (sensi-
bly enough) that domestic advertising would generate domestic de-
mand, it actually preferred that an applicant for a casino license 
who would not agree to waive its First Amendment rights to adver-
tise not operate a casino at all.156 This is true regardless of whether 
the government’s purpose was to keep a lid on domestic gambling 
for purposes of morals or health, or to protect the cockfight industry 
and the state-run lottery.157 
                                                                                                                       
156. Alternatively, the legislature might have been prepared to sacrifice its own citizens to 
the unrestrained lures of the casino industry sooner than it would have abandoned its interest in 
using casinos to attract tourists. Were that the case, then the legislature’s supposed preference 
that any given casino that refused to abstain from domestic advertising not operate at all de-
pended upon its confidence that some other persons would accept the legislative deal of furnish-
ing unadvertised casino gambling. That, I suppose, would make the proposal coercive. Of course, 
even if all this is right in some sort of conceptual or logical sense, there is no denying that it 
raises practical challenges. How, under such circumstances, is a court supposed to determine the 
true ranking of legislative preferences? Although the matter deserves further attention, it is 
worth noting to start that there is no single correct solution, and all might depend upon judicial 
allocation of the burden of proof. It is worth noting too that the practical difficulties should not be 
overstated. After all, severability doctrine relies on just this sort of judicial imagining of legisla-
tive preferences, requiring courts to determine whether the legislature would have enacted the 
constitutional sections of a challenged provision absent those sections held unconstitutional. See 
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987). 
One apparent implication, though, is that restrictions imposed on the advertisements and so-
licitations of licensed professionals such as lawyers, accountants and pharmacists (which regula-
tions constitute a large percentage of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech cases) are extraor-
dinarily likely to be coercive, which means in turn that they are likely to be unconstitutional for 
failing strict scrutiny—unless, of course, the Court becomes persuaded that something other 
than strict scrutiny ought to govern coercive restrictions of some sorts of professional speech. The 
appropriate constitutional status of professional speech is sensitively explored in Halberstam, 
supra note 22, at 834-39. 
157. For arguments in support of Justice Brennan’s view that it does matter, see EPSTEIN, 
supra note 74, at 207-09; Neuborne, supra note 22, at 37 (“[T]he legislature’s censorship decision 
is entitled to no deference because it is a self-interested attempt to favor a government lottery 
system at the expense of its private sector competition. Whatever the result might be if Puerto 
Rico genuinely sought to prevent its citizens from gambling at all, no serious argument in favor 
of selective censorship exists when the government sponsors a lottery and then seeks to cripple 
the ability of private competitors to inform consumers of a choice between government sponsored 
gambling and a lawful private alternative.”). Although I think Puerto Rico’s interest in protect-
ing its lottery revenue, and even in protecting its cockfighting constituents, suffices to render the 
advertising restriction noncoercive, if Puerto Rico can defend the ban only on the strength of 
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Furthermore, this analysis reveals why the many hypotheti-
cal and actual cases that critics claim are indistinguishable from 
Posadas are in fact distinguishable and unconstitutionally coercive. 
Consider first the argument that regulations restricting speech 
about casinos issued by the casino operators cannot be distin-
guished from identical speech about the casinos issued by someone 
else. Once again, Van Alstyne puts the point clearly and forcefully: 
[T]he First Amendment [does not] provide an exception that the Court should be 
willing to recognize, permitting the suppression of . . . information, to keep it from 
reaching the public, just on account of its commercially interested source. . . . That 
the speech in question the government seeks to suppress appears in a flyer dis-
tributed by a [retailer of the commodity to which the information relates], rather 
than in an identical flyer distributed to all the same persons by an individual or an 
association who differ solely in that they may personally have less economically at 
stake in doing so, would appear to provide very little by way of distinction between 
them  . . . in respect to the proper measure of protection each may be due, so far as 
the First Amendment is concerned. . . . A legislature may not regard it as a contri-
bution to the public welfare that a newspaper would run a local feature on casinos 
the state sees fit to license . . . , and yet have no power to suppress that fea-
ture. . . . Nor will it matter whether the feature is carried partly, or even princi-
pally, or even wholly, because the newspaper thinks it conducive to the newspa-
per’s own commercial success so to provide that feature, rather than for some rea-
son more sublime.158 
The proposition that the state may not prohibit, or even 
regulate, a column about casinos published in the local newspaper 
is unimpeachable. But the argument developed in this part reveals 
that there is, in fact, much by way of distinction between this hypo-
thetical and the actual case. Through the Games of Chance Act of 
1948, the Puerto Rico legislature was seeking to induce persons 
who might be interested in promoting the consumption of casino 
gambling to waive their rights to actively promote that consump-
tion via advertising in exchange for licenses to operate gambling 
casinos. In contrast, a ban on speech advocating casino gambling by 
persons other than casino operators—whether, for instance, jour-
nalists or private citizens—operates by “offering” a very different 
sort of benefit in exchange for waiver of one’s First Amendment 
rights—for example, the “benefits” of not being shut down, not pay-
ing a fine, or not going to jail. The actual advertising ban raises the 
unconstitutional conditions problem (as conventionally defined) be-
cause it offers a benefit (a license to operate a casino) in exchange 
for waiver of a right. Moreover, under the circumstances, the offer 
is probably not coercive. A hypothetical restriction on newspaper 
                                                                                                                       
these interests, and not as a way of protecting public “morals,” that might make a difference at 
other stages in the full constitutional analysis. See infra notes 273-78 and accompanying text. 
158. Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 524-26. 
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coverage of casinos does not even raise the unconstitutional condi-
tions problem, for the carrot it extends to induce newspaper pub-
lishers to induce them to waive their First Amendment rights are 
not benefits the state is free to withhold.159 Such a regulation, there-
fore, is palpably coercive and appropriately subject to strict scru-
tiny.160 
If coercion analysis provides one meaningful basis for distin-
guishing speech based on the identity of the speaker (the same 
speech raising different issues when engaged in by a casino opera-
tor rather than by a journalist), it also supports distinguishing dif-
ferent sorts of speech engaged in by a single commercial entity. 
Consider in this regard First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
which involved a Massachusetts law providing that no corporation 
incorporated within the state may “directly or indirectly give, pay, 
                                                                                                                       
159. One might wonder what makes a license to operate casinos a “benefit” but a license to 
operate newspapers not. Nothing in the objective nature of things—though it is obviously rele-
vant that licensing of the press was historically at the core of free speech concerns. See, e.g., 
LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 173 (1963). That determinations of what is and is 
not a “benefit” are themselves the products of (potentially contestable) substantive judgments of 
constitutional law is why I would attach a note of caution to the conventional formulation of the 
unconstitutional conditions problem. See supra note 131. For other arguments designed to un-
dermine the supposed naturalness of conventional formulations of the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine, see, for example, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 293 (1993) 
(“There is no fundamental or metaphysical difference between the unconstitutional conditions 
case (welfare benefits will be eliminated for those who criticize the government) and the ordinary 
constitutional case (people who criticize the government must pay a fine).”); William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
1439, 1445-49 (1968). 
This point has obvious significance for the public forum debate. It suggests that, analytically, 
the core difference between public and nonpublic forums is simply that access to the former is 
not a “benefit” in the sense of something the government may withhold with minimal justifica-
tion so long as the withholding does not amount to a penalty. It suggests too that there will exist 
no value-neutral way to identify the substantive principles—such as “tradition,” see Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983), or anything else—that should be 
relied upon to do the necessary classification. For valuable explorations of the problem, see, for 
example, Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 
SUP. CT. REV. 79, 85; Robert Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and The-
ory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1758-64 (1987).  
160. Compare Rodney Smolla’s observation that “[i]t is only the linkage between commercial 
speech and a commercial transaction that gives government the theoretical leverage to presume 
to regulate the speech at all. Because government has virtually unchecked constitutional power 
to regulate transactions, government may legitimately claim some special prerogative to regulate 
speech about transactions.” Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: 
A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993). This, I 
think, is true. But it is also cryptic and conclusory. What is the nature of this “theoretical lever-
age”? Why does government’s expansive power to regulate transactions give it authority to regu-
late speech about transactions? What is the scope of this “special prerogative”? The answers 
emerge, I suggest, once we imagine the advertising ban as a conditional offer and recognize that 
it is not a coercive one. 
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expend or contribute . . . any money or other valuable thing for the 
purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question 
submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of 
the property, business or assets of the corporation.”161 Splitting five 
to four, the Court struck down the law as a violation of the First 
Amendment. 
In my view, this statute is problematic for a variety of rea-
sons.162 Here, though, I want only to examine whether it is coercive. 
At first blush it seems more like the actual Puerto Rico ban on ca-
sino advertising than the hypothetical ban on newspaper features 
concerning casino gambling in being describable in unconstitutional 
conditions terms. That is, the inducement offered in exchange for a 
business entity’s waiver of its expressive rights—the “privilege” of 
assuming the corporate form—might look like a “benefit” that the 
state is free to withhold. But even if that is so, the refusal to confer 
that benefit because of the offeree’s refusal to agree to abide by the 
statutory limitation on its expression is most reasonably viewed as 
a penalty. Put very simply, the public benefits that accrue from 
granting incorporation are of sufficient scope and magnitude that, 
were Massachusetts to take an applicant’s refusal to waive its ex-
pressive rights as a given, the state would most probably prefer to 
extend the benefit rather than withhold it. If this is right (and I 
concede that I have done no more than assert it), then the condi-
tional offer (you may become incorporated only if you agree not to 
exercise your First Amendment rights in certain specified ways) 
threatens to penalize those who would not accede to the condition, 
hence is coercive. 
The upshot is that a conceptualization of coercion that ex-
tracts from the greater/lesser feature of Puerto Rico’s ban on casino 
advertising the conclusion that that particular ban was not coercive 
does not usher in a parade of horribles. The casino advertising ban 
is fairly distinguished from (a) bans on the same types of communi-
cation about casino advertising, but made by entities other than the 
casinos themselves; and (b) restrictions on other types of communi-
cation that might plausibly be characterized as “commercial 
speech.” Instances of these latter types of speech regulations often 
will be coercive, thereby infringing First Amendment interests of 
the speakers.163 
                                                                                                                       
161. 435 U.S. 765, 768 n.2 (1978). 
162. Surely, for instance, it is worrisome on the dimension of effects. See infra Part V. 
163. The importance of shaping doctrine to be somehow sensitive to the presence or absence 
of coercion is highlighted by Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, Docket No. 01-344, a 
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case involving federal restrictions on the advertising of drug “compounding” that was argued 
before the Supreme Court this past February. 
Compounding is the pharmaceutical process of combining or altering ingredients to create a 
medication for an individual patient. It is often used to furnish alternatives to generally avail-
able drugs, as when a patient is allergic to an ingredient in the manufactured drug or requires 
that the drug be administered in a different manner. Federal law provides generally that a new 
drug may not be introduced into interstate commerce until the drug’s manufacturer or distribu-
tor demonstrates to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) that the drug is safe and effec-
tive for each of its intended uses, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2001), although the FDA routinely ex-
empted compounded drugs from the requirement that they obtain prior approval. In the Food 
and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Congress essentially codified existing agency practice by 
formally exempting compounded drug products from the FDA approval process subject to several 
conditions. Two conditions restricted the compounding pharmacist’s speech: the compounded 
drug must be prepared for an individual patient in response to an unsolicited prescription from a 
physician, 21 U.S.C. § 353a(a) (Supp. V 1999); and the pharmacy must “not advertise or promote 
the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug,” § 353a(c), though it may 
advertise that it performs compounding services. The district court held these two restrictions—
on soliciting prescriptions and on advertising particular compounded drugs—unconstitutional for 
failing Central Hudson, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 69 F. 
Supp. 2d 1288 (D. Nev. 1999), aff’d, 238 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2001). 
This is a complex case that cannot possibly be treated fully in a footnote. What I want to sug-
gest here is only that an essential (if somewhat hidden) component of the government’s argu-
ment is that the regulation is not coercive and therefore does not infringe the First Amendment. 
Central Hudson looks like a justificatory test as opposed to an evidentiary one: its function is to 
determine whether governmental action that infringes the Constitution is justified by the way it 
advances a substantial governmental interest, thus is not a violation. But part of the govern-
ment’s argument in Western States Medical Center, I think, is that the regulation is not an in-
fringement. This is an argument—regardless of whether it is right or wrong on the actual facts—
that is not cognizable by, indeed is invisible to, existing commercial speech doctrine. 
To understand this point, it will be helpful to start with one interest that the government 
claimed the solicitation and advertisement restrictions advanced, and which the lower courts 
agreed was substantial: “[M]aintaining the integrity of the drug approval process.” Id. at 1302. I 
think that this argument can best be understood as an effort to justify the government’s in-
fringement of the pharmacists’ First Amendment rights. Fleshed out, the argument runs as 
follows. The existence of the compounding exception manifests the following governmental pref-
erence hierarchy with respect to any particular drug that could satisfy the compounding rules: 
(1) the drug is submitted for ordinary approval and then made available for sale only if deemed 
safe and effective; (2) the drug is permitted for sale as an unapproved compound; and (3) the 
drug is not made available. Accordingly, the government’s objective should be to make option (2) 
available only for those drugs which would otherwise fall into category (3), while foreclosing it for 
those drugs that would otherwise fall into category (1). The problem is that government cannot 
accomplish that sorting perfectly, and false negatives and false positives are both costly. A par-
tial solution might be to treat whether a particular compounded drug is advertised in certain 
ways as a proxy for whether that drug could be shunted into track (1). That is, because the 
amount and sort of product advertisement provides some evidence for the amount of market 
share the manufacturer-pharmacist expects, barring the compounding of drug classes that are 
advertised (which is an alternative description of a ban on the advertising of drug classes that 
are compounded) is an imperfect way to make option (2) unavailable for those drugs, but only 
those drugs, that would otherwise be provided via option (1). In this way, the solicitation and 
advertising restrictions might serve government’s interest in preserving the integrity of the drug 
approval process—though they could also fail the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, as 
the lower courts in fact held. Id. at 1303-09, aff’d, 238 F.3d 1090, 1094-96 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Things get interesting, though, when we consider a second interest that the government ad-
vanced, “protecting the public health and safety.” Id. at 1301. What is puzzling is that this 
2002] COMMERCIAL SPEECH 741 
V. AUDIENCE INTERESTS AND BAD EFFECTS 
We have seen that the majority’s opinion in Posadas has 
likely survived its first test. True, the opinion was wrong to assert 
that the greater power necessarily includes the lesser. Nonetheless, 
if (as is quite possible) withholding the privilege to operate a gam-
bling casino upon an applicant’s failure to agree to abide by the ad-
vertising restrictions would be constitutionally permissible, Puerto 
Rico’s conditional offer cum conditional threat was not coercive. For 
this reason it is sensible to conclude that the conditional offer did 
not infringe any speech interest of the casino operators. Of course, 
the casino operators’ interests are not the only ones of constitu-
                                                                                                                       
should be presented as an alternative to the government’s interest in preserving the integrity of 
the drug approval process, when surely that latter interest is itself only a mediate interest in 
service of the more ultimate interest in protecting public health and safety. To present these 
goals as separate governmental interests can make sense only if the government means to sug-
gest that the challenged restrictions promote public health and safety in some way other than 
via the chain of causation that the notion of “protecting the integrity of the drug approval proc-
ess” is intended to capture. But how could this be? 
The path to one possible answer begins, I think, by answering two prior questions. First, why 
does the government not generally allow unapproved drugs? And second, why does it allow un-
approved drugs that have been compounded? The answer to the first question is obvious: drugs 
are dangerous, and untested drugs could do more harm than good. Not always, though. So the 
FDA might sensibly try to identify and carefully delimit the situations in which a particular 
drug, albeit not FDA-approved, is likely to offer greater expected health benefits to the consumer 
than expected health costs. One circumstance might be this: when (a) the particular drug is 
carefully tailored for the patient’s particular benefit by a licensed pharmacist; and (b) no drug 
that has already been approved would be adequate for her. This looks like an answer to the sec-
ond question; it explains why compounded drugs are allowed. 
The question now, of course, is whether the fact that the pharmacy advertises its compound-
ing of particular types of drugs, or solicits prescriptions, could affect the above calculus. And it is 
easy to see how the answer could be yes. When the pharmacy advertises the compounding of 
particular drug types or classes, the risk increases that the benefit to the average individual 
patient will not exceed the risk to her because that particular class or type of drug will be com-
pounded for the median expected patient rather than being adequately tailored to each patient’s 
particular needs; when the pharmacy solicits prescriptions, some doctors might prescribe a com-
pounded drug for patients for whom approved drugs would be adequate. In either case, the ex-
pected public health benefits of allowing the compounded drugs would not exceed the expected 
public health risks. 
Surely this argument is logically coherent. If true, then withholding permission to compound 
from a pharmacy that refuses to comply with the advertising/solicitation restrictions would di-
rectly promote public health and safety, unmediated by a purpose in deterring or punishing 
pharmacies that refuse not to advertise. That is, carrying out the threat would not be a penalty, 
and the conditional proposal would not be coercive. To be sure, I have no way of judging whether 
the argument is factually plausible, let alone sound. But the interesting and important point 
transcends the dispute over this particular statute. The point is that the two ways that the solici-
tation and advertising restrictions might be alleged to promote public health are meaningfully 
distinct: they reflect the difference between denying an infringement and justifying it. The ar-
gument that would deny an infringement is just the sort that the coercion inquiry is designed to 
entertain. It is one that Central Hudson, in contrast, cannot perceive. 
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tional significance. This part examines whether the advertising ban 
violates First Amendment interests belonging to the would-be audi-
ence for the casinos’ advertising. 
Supporters of the advertising ban might be tempted to resort 
to the greater/lesser intuition once again. To be sure (they would 
start by conceding), ordinarily the would-be consumers of a product 
or service would most prefer legalization both of the product or ser-
vice itself and of advertisements for it. But if government is consti-
tutionally free to prohibit the transaction and then to ban adver-
tisements soliciting it, that consumers find a mere advertising ban 
suboptimal cannot be of constitutional significance. Even were it 
true (to take the extreme case) that the lack of advertising would 
render consumers wholly unable to avail themselves of the product 
or service, they would still be no worse off than they would be if 
government exercised its greater power to prohibit the transaction 
as well as its advertising. Therefore, from the perspective of the 
audience, no less than that of the speaker, the greater power to ban 
a product or service should include the lesser power to permit the 
ban on condition that it not be advertised. 
Stated this categorically, the argument is clearly false. Con-
sider, for example, contemporary debates over whether the state 
should ban the sale of all-terrain vehicles (“ATVs”) or St. John’s 
Wort, due to concerns, respectively, with rollover risk and with im-
purity and misuse. Now suppose that the state decides to permit 
these products notwithstanding their dangers. Many competitors 
would enter the market and, if these concerns were not fanciful, 
would likely compete on precisely these safety and health issues 
(among others). One problem with a conditional advertising ban 
now becomes apparent. Allowing the products but disallowing the 
advertising might place consumers in the worst of all possible 
worlds: they would be free to buy potentially dangerous products 
but hampered from receiving information that would better enable 
them to choose the less dangerous brands. Moreover, without effec-
tive ways to educate consumers about their product’s relative 
health and safety advantages, manufacturers would have less in-
centive to make their products less dangerous. 
The direct lesson is simple: even if manufacturers accede to a 
noncoercive advertising ban, the effects of that ban on consumers 
can be matters of real importance. The critical task, then, is to de-
termine how constitutional doctrine should take these effects into 
account. 
One might suppose that Central Hudson (or something like 
it) already provides the correct solution. The intermediate scrutiny 
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of Central Hudson is generally defended (when defended at all) on 
the grounds that commercial speech is of lower value than the type 
of speech that is protected by strict scrutiny.164 But the analysis of 
Part IV furnishes a very different possible justification for the re-
duced degree of protection that commercial speech enjoys. All re-
strictions on speech—commercial and noncommercial—impinge 
upon interests of the (actual or potential) audience. However, re-
strictions on advertising are frequently not coercive and, to the ex-
tent they are not, do not infringe upon the constitutional interests 
of the speaker.165 So even if commercial and noncommercial speech 
are of equal constitutional value (whatever that might mean), regu-
lations of the latter should face a heavier burden of justification, if 
only because they implicate interests of speakers and audience 
alike, whereas regulations of the former (when not coercive) impli-
cate interests only of the audience. 
Although this is a provocative defense of Central Hudson, I 
think it cannot succeed. First of all, it is not clear that there exists 
any principled way to distinguish a doctrinal solution that makes 
the applicable level of scrutiny turn upon the number of sets of per-
sons who are affected (speakers and audience together provoking a 
higher level of scrutiny than audience alone) from one that would 
make the level of scrutiny turn upon the total number of persons 
affected (a regulation that infringes interests of 2n persons ipso 
facto warranting heavier scrutiny than one infringing the interests 
of only n persons). But that latter approach is plainly unacceptable, 
for it would lead to the absurd consequence that the constitutional 
protection due given expression is proportional to its popularity. 
There is a more important reason too. Central Hudson is of-
ten called a “balancing test.”166 Yet if not quite a misnomer, this is 
                                                                                                                       
164. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 317-19 
(1995) (describing the development of the doctrine of low-value speech as applied to commercial 
speech); see also Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (“ ‘[C]ommercial speech 
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale 
of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that might be impermissible 
in the realm of noncommercial expression.’ ”) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 
(1989), quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). 
165. This is not to deny, of course, that the would-be speakers experience the advertising re-
striction as a setback to their interests relative to a world in which they are allowed to peddle 
their wares and to advertise. 
166. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gollin, Comment, Improving the Odds of the Central Hudson Bal-
ancing Test: Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 873 (1998). On 
the Court, apparently only Justice Thomas refers to Central Hudson as a balancing test. See 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 531 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. 521 U.S. 457, 504 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, 
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at the least misleading. Central Hudson requires that regulations of 
non-misleading speech concerning a lawful activity directly advance 
a substantial government interest and do so without abridging more 
speech than necessary.167 If the interests at stake are those of the 
government and of the audience, the test is partially sensitive to 
differences in magnitude or weight of the former (substantial gov-
ernment interests faring better than not-quite substantial ones) but 
wholly insensitive to differences in the weight of the latter. The au-
dience’s interest in receiving the speech is treated as though it were 
invariant. 
Comparing the advertising ban at issue in Posadas with the 
hypothetical bans on advertising for ATVs or St. John’s Wort, how-
ever, suggests the wrong-headedness of that approach. Simply put, 
the effects on audience interests of the latter two bans are of an en-
tirely different character than are the effects of a ban on casino ad-
vertising. Whereas bans on advertising for ATVs or herbal remedies 
threaten consumer interests in safety and health, the casino adver-
tising ban threatens an interest in (to be only a little facetious) 
identifying the loosest slots. The Central Hudson approach cannot 
take this difference into account. Better, one might think, to employ 
a true balancing test—one that, like the well-known (albeit much- 
criticized)168 Pike balancing test of dormant commerce clause juris-
prudence,169 weighs, in any given case, the character and magnitude 
of the government’s interest against the character and magnitude of 
the private interests that the challenged action frustrates. The 
Court has in fact protected First Amendment rights via such true 
balancing tests in the past.170 Arguably, this would be the more ap-
                                                                                                                       
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter’s description of Central 
Hudson’s midlevel scrutiny as “similar” to a pure balancing test, see Timmons v. Twin Cities 
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 383 n.2 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting), strikes me as more per-
spicuous. 
167. See supra note 7. The Court has struggled to articulate precisely what the fourth prong 
concerning fit requires. In Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989), it made clear 
that this was only a “narrow tailoring” requirement, not one of “least restrictive means.” 
168. See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1106-08 (1986). 
169. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).  
170. See, e.g., Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358 (“When deciding whether a state election law vio-
lates First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the character and magni-
tude of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State con-
tends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State’s concerns make the burden 
necessary.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In the public employment context, 
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propriate way to take into account audience interests in the free 
flow of communication: the more important the restricted communi-
cation is for advancing such First Amendment values as individual 
self-realization, political self-governance, and the search for truth, 
the more important need be the interest the government claims in 
justification. 
In rejecting an approach of this sort, a defender of Central 
Hudson might be tempted to deny the premise that, from the per-
spective of audience interests, the casino advertising ban at issue in 
Posadas differs in any meaningful respect from the other advertis-
ing bans I have hypothesized. Recall Justice Blackmun’s oft-quoted 
remark in Virginia Pharmacy: “[T]he particular consumer’s interest 
in the free flow of commercial information may be as keen, if not 
keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political 
debate.”171 If consumers may subjectively value commercial infor-
mation as highly as, or more highly than, political information, by 
the same token they may subjectively value information about casi-
nos as highly as information about ATV safety (or about candidates 
for political office or surgeons). 
Yes, they may, but it is not likely. Even without overriding 
people’s actual subjective valuations, one could simply believe that, 
as an empirical matter, people probably do value a free flow of 
(truthful) information useful for making decisions related to safety 
more than the free flow of information that can help them maximize 
the value of their leisure dollars. Surely a legislature might think 
                                                                                                                       
the Court also engages in balancing. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) 
(“[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ 
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry 
in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, 
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”); 
see also United States v. Nat’l Treas. Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995) (discussing how the 
Pickering balancing test applies to statutes that ban whole classes of employee speech, as op-
posed to individual disciplinary actions); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat’l Assoc. of 
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973).  
A hint of the true balancing approach has even surfaced in the commercial speech case law. 
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., in striking down a city ordinance that barred 
commercial newsracks from public sidewalks while permitting noncommercial ones, the Court 
held the fit prong of Central Hudson unsatisfied because the city “has not ‘carefully calculated’ 
the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition.” 507 U.S. 
410, 417 (1993). This is not what a strict reading of Central Hudson would require. Interestingly, 
nearly two decades ago, Steven Shiffrin lauded the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence for 
what he perceived as something akin to a case-by-case balancing approach. See Shiffrin, supra 
note 96, at 1252. 
171. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 
(1976). 
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so. If this is so, the question becomes why we should interpret the 
Constitution so as to foreclose the legislature from making distinc-
tions based on the value of information to the listener. To be clear, 
the issue is not whether the legislature should enjoy constitutional 
free reign to trench upon audience interests in being exposed to ad-
vertising. The more precise issue is whether constitutional doctrine 
should foreclose the judiciary from taking into account differences 
in what it adjudges the value of the communication to be to the au-
dience when exercising its power of judicial review.172 
Resolving this issue might seem to require that we confront 
the familiar objections to judicial balancing—principally that it is 
unpredictable and relies too much on the subjective value determi-
nations of individual judges.173 But perhaps this is unnecessary, for 
the present doctrine that I would replace with a more comprehen-
sive balancing is itself a balancing test of a sort.174 In requiring that 
the courts assess commercial speech regulations by reference to the 
                                                                                                                       
172. Put another way, even assuming arguendo that the effects of speech restrictions in re-
ducing people’s access to communication are always of potential constitutional significance, it 
does not follow that the constitutional analysis need treat preferences in receiving communica-
tions of every imaginable variety as of equal constitutional value. 
173. The most valuable scholarly discussions of balancing include T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 75-
83 (1997); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); and James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of 
Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 805-06 (1995). A 
third objection holds that the very enterprise is incoherent. As Justice Scalia memorably put it: 
“[T]he scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensu-
rate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” 
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). To 
this, Richard Fallon’s response can hardly be improved upon:  
[So long as] “balancing” is viewed as a metaphor for multifactor decisionmak-
ing, the “incommensurability” objection becomes either too strong or too weak. 
It is too strong to be credited at all—because too inconsistent with the deepest 
assumptions of practical reasoning—if it suggests that, when different kinds of 
considerations bear on a decision, there can be “no basis in our knowledge of 
value” to say that one decision is rationally preferable to another. In contrast, if 
the claim allows that rational “comparability” is possible (even if “commensura-
bility,” in the sense of measurement according to a single metric, is not), then it 
is too weak to show that balancing in the metaphorical sense should be aban-
doned as an approach to legal . . . decisionmaking. 
Fallon, supra, at 80 (internal citations omitted). 
174. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions 
Law: A Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, 55 ALB. L. REV. 605, 606 (1992) (“Interme-
diate scrutiny is real balancing.”). My point above was only that it is obscuring to use a single 
term to refer both to immediate scrutiny and true balancing tests like Pike and Timmons. It was 
not to deny that the different sorts of tests share characteristics in common. Indeed, we might 
usefully think of Timmons and Central Hudson as both belonging to the balancing genus, 
whereas only Timmons belongs to the balancing species. 
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substantiality of the government interest, the directness with which 
the regulation advances that interest, and the closeness of means-
ends fit, Central Hudson already exhibits the vices of judicial sub-
jectivity and lack of predictability. So long, then, as the alternative 
to ad hoc balancing is a nonabsolutist test—like Central Hudson or 
strict scrutiny—that is responsive to differences in character and 
magnitude of state interest, a balancing of the sort I propose—one 
that is sensitive to differences on both sides of the ledger—cannot 
fairly be rejected on the strength of the usual objections to balanc-
ing.175 
The better-tailored objection to two-handed balancing, as op-
posed to its one-handed cousin, then, probably arises from a concern 
that courts will systematically undervalue audience interests. 
While I would not dismiss this worry out of hand, the tension it 
creates with well-settled Supreme Court practice cannot be ignored. 
When focusing on the governmental interest side of the ledger, the 
Court has frequently determined, in a variety of contexts, that the 
state’s interest in protecting safety and health is qualitatively 
greater than its interest in conserving fiscal resources.176 What this 
really means, of course, is that an interest in protecting the people’s 
health and safety is greater than an interest in saving the people’s 
money. But if these differences are properly accounted for on one 
side of the constitutional balance, much more needs to be said to 
explain why the courts are not competent to effectuate the very 
same judgment on the other side as well. That is, if the Court may 
declare that interests in health and safety are qualitatively greater 
than financial interests, then, all else being equal, government ac-
tion that restricts communication that principally advances audi-
ence interests related to health or safety should raise greater con-
stitutional concerns—i.e., impose a heavier burden of justification—
                                                                                                                       
175. For an argument that intermediate and strict scrutiny routinely, perhaps inevitably, in-
volve bilateral balancing, see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 31-33. Concededly, to the extent that judicial application of Central Hudson turns espe-
cially on questions of fit, the two-handed balancing I propose would add an additional dimension 
of value judgment. 
176. Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, for example, the Court has repeatedly attributed 
special importance to state interests in promoting safety. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freight-
ways, 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (plurality opinion) (citing many cases for the proposition that 
“regulations that touch upon safety—especially highway safety—are those that the Court has 
been most reluctant to invalidate” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). And in the 
equal protection context, the Court has held that administrative ease and convenience—and 
consequent financial savings—are interests of insufficient importance to justify gender-based 
classifications. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
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than communication that principally advances audience interests of 
a financial nature. 
A summary is in order. First, this part argued that regula-
tions of commercial advertising can differ markedly in terms of the 
character and magnitude of the audience interests they affect. Sec-
ond, it observed that Central Hudson is unable to recognize these 
differences, and proposed that a more rational commercial speech 
jurisprudence should be able to do so. Third, it briefly considered, 
and rejected, objections to a constitutional doctrine that would be 
more sensitive to those differences. This does not yet determine 
precisely what that doctrine should look like.177 Although true ad 
hoc balancing is one obvious possibility, there might exist a range of 
alternatives that would be more sensible than Central Hudson.178 
Whatever the approach taken, the casino advertising barred by 
Puerto Rico must certainly rate near the low end of the scale. If au-
dience interests in receiving commercial communication are pro-
tected by any sort of test that is sensitive to real-life differences in 
the character of those interests and the extent to which they are 
impaired, the Puerto Rico casino advertising ban at issue in Posa-
das is likely to fare pretty well. Surely the public’s interest in re-
ceiving casino advertising is of sufficiently slight importance as to 
generate a correspondingly slight justificatory burden upon the 
government. 
VI. CITIZEN INTERESTS AND IMPERMISSIBLE PURPOSES 
Focusing on speaker interests, Part IV concluded that the 
casino operators had no constitutional grounds for complaint be-
cause they validly waived their First Amendment interests when 
accepting the government’s noncoercive conditional offer to operate 
                                                                                                                       
177. Cf. Post, supra note 22, at 54 (“If commercial speech is constitutionally valuable because 
it conveys information to facilitate better public decision making, then constitutional analysis 
ought to assess the impact of government regulations on the circulation of information, using as 
a standard of assessment the potential effect on public decision making and public opinion. . . . 
The exact parameters of any such test would no doubt require much careful consideration.”). 
178. One example would be a definitional balancing approach that recognizes more grada-
tions within the universe of speech than simply commercial and noncommercial. Perhaps, for 
instance, regulations of commercial advertising that threaten consumer interests in health or 
safety should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny whereas regulations that implicate other 
sorts of interests might provoke only rational basis review. I am inclined to believe that such an 
approach would raise a host of difficult questions—including ones related to the difference be-
tween facial and as-applied challenges—and I am far from advocating it. I mention this only to 
show that ad hoc balancing along the lines of Pike or Timmons is not the only conceivable solu-
tion. 
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casinos. Focusing on audience interests, Part V argued that, even 
though the First Amendment should be (and has been) construed to 
protect interests of the communication’s audience, not all informa-
tion reductions should require equally compelling governmental 
interests to sustain them. A ban on casino advertising, it contended 
further, should be scrutinized more leniently than Central Hudson 
would provide. This part examines the systemic interests of the 
citizenry in restraining government from aggrandizing its own 
power. 
Let us begin by clarifying just what this interest looks like. 
First, although the systemic or structural interest underlying free-
dom of expression overlaps the speaker and (especially) audience 
interests, it is importantly distinct. The audience interest refers to 
non-speakers’ interest in actually being exposed to particular com-
munication. For some communications, however, there may in fact 
be no potential listener with an interest in hearing what the 
speaker would like to communicate. Think, for instance, of the Na-
zis’ march in Skokie. However, the citizenry has a long-term struc-
tural interest in government not acting as the censor, even if none 
of its members has any interest in hearing the speech that, on a 
particular occasion, the government proposes to silence. 
The second point follows from the first. Whereas the indi-
vidualistic dimension of constitutional rights is generally oriented 
to the rather immediate interests of the rights-holder, the struc-
tural dimension of constitutional rights often assumes a more ex-
pansive perspective. Put somewhat differently, whereas interests of 
individual speakers, and even of individual sets of listeners, can be 
threatened by specific acts of government, including the enactment 
of specific laws, the citizenry’s interest in restraining governmental 
power attaches to the more general practices that individual acts 
and laws instantiate. And this has a further consequence. Insofar 
as we are concerned with how discrete laws impact upon discrete 
individuals, we are likely to think in terms of the means that the 
law employs (e.g., is it coercive? discriminatory?) and the effects 
that it has. But insofar as government action might be unconstitu-
tional because the practice under which it falls is thought likely to 
produce bad results over the long run, the practice is likely to be 
defined, at least in part, in terms of impermissible government pur-
poses.179 In sum, when, or to the extent that, a constitutional right 
                                                                                                                       
179. I am agnostic here and throughout the Article regarding whether references to govern-
mental purposes should be construed “subjectively” in terms of what actually motivated deci-
sionmakers or “objectively” in terms of the motivations that would be inferred from more circum-
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right serves a systemic or structural function, we should not be 
surprised to see it protected by a purpose test.180 
And, indeed, one purpose test does emerge time and again in 
the commercial speech case law. It appears at least as far back as 
Virginia Pharmacy, where Virginia defended its ban on price adver-
tising by pharmacists as a means to preserve the relationship be-
tween customer and professional pharmacist from destruction by 
presumably low-quality discounters, thus provoking the Court to 
observe “that the State’s protectiveness of its citizens rests in large 
measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance.”181 This 
motivation, the Court concluded, rendered the ban unconstitu-
tional: “It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of 
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely 
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.”182 Ever since, 
individual Justices have frequently reiterated the view that state 
action undertaken for the purpose of suppressing information is a 
special type of First Amendment evil. In Central Hudson, for exam-
ple, Justice Blackmun, Virginia Pharmacy’s author, concurred in 
the judgment precisely to reject the majority’s adoption of interme-
diate scrutiny, and to opine that strict scrutiny should “be applied 
when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in or-
der to manipulate a private economic decision,”183 and Justice Ste-
vens concurred to a similar effect in Coors Brewing.184 More re-
cently, Justice Thomas has put the position even more strongly, 
arguing in 44 Liquormart that “the government’s asserted inter-
est . . . to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order 
to manipulate their choices in the marketplace . . . is per se illegiti-
mate . . . .”185  
                                                                                                                       
scribed classes of evidence. A still useful exploration of this issue is John Hart Ely, Legislative 
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970). 
180. For elaboration of this observation, see Berman, supra note 55, at 25 n.100. To be more 
precise, we would expect that the judicial test turns either directly upon purposes or upon other 
factors that are adopted as proxies for the purposes that are deemed constitutionally bad. 
181. 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976). 
182. Id. at 770. 
183. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
184. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 498 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Con-
gress may limit directly the alcoholic content of malt beverages. But Congress may not seek to 
accomplish the same purpose through a policy of consumer ignorance, at the expense of the free-
speech rights of the sellers and purchasers.”). 
185. 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). Unfortunately, it is hard to reconcile 
this view with the fact that Thomas joined the Supreme Court majority in granting a stay of the 
recount in Bush v. Gore, 513 U.S. 1046 (2000). In an opinion defending the stay, Justice Scalia 
explained that “[t]he counting of votes that are of questionable legality . . . threaten[s] irrepara-
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Justice Brennan thought this rule was enough to condemn 
the advertising ban at issue in Posadas. As he explained in his dis-
sent, “where the government seeks to suppress the dissemination of 
nonmisleading commercial speech relating to legal activities, for 
fear that recipients will act on the information provided, such regu-
lation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”186 Thus, strict 
scrutiny should apply “where, as here, the government seeks to 
suppress commercial speech in order to deprive consumers of accu-
rate information concerning lawful activity.”187 
I think Brennan was wrong. Even supposing that heightened 
scrutiny—perhaps even a per se rule of invalidity—should apply 
whenever government acts for the purpose of promoting “ignorance” 
or “suppressing information,”188 it is naive to suppose that all regu-
lations limiting advertising are animated by such a purpose. Pay 
close attention to Brennan’s language. Over the course of two 
pages, he says essentially the same thing no fewer than seven 
times, each time emphasizing the impropriety of government acting 
for the purpose of suppressing information.189 But the notion that 
advertising has much to do with conveying information in the ordi-
                                                                                                                       
ble harm to [Governor Bush], and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be 
the legitimacy of his election.” Id. at 512 (Scalia, J., concurring). As David Strauss has observed, 
“The premise of this argument is that there is a legitimate interest in suppressing truthful in-
formation—information about what the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court would 
have disclosed—in order to protect the President of the United States from political harm.” 
David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 184, 190 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). 
186. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 351 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
187. Id. at 350 (emphasis added). 
188. Of course, maybe this proposition should be resisted. The argument of Part V might be 
adapted in support of the view that the level of judicial scrutiny should vary depending upon the 
type of information that government seeks to keep from the citizens. After all, the principal pro-
ponents of the view that government may not act for the purpose of suppressing information 
apparently agree that the government may permissibly regulate commercial speech for the pur-
pose of suppressing false information. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 
U.S. 410, 432-33 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring). And this position might suggest a contin-
uum: government needs only slight justification when regulating for the purpose of suppressing 
false commercial information, compelling justification when regulating for the purpose of sup-
pressing some specified sorts of true information, and moderate justification when regulating for 
the purpose of suppressing other specified sorts of true information. I am not sympathetic to this 
argument partly because I believe that balancing (definitional or otherwise) makes more sense 
as part of an effects test geared to audience interests than as part of a purpose test designed to 
protect systemic interests. But developing this intuition would take us far afield. 
189. See also, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 350 (asserting that the government 
has sought “to suppress commercial speech in order to deprive consumers of accurate information 
concerning lawful activity”); id. at 351 (asserting that “the government seeks to manipulate 
private behavior by depriving citizens of truthful information concerning lawful activities”). 
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nary sense of “knowledge” or “a collection of facts or data”190 is 
quaint. As Ronald Collins and David Skover have persuasively ar-
gued, “[t]he history of modern advertising is the story of the general 
movement from product-information to image and lifestyle advertis-
ing.”191 Today, “[i]mage, not information, is the touchstone of much 
of our commercial discourse.”192 This basic description (which read-
ers who have personally encountered advertising can perhaps con-
firm for themselves) is accepted even by their critics. Alex Kozinski 
and Stuart Banner, for example, acknowledge, as “unlikely to be 
disputed,” that “[m]uch advertising is about conveying product im-
ages, or molding consumers’ own self-images, rather than about 
conveying information about products themselves,” and that “much 
advertising is nonsense.”193 
According to Collins and Skover, this more realistic picture 
of commercial advertising justifies removing commercial speech 
from the First Amendment’s protective embrace.194 And it is here 
that their critics jump ship. As Kozinski and Banner argue: 
The First Amendment, one might think, prevents the people’s representatives in 
legislatures from prohibiting speech the majority doesn’t like. That’s the whole 
point. People might quibble about why that should be so, or about the values 
served by the freedom of speech, but there seems to be no debate that the First 
Amendment bars the majority from suppressing the speech of some simply because 
others find it to have little value. 
  Given that premise, it strikes us as odd to argue that a particular form of speech 
shouldn’t receive First Amendment protection solely because that speech has little 
value. This is exactly the type of argument the First Amendment should foreclose. 
People value speech differently, and all sorts of different people think that all sorts 
of different speech is valueless or downright pernicious.195 
Arguably this is not entirely responsive. The distinction they 
would favor, Collins and Skover might rejoin, depends not upon 
contestable judgments of high and low value, but upon qualitative 
                                                                                                                       
190. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 927 (3d ed. 1992); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1160 (1993). 
191. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
697, 700 (1993). 
192. Id. at 736. 
193. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 113, at 748; see also Smolla, supra note 160, at 778 
(agreeing “that the basic descriptive portrait of contemporary advertising drawn by Collins and 
Skover is realistic”). 
194. Collins & Skover, supra note 191, at 726 (“All of these consequences of commercial 
communication might prompt us to reconsider the structure of traditional First Amendment 
analysis. Is the central question, as typically thought, whether commercial expression should 
receive constitutional protection? Or is it whether the government should act affirmatively to 
fortify the First Amendment wall against the battering ram of commercial advertising?”). 
195. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 113, at 751-52. 
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differences between speech that has cognitive content and speech 
that has only emotional or subliminal appeal.196 But this distinction 
is no more satisfactory, and the Supreme Court has rejected it out-
side of the commercial speech arena. As Justice Harlan powerfully 
put it in Cohen v. California:197 “We cannot sanction the view that 
the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of indi-
vidual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function 
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important ele-
ment of the overall message sought to be communicated.”198 And for 
reasons Sylvia Law has urged, this seems plainly right: “[A] broad 
principle curtailing or denying First Amendment protection for im-
age advertising justifies suppression of much speech that forms a 
valuable part of our culture. More damaging, however, the distinc-
tion between informational and emotive speech undermines the 
First Amendment protection for vulnerable artistic and personal 
expression.”199 
I fully agree with the critics. Indeed, even much core political 
speech is as heavily emotive and lightly informational as is com-
mercial advertising. So it bears emphasis that I aim to make much 
less ambitious use of the fact that advertising is not really about 
conveying information.200 I do not take this to mean that commer-
                                                                                                                       
196. An argument along these lines is advanced in Lowenstein, supra note 65, at 1225-37, 
and critiqued in, for example, McGowan, supra note 22, at 411-29. Similarly, Martin Redish 
argued in 1971 that only “informational advertising,” and not “persuasive advertising,” should be 
protected, Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and 
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 445-47 (1971), only to disavow this 
same distinction a decade later, see Redish, supra note 93, at 630 n.135. Redish was right to 
reject this line of argument. My distinction is drawn in terms of the (predominant) regulatory 
purposes, not the (predominant) character of the speech being regulated (though I recognize, of 
course, that the two principles of classification will yield extensional overlap). Thus, for the 
Puerto Rico casino advertising ban to fall on the right side of the line, I need not make the 
“plainly misplaced” assumption (as McGowan correctly observes that Lowenstein must) “that the 
advertisements in Posadas were noninformational.” McGowan, supra note 22, at 423. 
197. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning conviction for the wearing of a jacket bearing the lan-
guage “Fuck the Draft” under a statute prohibiting “offensive conduct”). 
198. Id. at 26. 
199. Law, supra note 22, at 933; see also, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 22, at 800-05; Smolla, 
supra note 160, at 782 (arguing that “the distinction that is central to the Collins and Skover 
argument, a distinction that seeks to drive a wedge between the rational and irrational compo-
nents of advertising, is one that has been repudiated in virtually all other areas of current First 
Amendment doctrine”). 
200. Although, as we have seen, Kozinski and Banner vehemently disagreed with the legal 
conclusion that Collins and Skover advanced, they acknowledged the importance of taking a 
realistic view of the matter being regulated: 
[Collins and Skover have] convincingly demonstrated that the practice of adver-
tising out there in the world looks quite a bit different from the descriptions of 
advertising in the opinions of appellate courts. Regardless of whether this di-
vergence has any implications for the First Amendment, it is an important 
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cial speech warrants no constitutional protection, or even that it 
warrants less protection than more information-heavy speech. My 
point is simple. The grievous sin often thought present in Posadas 
was that Puerto Rico had adopted its casino advertising ban for the 
purpose of promoting “ignorance” or suppressing “information.”201 
But one might wonder precisely what information these critics sup-
posed the legislature was trying to keep its residents ignorant of—
that the casinos existed? Surely not.202 Indeed, it is far from self-
evident—and almost certainly false—that the legislature acted for 
the purpose of suppressing information at all.203 Much more plausi-
bly, the advertising ban was driven not to maintain consumer “ig-
norance” of any facts or “information,” but to protect the public 
from the noncognitive affective force of advertising. Stated differ-
ently, the informational content of casino advertising was most 
probably not the government’s target when enacting the advertising 
ban; its nonrational, want-creating function was.204 In short, the 
                                                                                                                       
point in itself. If courts are going to apply the First Amendment to commercial 
speech with any coherence, they should have a grasp of what commercial speech 
actually is. 
Kozinski & Banner, supra note 113, at 747. I agree. My objective in this part is to turn the de-
scriptive claim elaborated by Collins and Skover (among others) to different legal effect. 
201. See 478 U.S. 328, 358 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that Puerto Rico 
may not suppress the dissemination of truthful information about entirely lawful activity merely 
to keep its residents ignorant.”); see also Halberstam, supra note 22, at 858 (“In both Posadas 
and Edge Broadcasting, the reason for keeping the information from potential consumers was 
not based on a concern about such information coming from any seller, but simply on a desire to 
keep such information from the audience as a general matter.”); cf. Redish, supra note 22, at 604 
(“An inherent assumption underlying a total ban on tobacco advertising . . . is that the citizenry 
cannot be trusted to make proper judgments on the basis of exposure to truthful advocacy on 
behalf of a lawful activity. The premise of the proposed ban, then, is that individuals are incapa-
ble of making their own judgments on the basis of the expression of competing views and infor-
mation.” (internal citation omitted)). 
202. Cf. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993) (“Congress clearly was 
entitled to determine that broadcast of promotional advertising of lotteries undermines North 
Carolina’s policy against gambling, even if the North Carolina audience is not wholly unaware of 
the lottery’s existence. Congress has, for example, altogether banned the broadcast advertising of 
cigarettes, even though it could hardly have believed that this regulation would keep the public 
wholly ignorant of the availability of cigarettes.”). 
203.  To be sure, as we saw in Part V, the ban would have the effect of reducing dissemina-
tion of some information (hours of operation, the existence of special promotions, comparative 
payout rates, etc.), an effect that no doubt could have been predicted. But acting with knowledge 
of likely consequences is not the same as acting for the purpose of producing those consequences. 
And the difference often matters in practical, ethical, and legal reasoning. See, e.g., MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985) (differentiating purposely and knowingly as levels of criminal 
culpability). 
204.  As William Van Alstyne noted, legislators who suppress advertising are often exploiting 
“a simple psychological truth (‘out of sight, out of mind’).” Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 508 n.8. 
Needless to say, that something is “out of mind” within contemplation of this maxim does not 
mean that the actor doesn’t know it, but only that she’s not thinking about it. 
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Puerto Rico legislature is often lambasted for engaging in a consti-
tutional sin—regulating for the purpose of keeping its citizens igno-
rant—of which it was almost certainly innocent.  
Again, so what? One might object that even if Puerto Rico 
was not trying to suppress “information” or keep its residents “igno-
rant,” its purposes were nonetheless constitutionally improper. 
Perhaps. That is indeed the debate worth having. Notice, though, 
that this argument comes without support from the major premise 
that the state may not act for the purpose of suppressing informa-
tion or keeping its citizens ignorant—a premise that Justice Bren-
nan thought important enough to employ an average of once every 
page of his dissent. The challenge for Posadas’s opponents, then, is 
to identify precisely what purpose or motivation thought to animate 
Puerto Rico’s casino advertising ban runs afoul of the First 
Amendment. Although a comprehensive assessment of all possible 
candidates cannot, of course, be attempted here, examining some of 
the more obvious proposals will provide a flavor of the task’s diffi-
culty. 
Start with these possible rules that have appeared in the 
case law and the commentary. The regulation of private speech 
should provoke significantly heightened scrutiny (or even be subject 
to a per se rule of invalidity) whenever imposed (1) “for the purpose 
of manipulating public behavior”;205 (2) out of paternalistic regard 
for the audience;206 (3) because the government fears “that the 
speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the gov-
ernment considers harmful”;207 (4) “out of concern for its likely 
                                                                                                                       
205. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Redish, supra note 
22, at 605-06 (“[I]f our constitutional system allows government to control expression out of a 
fear that the public cannot be trusted to make proper judgments on the basis of that expression, 
the only remaining question concerns a determination of which potential public choices the gov-
ernment deems unwise. No meaningful system of free expression can flourish if government is 
given such a power.”). Notice, incidentally, how Redish links the structural dimension of freedom 
of speech to the policing of governmental purposes. 
206. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1995) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (“[T]he Government’s asserted interest, that consumers should be misled or uninformed for 
their own protection, does not suffice to justify restrictions on protected speech in any context, 
whether under ‘exacting scrutiny’ or some other standard.” (first emphasis added)). The an-
tipaternalistic theme of many of the Court’s commercial speech decisions is traced in Stern, su-
pra note 86, at 58-72. 
207. Strauss, supra note 22, at 335 (adding that “[p]ut another way, harmful consequences 
resulting from the persuasive effects of speech may not be any part of the justification for re-
stricting speech”). Thomas Scanlon had earlier raised a nearly identical idea, see Thomas Scan-
lon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972), only to repudiate it, see 
T.M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 532-
34 (1979). 
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communicative impact”;208 or (5) “based on hostility—or favorit-
ism—towards the underlying message expressed.”209 Call these, 
respectively, the manipulation principle, the paternalism principle, 
the persuasion principle, the communicative-impact principle, and 
the ideology principle.210 Added to the ignorance principle that we 
have already examined—that government may not suppress speech 
for the purpose of keeping its citizens ignorant—this makes six 
closely related purpose-based rules.211 Although these different 
principles often appear clumped together and will overlap in their 
conclusions, each differs from the others both intentionally and ex-
tensionally.212 My strategy is to tease them apart and consider them 
separately. My conclusions are as follows: The manipulation and 
paternalism principles are questionable as general principles and, 
in any event, do not condemn Puerto Rico’s casino advertising ban; 
the persuasion principle seems plausible, but also very possibly 
does not condemn the casino advertising ban; and the communica-
tive-impact and ideology principles probably would condemn the 
casino advertising ban, but are not sound rules when applied to 
noncoercive speech regulations. 
Consider first the manipulation and paternalism principles. 
Of course, government is not generally prohibited from acting “for 
the purpose of manipulating public behavior.”213 Large swaths of 
the law—from criminal law to torts to many parts of the tax code—
are motivated by little else. Nor does the purposeful manipulation 
of public behavior automatically raise constitutional concerns when 
it is done for paternalistic reasons. A great number of laws that 
regulate or bar victimless conduct (drug use, gambling, driving 
                                                                                                                       
208. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990). 
209. R.A.V. v. City of  St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
210. I am here following and extending the work of David Strauss, who coined the phrase 
“the persuasion principle” in reference to candidate rule (2). Furthermore, my label “the ideology 
principle” for the rule announced in R.A.V. derives from Elena Kagan’s defense and elaboration 
of that rule in Kagan, supra note 103, where she distinguishes between “harm-based” and “ideo-
logical” reasons for restrictions of speech. See id. at 430. As Kagan describes it, what I have 
called the ideology principle differs from Strauss’s persuasion principle in “posit[ing] that the 
government is forbidden from restricting speech on the ground that it will persuade people to 
adopt wrong or false opinions (rather than persuade people to take actions causing harm).” Id. at 
436 n.68. 
211. A distinction between purpose and motive might plausibly be drawn here, but I follow 
conventional wisdom in treating purpose and motive as synonymous. See Berman, supra note 55, 
at 23 n.87 (citing authorities). 
212. For example: a ban on loud communications could be based on paternalistic reasons but 
have nothing to do with the speech’s communicative impact; a ban on speech could be adopted to 
manipulate public behavior, but not for paternalistic reasons, etc. 
213. See supra note 205. 
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without a seatbelt, etc.), though often rationalized as concerned 
with negative externalities, are undoubtedly paternalistic at their 
core. Accordingly, the question is why these purposes should taint 
laws that proceed by regulating expression but not by prohibiting 
conduct. And the most plausible answer, I think, proceeds along 
lines proposed by Professor Strauss and noted earlier: it is one 
thing to prevent people from satisfying their desires, but the First 
Amendment stands against government action designed to prevent 
people from formulating those desires in the first place.214 
This is not persuasive.215 Desires are formulated by experi-
ence as much as, if not more than, by the receipt of communication. 
No matter how many accounts I might read of, say, the use of puta-
tively mind-expanding drugs or riding a motorcycle without a hel-
met, I cannot really know what these experiences are like—and 
therefore whether they are things I very much want to do—unless I 
have done them. And that is precisely what the law forbids.216 Much 
more needs to be said, then, to explain why the First Amendment 
should be construed to make speech special in the particular sense 
that it forecloses government from enacting speech regulations to 
advance precisely the paternalistic and/or manipulative purposes 
government may pursue with ease via regulations of conduct. 
Moreover, even were these sound principles of First Amend-
ment law, that they would damn the casino advertising restrictions 
at issue in Posadas is very doubtful. This is more apparent with 
respect to the paternalism principle. Justice Brennan, after all, 
surmised “that the legislature chose to restrict casino advertising 
not because of the ‘evils’ of casino gambling, but because it pre-
ferred that Puerto Ricans spend their gambling dollars on the 
Puerto Rico lottery.”217 To the extent this is true, the law was not 
paternalistic (although Brennan notably did not consider that a 
point in the statute’s favor). 
As for the manipulation principle, all depends upon what is 
meant by manipulation. This is another place where some realism 
about the manipulative effects of advertising becomes important. If 
                                                                                                                       
214. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
215. A narrowly utilitarian objection that I do not rely upon might observe that, if utility is 
measured by the satisfaction of wants, preventing people from developing wants in the first place 
reduces utility less than does preventing people from satisfying wants that they already have. 
216. Actually, Texas law would allow me to ride a motorcycle helmetless. But the First 
Amendment would not prevent Texas from following the many states that prohibit it. 
217. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 354 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). But see Lowenstein, supra note 65, at 1243 (claiming that Posadas “presented as pure a 
paternalism issue as the Court has seen”). 
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government’s hostility to particular speech stems from belief in that 
speech’s manipulative character (a premise that would be plausible 
sometimes, though not always), it seems inapt to characterize a re-
striction on that speech as itself manipulative. Recall the story of 
Odysseus and the Sirens. Concerned with the seductive and ma-
nipulative character of the Sirens’ song, Odysseus had himself tied 
to the mast and his sailors’ ears plugged. To describe the earplug-
ging order as enacted for the purpose of manipulating the sailors’ 
behavior seems wrong. And that conclusion should not change if 
Odysseus, magically granted authority over the Sirens, had ordered 
them not to sing as his ship went by. 
Similar things could be said about the persuasion principle. 
Strauss identifies Posadas as the one case other than those that by 
1991 “ha[d] already been discredited, in which the Court explicitly 
rejected the persuasion principle.”218 If the persuasion principle is 
right, he concluded, then Posadas was clearly wrong.219  
But Posadas did not “explicitly” reject the persuasion princi-
ple. Indeed, I doubt that Posadas rejected that principle even im-
plicitly. “ ‘Persuade,’ ” Strauss is careful to emphasize, “does not 
mean simply ‘induce.’ ‘Persuasion’ denotes a process of appealing in 
some sense, to reason.”220 As something close to a subset of the ig-
norance principle, the persuasion principle “prohibits the govern-
ment from deliberately denying information to people for the pur-
pose of influencing their behavior.”221 Thus, “like certain forms of 
liberalism,” it is “highly rationalistic; from the point of view . . . [of 
the persuasion principle,] speech is valuable only to the extent that 
it furthers rational decision making.”222 
But if all of this is so, one is entitled to wonder about 
Strauss’s confident assertion that Posadas violated the principle. 
Indeed, at first blush one might think that many restrictions on 
advertising should be permissible on grounds Strauss explicitly ac-
knowledges—namely, that in addition to false statements of fact, 
“[a]nother candidate for exclusion from the persuasion principle is 
                                                                                                                       
218. Strauss, supra note 22, at 359. 
219. Id. at 345. 
220. Id. at 335. 
221. Id. at 355. This particular passage makes the persuasion principle look like a subset of 
the ignorance principle insofar as it bars the purposeful suppression of information out of con-
cern for the persuasive effect of that speech, a qualification that the ignorance principle does not 
contain. Notwithstanding this passage, though, I suspect that whether the communication sup-
pressed is “informational” is not really critical to the persuasion principle, as it might be to the 
ignorance principle, in which event neither of the two principles would be a subset of the other. 
222. Id. at 370. 
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speech that seeks to precipitate an ill-considered reaction.”223 
Strauss does not, however, expressly address this possibility. In-
stead, he proceeds to problematize the category: “The true problem 
with allowing the government to restrict speech that precipitates an 
ill-considered reaction is . . . that every action is to some degree ill-
considered. . . . That is why this category is so ill-defined—because 
potentially it includes all manipulative private speech, a very broad 
category indeed.”224 
The oddity is that although Strauss defines the persuasion 
principle itself in terms of government’s motives or reasons for ac-
tion, he defines the “unclear and troublesome” category of “speech 
that seeks to precipitate an ill-considered reaction”225 in terms of 
the character of the speech itself.226 This disparity of categorizing 
principle cannot, I think, be coherently maintained. But the asym-
metry could be cured by recognizing that much communication con-
tains information as well as a capacity to induce ill-considered ac-
tion. In other words, any given speech designed to induce action can 
operate both by providing rational reasons for action and by seduc-
ing the listener in nonrational ways. Accordingly, the scope of the 
protection the persuasion principle affords should depend upon 
categorizing, not the communication being regulated, but rather the 
reasons animating the regulation. It might follow that, consistent 
with its rationalistic underpinnings, the persuasion principle by its 
own force prohibits (absolutely or presumptively) governmental ac-
tion that purposely “den[ies] information to people for the [further] 
purpose of influencing their behavior,”227 whereas the more general 
concern with manipulation and coercion that Strauss describes as a 
close cousin to the persuasion principle228 imposes a like prohibition 
against governmental action that coerces speakers for the purpose 
of manipulating the behavior of listeners, whether or not govern-
ment’s purpose is to suppress information. Because Puerto Rico’s 
casino advertising ban was arguably not adopted for the purpose of 
denying information and was not coercive, then Posadas is not so 
clear an exception to the persuasion principle as Strauss supposes. 
Lastly, consider the communicative-impact and ideology 
principles. The communicative-impact principle has been described 
                                                                                                                       
223. Id. at 335. 
224. Id. at 367. 
225. Id. at 335. 
226. See id. at 365 (asserting that “the persuasion principle . . . does not protect false state-
ments of fact or statements that seek to precipitate ill-considered action”). 
227. Id. at 355. 
228. See, e.g., id. at 355-59. 
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as declaring that “[t]he government may not restrict speech for any 
reason having to do with either the messages embedded in the 
speech or the consequences of those messages.”229 The ideology 
principle “prevents government from proscribing speech . . . because 
of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”230 Although the conclusion is 
not unchallengeable (much depends on what “message” and “idea” 
mean for purposes of these principles), Puerto Rico’s casino adver-
tising ban would seem to run afoul of each of these principles. The 
Puerto Rico legislature enacted the restriction out of concern that 
casino advertising would cause audience members to act in a cer-
tain way—namely, to engage in casino gambling—and because of 
hostility to the underlying message that residents should do pre-
cisely that. 
Accordingly, the question boils down to whether either of 
these principles states a sound rule of First Amendment doctrine. 
Important First Amendment scholars have contended that they 
do,231 and I concede that they could be right. Surely a full examina-
tion cannot be conducted in this short space. Here it will be enough, 
I think, to note how varied are the considerations that can be 
brought to bear against them. 
First, we should take seriously language from the commer-
cial speech case law that has repeatedly emphasized how particu-
larly evil is government action motivated specifically to preserve 
public ignorance. Justice Stevens put the point sharply in his Edge 
Broadcasting dissent, where he complained that “the United States 
has selected the most intrusive, and dangerous, form of regulation 
possible—a ban on truthful information regarding a lawful activity 
imposed for the purpose of manipulating, through ignorance, the 
consumer choices of some of its citizens.”232 While I do not suggest 
that the many proponents of views of this sort are now somehow 
estopped from redescribing the set of governmental purposes that 
they contend should warrant especially heightened scrutiny, I do 
                                                                                                                       
229. Kagan, supra note 103, at 435. 
230. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
231. The most prominent proponents of the communicative-impact principle include Laur-
ence Tribe and John Hart Ely. See TRIBE, supra note 22, at 789-804; John Hart Ely, Comment, 
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment 
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493-96 (1975). Elena Kagan, who has elucidated the ideology 
principle, contends that it constitutes the central organizing principle around which the great 
bulk of existing First Amendment doctrine is framed, but stops short of valorizing it. See Kagan, 
supra note 103, at 415. 
232. 509 U.S. 418, 439 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphases added). 
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believe that the repeated expression of such views reflects an un-
derlying intuition that we should not cavalierly abandon.233 
Second, without much difficulty we can identify reasons for 
the intuition that government action designed to suppress informa-
tion so as to maintain the people’s ignorance is especially perni-
cious. Most fundamentally, such a reading of the First Amendment 
is consistent with the widespread view of American political culture 
in general, and founding era political theory in particular, as highly 
rationalistic.234 Relatedly, but distinctly, it follows from central 
First Amendment dogma that, in the much-quoted words of Justice 
Brandeis, when government seeks to cure the evil it associates with 
given speech, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not en-
forced silence.”235 If (as seems plausible) the propositional aspects of 
speech are more susceptible to rebuttal by more speech than are the 
nonpropositional aspects, the “more speech” requirement has spe-
cial force in prohibiting regulatory strategies motivated by hostility 
to speech’s informational content.236 
Third, a negative point. One might reasonably worry that 
the distinction I would hope to draw—between purposes of sup-
pressing information and purposes to protect people from nonin-
formational aspects of communication—would eviscerate protection 
for artistic expression and would essentially abandon Cohen. This 
belief would be mistaken. The argument of this part would not give 
the state carte blanche to restrict speech so long as it is not moti-
vated by hostility to the speech’s informational content (somewhat 
narrowly understood). The regulation would still have to pass scru-
tiny on the dimension of effects. Much more importantly, strict 
scrutiny would apply if the state pursues such ends via coercive 
means. Indeed, nothing in this part is inconsistent with the central 
distinction of First Amendment doctrine between content-neutral 
and content-based regulations, or with efforts to operationalize the 
content-based category by reference to communicative impact.237 
                                                                                                                       
233. Robert Post draws a distinction much like the one I am proposing in recommending that 
we “distinguish between government efforts to alter public opinion by means of suppressing 
advertising and government efforts to modify behavior by means of suppressing the information 
contained in commercial speech.” Post, supra note 22, at 50. Surprisingly, though, he proceeds to 
consider the possibility (though ultimately to reject it) that the former should be treated with the 
greater suspicion. See id. at 50-53. 
234. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON (1796) (not the book, just the title). 
235. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
236. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 22, at 636 (“To the extent certain speech is easily 
susceptible to debunking by counterspeech, there seems to be less, not more, justification for 
government interference.”). 
237. See authorities cited supra note 231. 
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Whether a coercive speech regulation provokes strict scrutiny might 
well depend upon whether it was adopted out of hostility to the 
speech’s expected communicative impact.238 
To summarize: First, the structural dimension of the Free 
Speech Clause might very well entail that demanding scrutiny be 
applied whenever the state regulates private speech239 for the pur-
pose of keeping the public ignorant of information. Second, even if 
the ignorance principle is a sound rule of First Amendment law, 
that has little if any bearing on Posadas, for the casino advertising 
ban there at issue most likely was not driven by a purpose in sup-
pressing information or preserving public ignorance. Third, this 
does not establish, however, that government regulation raises no 
First Amendment worries on the dimension of purpose when en-
acted for reasons other than the suppression of “information.” In-
deed, other principles, kindred to the ignorance principle, have been 
articulated in the case law and scholarly commentary. But fourth, it 
is far from clear that any one of the most apparent candidate prin-
ciples—what I have called the manipulation, paternalism, persua-
sion, communicative-impact, and ideology principles—both (a) 
states a sound purpose-based rule of First Amendment doctrine, 
and (b) is violated by Puerto Rico’s casino advertising ban. 
                                                                                                                       
238. To see this more clearly, imagine a zoning regulation that permits bookstores but pro-
hibits the sale of sexually explicit materials. Assuming that a substantive understanding of the 
Free Speech Clause entails that individuals have a right to distribute protected material by 
means of retail stores open to the public, the regulation threatens to withhold from sellers of 
pornographic books a benefit to which they are presumptively entitled, and is therefore coercive. 
See infra Part VII.A.2. Now imagine three sorts of reasons for this coercive law: (1) to keep peo-
ple ignorant of the types of sexual practices that the pornography depicts or describes; (2) to 
protect against the coarsening of values, or the development of misogynistic impulses, that the 
consumption of pornography can produce; (3) to combat the prostitution that stores specializing 
in sexually explicit materials might attract. (Of course, this menu of possibilities is simplified for 
purposes of illustration.) Only motives of the first sort would run afoul of the ignorance or per-
suasion principles. But this need not entail that only motives of the first sort render the regula-
tion subject to strict scrutiny. If the line separating coercive speech regulations that are subject 
to strict scrutiny from coercive speech regulations that are subject to intermediate scrutiny is 
drawn in terms of whether the law is adopted out of concern for the likely communicative impact 
of particular speech (or, what is similar but not identical, out of hostility toward the expression’s 
underlying message), then only zoning regulations motivated by the third sort of reasons escape 
strict scrutiny. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-55 (1986). 
239. Surely different issues will arise when the state acts to maintain public ignorance but 
does so in its capacity as speaker. 
2002] COMMERCIAL SPEECH 763 
VII. BEYOND POSADAS 
Notwithstanding widely differing views on such matters as 
the values that the First Amendment is most fundamentally de-
signed to serve, the worth of commercial speech as measured 
against those diverse values, and the relative attractiveness of 
rules versus standards, most scholars of commercial speech have 
found common ground on one proposition: Existing commercial 
speech doctrine is a mess.240 This part explores one way to clean it 
up. Because the formulation of judicial doctrine designed to imple-
ment or enforce the constitution’s presumed meaning is a creative 
task, not an interpretive one, however, modesty is especially appro-
priate here. For one thing, I will not take myself to be writing on a 
blank slate. Although the revision I propose is, in some respects, 
fairly substantial, it is just that, a revision, and not a wholesale 
replacement. For instance, I preserve existing doctrine’s central 
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations 
and employ conventional strict scrutiny within the content-based 
track. Furthermore, I do not pretend that what I propose here is 
complete or even “correct” as far as it goes. The most I can claim is 
that its basic outlines are sound and that it is far preferable to 
what exists. It is the starting point for analysis, emphatically not 
the end point. 
Part VII.A sketches a doctrinal revision consistent with the 
arguments thus far developed. The modified and rationalized doc-
trine’s most distinctive feature is that it contains no separate track 
for regulations of “commercial speech.” Instead, a single multipart 
test applies to all regulations of speech. Part VII.B applies this test 
to a smattering of important recent commercial speech cases. This 
section fleshes out the skeletal doctrine put forth in the first section 
                                                                                                                       
240. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 335 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (stating that commercial speech “jurisprudence has become as complex and difficult to 
rationalize as the statutory advertising regulations the Court has condemned”), rev’d, 527 U.S. 
173 (1999); Halberstam, supra note 22, at 778 (“[T]he Court’s traditional commercial speech 
doctrine is in dire need of reform.”); Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech 
Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Frame-
work, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1991) (calling commercial speech doctrine “simplis-
tic,” “naive,” “ineffectual,” and “procrustean”); McGowan, supra note 22, at 448 (“The commercial 
speech doctrine is in disarray.”); Post, supra note 22, at 2 (“ ‘[C]ommercial speech’ doctrine [is] a 
notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Van Alstyne, 
supra note 22, at 1635 (“The First Amendment law of commercial speech is currently in confu-
sion.”). But see Blim, supra note 56, at 736 (concluding that “contrary to . . . the conventional 
wisdom among commentators[,] . . . the Court’s commercial speech decisions . . . form a relatively 
coherent body of law”). 
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and also enables the reader to test the test against her own case-
specific intuitions.  
A. Toward Doctrinal Reform 
Let us start with a capsule summary of the fundamental 
reasons why commercial speech doctrine has been unstable. Argua-
bly, the core rule of free speech law is that content-based regula-
tions are unconstitutional unless they satisfy “strict scrutiny,” 
which requires that the regulation be narrowly tailored, and the 
least restrictive means, to achieve a compelling governmental in-
terest.241 Applying this rule to paradigmatically commercial speech 
like advertisements is often thought problematic for two related but 
distinct reasons. First, many Justices and scholars simply believe 
that commercial speech does not implicate the core values underly-
ing the First Amendment, or advances them to a smaller degree 
than does noncommercial speech,242 and, therefore, that subjecting 
all content-based regulations of commercial speech to the exacting 
rule of strict scrutiny would yield a great many normatively unac-
ceptable outcomes.243 The second argument is in a sense parasitic 
upon the first, but it takes judicial belief in the lower value of com-
mercial speech as a brute sociological fact. Whether or not commer-
cial and noncommercial speech are of equal constitutional value, 
the argument goes, if doctrine requires judges to subject all com-
mercial speech regulations to strict scrutiny, and insofar as judges 
believe commercial speech is of lower value, they will distort the 
doctrine (consciously or not) to reach what they feel is the proper 
outcome in the case before them—namely, upholding the regula-
tion. The danger is that this has a diluting or leveling effect on 
strict scrutiny generally, thereby yielding outcomes in noncommer-
                                                                                                                       
241. This is shorthand. Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on 
Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487, 1528-34 (1995), sets forth some of the ways strict scrutiny 
has been formulated. 
242. Hence the Court’s repeated affirmation of a “common-sense” distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 
U.S. 410, 423 (1993); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 
748, 771 n.24 (1976). Sometimes this is referred to as the “ ‘common-sense’ distinction between 
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to gov-
ernment regulation, and other varieties of speech.” E.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). 
243. If the narrow tailoring and least-restrictive means requirements are taken seriously, for 
example, they would seem to disallow even mandatory health warnings on cigarette packages 
and other unhealthy or dangerous products, as well as many regulations that police deceptive 
advertising. 
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cial speech cases that are insufficiently attentive to legitimate ex-
pressive interests.244  
Considerations such as these have led the Court to place 
commercial speech in its own separate tier of constitutional value, 
garnering greater First Amendment protection than, say, obscenity, 
which gets none,245 but less than ordinary non-commercial speech. 
The major problem with this approach has centered on the diffi-
culty of adequately defining the predicate.246 The Court’s initial 
definition of “commercial speech” as speech that does “ ‘no more 
than propose a commercial transaction’ ”247 seems as administrable 
                                                                                                                       
244. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456; Schauer, supra note 56, at 1193-97; Van Alstyne, su-
pra note 22, at 1640-48. That the dilution argument is heavily predictive and does not depend 
upon accepting that commercial speech is of less value than noncommercial speech appears to be 
overlooked by its critics. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 22, at 443 (“For the argument to be at all 
relevant, the Court must first justify its belief in the inferior value of commercial speech by ref-
erence to the values of the first amendment.”); Redish, supra note 80, at 1458 (“The dilution 
concern . . . fallaciously places the conceptual cart before the horse. Unless one can justify ra-
tionally, at the outset, the distinction in treatment between the different types of expression in 
terms of free speech theory, the dilution criticism is misplaced.”). Kozinski and Banner, for ex-
ample, assert that “[t]he argument seems to assume that the total amount of first amendment 
protection available for judges to draw upon is constant, so that protecting speech in one place 
will leave less protection for speech in another place where we might really need it.” Kozinski & 
Banner, supra note 22, at 648. But they misconceive the underlying assumption, which is that 
judges (including Supreme Court Justices) who are dispositionally inclined to view regulations of 
(some sorts of) commercial speech leniently will undertake the analyses mandated by strict scru-
tiny—such as what constitutes a “compelling” governmental interest and how close a fit is re-
quired to satisfy the demand of “narrow tailoring”—laxly in commercial speech cases, thereby 
diluting the protection of that test for all future cases. This is a prediction, thus may not be true, 
but it is not responsive to rejoin that “[p]rotecting commercial speech less than noncommercial 
speech leads exactly to what you would think—not enough protection for speech implicating 
economic concerns.” Id. There is no inconsistency between this latter position and the dilution 
claim that protecting commercial speech the same as noncommercial speech leads to not enough 
protection for speech implicating noneconomic concerns.  
Martin Redish goes even farther than do Kozinski and Banner, in arguing that commercial 
speech doctrine might lead not only to insufficient protection for speech implicating economic 
concerns, but for all speech via a process Redish terms “reverse-dilution.” According to Redish, 
“[i]f the Court accepts a justification for the regulation of commercial speech that is in no way 
tied to the unique nature of that form of expression, there exists the danger that the same logic 
will be employed to uphold a similar regulation of noncommercial speech.” Redish, supra note 22, 
at 592; see also Redish, supra note 80, at 1456-58. Nat Stern analyzes this claim, see Stern, supra 
note 86, at 107-10, concluding that “the phenomenon of reverse dilution is suspect in theory and 
unsupported in practice.” Id. at 108. 
245. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
246. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 86, at 75 (“The argument for abolition of the commercial 
speech doctrine is based mainly on the contention that commercial expression, in its nature and 
its promotion of First Amendment values, cannot be categorically distinguished from non-
commercial speech.”). 
247. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). A broader definition, beset by similar 
difficulties, appears in Central Hudson, where the Court defines commercial speech as “expres-
sion related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” 447 U.S. 557, 561 
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a definition as most that occur in constitutional law. But, of course, 
it is nearly a null set. Almost all speech that one would be disposed 
to label “commercial” does something more than propose a commer-
cial transaction, and much does not do even that. Unfortunately, 
once this administrable but inadequate definition is rejected, noth-
ing has appeared to take its place that is not intolerably vague or 
ambiguous,248 or that does not threaten to expand the category of 
commercial speech beyond what can plausibly be defended as low 
value249 (e.g., “speech undertaken for a profit motive”), or both.250 
Consequently, the Court has candidly acknowledged “the difficulty 
of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in 
a distinct category.”251 
In this part, I accept (without defending) both that a defini-
tion of “commercial speech” that is workable and normatively ac-
ceptable is likely unattainable,252 and that the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                       
(1980). Naturally, this definition cannot do without the qualifier “solely,” but cannot cover much 
with it. 
248. One might think Robert Post’s recent definition of commercial speech “as the set of 
communicative acts about commercial subjects that within a public communicative sphere con-
vey information of relevance to democratic decision making but that do not themselves form part 
of public discourse,” Post, supra note 22, at 25, falls into this category. 
249. For an extreme example, see Kenton F. Machina, Freedom of Expression in Commerce, 3 
LAW & PHIL. 375, 377 (1984) (defining commercial speech as “any expression concerned with 
buying or selling”). 
250. For an influential argument that the category of “commercial speech” cannot be drawn 
in a coherent fashion, see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 22, at 638-48. Others reaching the 
same conclusion include, for example, Eberle, supra note 56, at 418-19; McGowan, supra note 22, 
at 382-402; Post, supra note 22, at 7 (arguing that “the impossibility of specifying the parameters 
that define the category of commercial speech has haunted its jurisprudence and scholarship”); 
Redish, supra note 80, at 1444-56; and Shiffrin, supra note 96, at 1215. In contrast, Frederick 
Schauer argued over a decade ago that these criticisms were overblown, as resting on the mis-
taken assumption that “a distinction that cannot be sharply drawn cannot be drawn at all.” 
Schauer, supra note 56, at 1189. This argument is developed at length in Stern, supra note 86. 
See, e.g., id. at 57 (contending “that judicial reluctance to embrace a set of all-encompassing 
criteria for commercial speech represents a healthy pragmatism, not jurisprudential failure”). 
251. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993).  
252. Perhaps the most promising effort appears in Thomas Merrill’s student note, where 
Merrill accepts the Supreme Court’s governing framework under which noncommercial speech is 
protected by strict scrutiny and commercial speech receives a categorically lower degree of scru-
tiny, and defines commercial speech as: 
(1) speech that refers to a specific brand name product or service, (2) made by a 
speaker with a financial interest in the sale of the advertised product or ser-
vice, in the sale of a competing product or service, or in the distribution of the 
speech, (3) that does not advertise an activity itself protected by the first 
amendment. 
Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The 
New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 236 (1976). A few quick thoughts. First, 
prong (1) is too restrictive. Strict scrutiny should not invariably apply to regulations of speech 
that satisfies the other two criteria but does not mention a specific brand. Also (a quibble), the 
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ought not to be construed so as to make regulations of paradigmatic 
instances of commercial speech as hard to defend as strict scrutiny 
would make them. I therefore advocate a third option. Instead of 
subjecting “commercial speech,” however defined, to a categorically 
different level of scrutiny than applies to other speech, this part 
recommends that general First Amendment doctrine be recrafted to 
be more sensitive to the myriad factors that ought to be relevant to 
First Amendment analysis.253 If this is done correctly, it should 
naturally result in conferring upon Congress and the states greater 
latitude to regulate some forms of commercial speech than would a 
reflexive application of strict scrutiny, even without diluting consti-
tutional protection for other forms of expression. 
I have argued elsewhere (not novelly) that government ac-
tion can violate the Constitution in three ways: by the purposes 
that underlie it, by the effects that it produces, or by characteristics 
of the action itself.254 That is, if the government has violated the 
Constitution it will be by dint of the purposes with which it has 
acted, the effects such action has caused or threatens to cause, the 
conduct that the government has engaged in or foregone, or some 
combination of these factors.255 Coming from a different direction, 
this Article has argued that the First Amendment is designed to 
protect interests of the citizenry in checking governmental power, 
interests of the speaker’s audience, and interests of the speaker 
herself. To be sure, there is not a one-to-one correspondence be-
                                                                                                                       
critical question for prong (3) should be whether the activity being advertised is constitutionally 
protected; if so, it should not matter on a coercion rationale whether the source of the protection 
is the First Amendment or something else. For these reasons, the test is underinclusive. But the 
overinclusiveness is more worrisome and less easily remedied. An illustration will make the 
point. I gather that Merrill’s test would render a law barring advertisements that portray social-
ism in a favorable light subject to something other than strict scrutiny. That, it seems to me, 
cannot be right. 
253. Howard, supra note 240, likewise takes this third path, though in a different direction 
than I do here. 
254. See Berman, supra note 55, at 19-29; see also Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT. 55 (1997). Though this observation will likely strike most readers as obvious, I do 
believe that its importance is frequently overlooked. 
255. This third category—conduct—is the only one that may be cryptic. In some cases, “con-
duct” might be more comfortably described as “means.” So, for instance, the Equal Protection 
Clause allows the government to pursue certain ends, even when causing racially disparate 
effects, so long as it does not employ racially discriminatory means. See, e.g., Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). Similarly, I have argued that government may act for certain 
purposes so long as it does not employ coercive means. Put in conduct terms, government may 
not engage in facial racial discrimination or coercion. Notwithstanding these examples, the “con-
duct” dimension of potential unconstitutionality is not reducible to “means.” Take an illustration 
offered by Charles Fried, see Fried, supra note 254, at 67—the constitutional requirement that 
the President deliver a periodic address on the state of the union. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
This command compels particular conduct, not purposes, effects, or means. 
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tween these two tripartite classifications. The purposes or effects of 
a given state action could be constitutionally bad because of the 
harm they do to any one of the three types of interests. Nonethe-
less, the mutually reinforcing character of these two distinct ana-
lytical lenses suggests that regulations of commercial speech ought 
to be analyzed in three steps.256 
The discrete inquiries can be undertaken in any order, but 
the order described below and depicted in Figure 1 might prove 
most useful as the default.  
 



























                                                                                                                       
256. Cf. Post, supra note 22, at 43 (advocating separate inquiries into purpose and effect). 
Does the regulation have
a bad purpose? 
Strict Scrutiny 
Is the regulation  
coercive? 
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1. The Purpose Inquiry 
As Part VII revealed, identifying the governmental purposes 
that presumptively or conclusively violate the First Amendment is 
a challenging task.257 The ignorance and persuasion principles, 
however, provide reasonable starting points.258 Accordingly, the 
questions are whether the regulation was adopted either for the 
purpose of keeping the public ignorant of certain information, or “on 
the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do some-
thing that the government considers harmful.”259 If so, strict scru-
tiny applies,260 and the challenged action survives only if it is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a more ultimate governmental purpose 
that is deemed compelling. If it is not a purpose of the action either 
to suppress communication qua information or to prevent the audi-
ence from being persuaded to do something that the government 
disfavors, then the regulation is invalidated only if it serves no le-
gitimate governmental interest. 
2. The Coercion Inquiry 
The courts ought to be concerned, next, with protecting ex-
pressive interests held by the immediate subjects of governmental 
action. The question here is whether the regulation coerces indi-
viduals into speaking or not speaking. And the test is whether the 
government is constitutionally entitled to bring about the outcome 
with which the speaker is threatened for not doing what the gov-
ernment wishes.  
Sometimes the answer is presumptively no, either because 
the government has a strong obligation to provide the outcome gen-
                                                                                                                       
257. See generally Kagan, supra note 103. 
258. Again, this is just a start. Additional purposes could be added to the list of those that 
absolutely or presumptively violate the First Amendment, and the appropriateness of even these 
two principles is still open for debate. But the goal now is to get clear on the bones of the overall 
analysis. It would paralyze the inquiry to demand at this early stage any fuller investigation of 
precisely what the impermissible purpose part of the doctrine should look like. 
259. Strauss, supra note 22, at 335; see supra note 207. 
260. For a strong argument that regulations which are adopted for a speech-restrictive pur-
pose should be adjudged per se unconstitutional, see Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s 
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 788 (2001). I agree with Rubenfeld that government purposes are 
properly central to constitutional analysis generally and to the First Amendment in particular. 
But perhaps because Rubenfeld does not recognize the distinction that I urge is critical between 
coercive and noncoercive speech restrictions, he does not interrogate the category of speech-
restrictive purposes as fully as I think is necessary. 
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erally, such that the reasons it may have for not doing so are sub-
stantially constrained (even wholly eliminated), or because the out-
come is entailed by a substantive understanding of the right at is-
sue. An example of the first situation would be if the government 
offers a jury trial to a criminal defendant on the condition that he 
cease his public criticisms of the government. An example of the 
second arises if the government conditions differential tax liability 
on one’s expressive activities.261 
Other times, the government has wide discretion in deciding 
not to provide the outcome in question, in which case we are dis-
posed to call the outcome a “benefit.” It is nonetheless unconstitu-
tional, as amounting to a penalty, to withhold the benefit for the 
purpose either of punishing the right-holder for exercising her 
speech rights or of discouraging either the right-holder herself or 
other similarly situated parties from exercising their rights on fu-
ture occasions. The way to determine whether withholding the 
benefit would constitute a penalty is through a thought experiment. 
If the state had to take as a given the offeree’s refusal to comply 
with the speech-restrictive condition, and could not take into ac-
count how the granting or withholding of the benefit at issue would 
affect the exercise or nonexercise of rights by other parties who are 
subject to the same or similar conditional offer, would it better ad-
vance its legitimate and actual interests by granting the benefit 
offered, notwithstanding the offeree’s (constitutionally protected) 
decision to reject the condition?262 If the (admittedly speculative) 
answer is that it would, then withholding the benefit penalizes the 
offeree’s First Amendment rights. 
If the action threatened would be unconstitutional for any of 
these reasons, then the conditional offer is coercive, in which case 
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regula-
tions becomes paramount.263 A content-based coercive regulation is 
                                                                                                                       
261. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (invalidating a California law provid-
ing that property tax exemptions for veterans would be available only to those who would declare 
that they did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the government). 
262.  A simpler, and perhaps good-enough, version would ask merely whether, under the 
specified conditions, the state “would grant the benefit offered.” The awkward “better advance its 
legitimate and actual interests” formulation is designed to yield the conclusion that withholding 
the benefit does penalize the offeree’s rights in circumstances where the simple version of the 
question generates a negative answer, but only because the state decisionmaker was motivated 
by vindictive or otherwise improper motives. 
263. Precisely how to operationalize this distinction is a matter of much disagreement—
especially after the Supreme Court’s Turner Broadcasting decisions. Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 
520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997); 512 U.S. 622, 623 (1994); see, e.g., Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Con-
tent-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. 
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subjected to strict scrutiny; a content-neutral one provokes inter-
mediate scrutiny. If the regulation is not coercive, then it ordinarily 
will not violate constitutionally protected interests of the speaker. 
3. The Effects Inquiry 
If the challenged governmental action does not run afoul of 
the First Amendment by virtue of any animating purposes, and if it 
is not coercive, then the remaining worries center on its effects. 
First, the regulation should be held unconstitutional if it exces-
sively diminishes the communication available to the public.264 One 
appropriate way to measure whether any diminution in communi-
cation is “excessive” would be to provide that the regulation is un-
constitutional if the character and magnitude of the communication 
lost to the potential audience outweighs the state interests that the 
regulation advances.265 Second, and relatedly,266 the Court should 
ensure that the regulation does not excessively chill expression to 
which the regulation does not by its own terms apply. 
B. Some Illustrations 
This section applies the approach just outlined to a sampling 
of cases grouped into four recurring problem areas of regulation: (1) 
truthful advertising; (2) false or deceptive advertising; (3) com-
pelled payments for advertising; and (4) nonbrand-specific advertis-
                                                                                                                       
REV. 69, 110 (1997); Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive Conduct: 
What in the World Do They Mean (and What Do They Mean to the United States Supreme 
Court)?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 551, 576-77 (2000). The analysis proposed in this part is de-
signed to accommodate any resolution of this debate. 
264. Of course, as others have observed, if governmental action can violate the First 
Amendment solely because of the action’s expressive effects, then every governmental policy is 
potentially at risk because every single state action (including inaction) has what Larry Alexan-
der calls “information effects.” Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations 
of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 929 (1993); see also, e.g., Rubenfeld, 
supra note 260, at 794-97; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 273-77 
(1992); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
615, 724 (1991). I am not too troubled by this fact so long as the burden of proving excessive 
diminution falls on the challenger, though I appreciate that much more must be said to rebut 
reasonable suspicion that my position rests on a naive and unjustified confidence in the foresight 
of courts and litigants.  
265. See supra note 170 (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 
(1997)). I suppose that this test should be applied at the aggregate level, and not with respect to 
each individual application of the law being challenged.  
266. The relationship is not an exceedingly close one, however, for unintentional chilling ef-
fects threaten speaker interests as well as audience interests. 
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ing.267 More than to show how individual cases should have been 
resolved, the goal is to demonstrate that this approach is coherent 
and yields (by and large) intuitively acceptable outcomes. The hope 
is that further study would reinforce the promise of this approach 
while providing the necessary tuning, both fine and gross. 
1. Restrictions on Truthful Advertising 
a. Constitutionally Protected Activities 
These are easy. Take, for example, the cases distinguished in 
Posadas itself, Bigelow v. Virginia268 and Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International,269 which involved, respectively, restrictions on 
the promotion of abortion services and the sale of condoms. Of 
course, the ignorance and persuasion principles are likely to render 
any such restrictions unconstitutional on the dimension of purpose. 
Moreover, because the provision of condoms and abortion services 
are themselves constitutionally protected activities,270 any advertis-
ing restriction that might amount to a conditional proposal to per-
mit an individual to engage in such activities if and only if she does 
not advertise them271 threatens an unconstitutional consequence, 
hence is coercive. Strict scrutiny applies and will prove fatal. 
b. “Vices” 
It is most particularly in respect of coercion that the Posadas 
majority was right to think the casino advertising ban there at is-
                                                                                                                       
267. One area I do not discuss concerns discrimination against commercial speakers in cir-
cumstances where the commercial speaker harms the state’s interests no more than do the non-
commercial speakers whose activities are not restricted. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425-26 (1993) (discussed supra note 50); Van Alstyne, supra note 22, 
at 1643-48. I leave open the possibility that the doctrine sketched in Part VII.A should be sup-
plemented with a fourth prong directly addressed to discrimination of this sort. 
268. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
269. 431 U.S. 678 (1977); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (strik-
ing down federal statute that prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contracep-
tives). 
270. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming the constitu-
tional right of a woman to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that individuals have a constitutional right to use contracep-
tives, and granting third-party standing to a distributor of contraceptives to vindicate the rights 
of the users). 
271. As it happens, the statute at issue in Bigelow cannot even be construed in this way, be-
cause it criminalized not just abortion providers’ own advertising of their services, but “the sale 
or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [to] encourage or prompt the procuring 
of [an] abortion. . . .” See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812-13 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)). 
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sue distinguishable from Bigelow and Carey. There is, of course, no 
constitutional right to operate a gambling casino. Furthermore, as 
already argued in Part IV, Puerto Rico would have legitimate rea-
sons, independent of the wish to discourage others from refusing to 
waive their First Amendment rights, for withholding a casino li-
cense from an applicant who did not accede to the no-advertising 
condition. Those reasons all involve the unquestionably legitimate 
state interest in preventing residents from engaging in casino gam-
bling.272 The proposal does not threaten a penalty and is not coer-
cive. 
Because (as argued in Part VI) the purposes behind the ban 
did not violate the ignorance principle or the closely allied persua-
sion principle,273 the constitutionality of the restriction should turn 
upon the outcome of an effects-oriented balancing test. One side of 
the balance—the magnitude and character of the audience interest 
in receiving casino advertising—seems slight.274 What about the 
weight and legitimacy of the countervailing government inter-
ests?275 Puerto Rico’s interests in controlling the vice that might 
accompany casino gambling—such as organized crime and prostitu-
tion—might provide reason for banning the casinos, but only slight 
support, if any, for the advertising restrictions. However, that still 
leaves such governmental interests as reducing the personal and 
social costs that gamblers incur and protecting the flow of revenue 
to the government-run lottery.276 Each is a legitimate state interest 
that the advertising ban would promote.277 This necessitates a 
                                                                                                                       
272. This interest is unquestionably legitimate as a matter of current constitutional law. I do 
not mean to pass any judgment on whether this is a legitimate state interest as a matter of my 
preferred substantive political morality or even whether the Constitution should be construed to 
impose a presumption against putative state interests of this sort. 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04 and 219-28. 
274. See supra Part V. 
275. I take no position here on whether the courts should consider any governmental inter-
ests that the advertising restriction might possibly serve, or just those argued by the govern-
ment, or just those the court believes did in fact animate the challenged action. See, e.g., Eden-
field v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993). 
276. That the lottery is a regressive tax is not an adequate objection. Surely that is a rea-
son—perhaps even a compelling one—to oppose state-run lotteries. But once that battle is lost, it 
does not provide an independent basis for concluding that the state lacks an interest in trying to 
steer gambling dollars to its own coffers—for public use—as opposed to private ones. 
277. That Puerto Rico permitted other forms of gambling, and did not restrict their advertis-
ing, see supra text accompanying note 11, is far from sufficient to demonstrate that Puerto Rico 
was not concerned with the adverse consequences that casino gambling could have on the lives of 
those who indulge in it. It could well be that the legislature appreciated that other forms of gam-
bling raised similar dangers, but also believed that domestic political realities would not allow 
imposing advertising restrictions upon them. Or, the legislature could have believed that casino 
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judgment call, to be sure. My judgment is that if the effects-based 
costs of the advertising restriction are accorded their appropriately 
low weight, then the casino advertising ban ought to pass a sensible 
balancing.278 Unless the regulations were so vague as to signifi-
cantly chill protected expression, Posadas was correctly decided. 
A more challenging and intriguing case is Edge Broadcast-
ing,279 in which the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting radio 
stations licensed to states that prohibit lotteries from broadcasting 
advertisements for lotteries run by other states. Because I am in-
clined to agree with those who have argued that spectrum scarcity 
provides an inadequate rationale for federal regulation of broad-
casters,280 I would hold that the First Amendment significantly con-
strains the federal government’s discretion in allocating broadcast 
licenses, and that this condition runs afoul of those constraints 
even if it does not threaten a penalty (which it might). But I will 
not try my readers’ patience by pursuing this line of thought now. 
Instead, I would like to imagine a variation on the actual facts of 
that case, one in which the federal law applied not to broadcasters 
but to states themselves (and therefore does not implicate any puz-
zles particular to broadcasting regulation).  
                                                                                                                       
gambling would hold an allure for more residents than the existing domestic forms of gambling 
did. 
The fact that Puerto Rico was not worried about the costs imposed on tourists seems even 
farther beside the point. Richard Epstein, for instance, decries that “[t]he Puerto Rican policy is 
cynical: gambling has terrible consequences for the social fabric, so Puerto Rico attempted to 
externalize its costs by taking the money of tourists, who will take their social and psychological 
problems home with their other belongings.” EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 207. Why any such cyni-
cism would be relevant to the constitutional analysis is not clear; it is in the nature of states to 
care for their own. More fundamentally, though, the charge of cynicism is overblown. For one 
thing, assuming casino gambling has consumptive value for those who participate, Puerto Rico is 
externalizing many of its benefits too. Beyond that, the fact that a tourist stays and gambles for 
only a limited time means not only that any problems gambling has caused her will leave with 
her, but that those problems are likely to be small in the first place. Put another way, the legisla-
ture could reasonably have surmised that casino gambling can create problems for those who 
patronize the casinos as part of their everyday lives wholly different in kind from the problems it 
causes those who play when on vacation. 
278. As noted earlier, this indeterminacy and subjectivity is not a fatal consideration against 
balancing. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75. Whether the accepted interest in preserv-
ing community morals is “substantial” or even “compelling” is comparably subjective, yet this 
type of inquiry is required under, respectively, the existing Central Hudson test and its principal 
alternative, strict scrutiny. 
279. 509 U.S. 418, 436 (1993). 
280. In Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969), the Court held that 
because the electromagnetic spectrum is a limited resource, the government could impose regula-
tions on licensees that it could not impose upon traditional media. For a good summary of criti-
cisms of this rationale, see Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1013-16 (1989). 
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As the Edge Broadcasting Court explained, the federal 
broadcasting restriction was designed to accommodate the conflict-
ing interests of lottery and nonlottery states.281 Federal interven-
tion was thought necessary to correct a structural asymmetry. The 
legalization of a lottery by one state adversely affects the interests 
of any neighboring states that seek to protect their own citizens 
from the vice of gambling because citizens in the nonlottery state 
may cross the border to play the lottery state’s lottery, whereas the 
interests of a lottery state are not adversely affected by its 
neighbor’s non-lottery policy. (To the contrary, when one state 
chooses to sit out the lottery business, it increases demand for the 
service its lottery-state neighbors provide.) But precisely because of 
this asymmetry, the federal government should be constitutionally 
empowered to choose to protect the interests of the nonlottery 
states by simply making the lottery illegal everywhere.282 If this is 
so, Congress could extend this conditional offer to any state (and 
perhaps to nonstate entities as well): you may operate a lottery only 
if you respect the interests of the nonlottery states by not directing 
advertising to them. More precisely (and more administrably), Con-
gress could demand, for example, that the lottery operator not ad-
vertise with any broadcaster licensed in a nonlottery state, or not 
advertise with any broadcaster that had more than a specified per-
centage of its audience living in a nonlottery state, no matter where 
the broadcaster itself was located. Carrying out the threat of with-
holding permission to operate a lottery would not constitute a pen-
alty, and the conditional offer would not be coercive.  
But approving of Posadas and Edge Broadcasting (or this 
variation on Edge Broadcasting) does not lead one down the pre-
sumably unacceptable path of permitting all restrictions on the ad-
vertisement of transactions that (unlike the provision of abortions 
and the sale of condoms) the state may prohibit. Coors Brewing 
(which involved a federal ban on printing alcohol content on beer 
labels) and 44 Liquormart (which involved a state ban on including 
prices in liquor advertising) are good examples. In both cases, the 
government did act for the purpose of keeping citizens ignorant of 
truthful information—the alcohol content of beer and the prices of 
alcoholic beverages, respectively—which would be a signal First 
Amendment infringement under the ignorance principle, albeit pre-
                                                                                                                       
281. 509 U.S. at 428. 
282. Of course, that would give no weight to the interests of the lottery states, but the federal 
government makes choices like that all the time—consider, for instance, how federal law would 
limit the options of any state that might now wish to legalize marijuana. 
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sumably not under the persuasion principle. Neither regulation 
could survive strict scrutiny were it to apply. Moreover, the regula-
tion at issue in Coors Brewing was quite possibly thrice damned. In 
addition to having been adopted for a presumptively bad purpose, it 
was coercive because, under the Twenty-first Amendment, the fed-
eral government is without authority to prohibit alcohol sales.283 
And third, the effects of the ban are more problematic than in 
Posadas, Edge Broadcasting, or 44 Liquormart. An essentially puri-
tanical constitutional culture is not likely to accord much weight to 
consumers’ interests in getting the biggest buzz for the buck. But it 
is not likely to similarly downgrade consumers’ interest in being 
able to select a beer on the basis of its lower alcohol content. 
For many years now the great social and constitutional issue 
looming over all commercial speech cases has concerned the extent 
of state power to restrict advertising for tobacco products. Scholars 
have divided over whether any such restrictions could be consistent 
with the First Amendment.284 And the Court’s recent decision in 
                                                                                                                       
283. At least so I assume. Although the relevant portion of the Amendment provides merely 
that “[t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United 
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited,” U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2, the Court had long interpreted it to provide the states 
with nearly plenary authority over the importation, sale, and use of liquor within their borders. 
See, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1980). 
Then again, Justice Stevens asserted in Coors Brewing—unfortunately, without citation to any 
authority—that “Congress may limit directly the alcoholic content of malt beverages.” 514 U.S. 
476, 498 (1995). 
284. The literature on the topic is vast. Even prior to Lorillard Tobacco, Thomas Merrill con-
cluded that “the consensus of the legal commentators seems to be that these restrictions [on 
tobacco advertising] cannot survive scrutiny under Central Hudson, or at least that they cannot 
survive under Central Hudson as reinterpreted by 44 Liquormart.” Merrill, supra note 22, at 
1195-96 & nn.179-80 (citing commentators). As recently as a decade ago, however, the handicap-
ping looked different. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (predicting that “the Court will never provide child pornography or cigarette adver-
tising the level of protection customarily granted political speech”); Lowenstein, supra note 65, at 
1248 (“There appears to be little danger that the Supreme Court will fail to uphold a cigarette 
advertising ban, if Congress should enact one.”). 
On the question whether the First Amendment should be interpreted and applied to ban 
such regulations, putting existing case law aside, scholarly opinion has been much more divided. 
For a sampling, compare, for example, Vincent Blasi & Henry Paul Monaghan, The First 
Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 502 (1986); Law, supra note 22, at 
954-55; Merrill, supra note 22, at 1204; David C. Vladeck & John Carey Sims, Why the Supreme 
Court Will Uphold Strict Controls on Tobacco Advertising, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 651, 676 (1998) (all 
arguing that restrictions on cigarette advertising should be upheld), with Redish, supra note 22, 
at 639; Strauss, supra note 22, at 343-45; Krista L. Edwards, Comment, First Amendment Values 
and the Constitutional Protection of Tobacco Advertising, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 179-80 (1987); 
Matthew L. Miller, Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette 
Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 655 (1985).  
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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly285 constitutes one weighty, though 
inconclusive, vote of “no.”286 After holding a host of Massachusetts 
regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes pre-
empted by federal law, a majority of the Court held unconstitu-
tional a state rule prohibiting outdoor advertising of smokeless to-
bacco or cigars within 1,000 feet of a school or playground. Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion for the majority held, in particular, that the 
regulation failed Central Hudson’s fourth prong by “unduly 
imping[ing] on the speaker’s ability to propose a commercial trans-
action and the adult listener’s opportunity to obtain information 
about products.”287 Four Justices—Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer—thought the question was closer and would have remanded 
the case for trial to better develop facts relevant to the question of 
fit.288 Three other Justices—Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas—thought 
the question was even less close than did Justice O’Connor. Con-
tinuing to maintain the position he had first set forth in 44 Li-
quormart, Justice Thomas argued that the advertising restrictions 
should be subject to strict scrutiny, not to the intermediate review 
of Central Hudson.289 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, 
added a brief concurrence to record general agreement with Justice 
Thomas’s views while noting that “[t]he obvious overbreadth of the 
outdoor advertising restrictions” made it unnecessary to decide 
whether scrutiny more demanding than Central Hudson’s was ap-
propriate.290 
Under the analysis advocated here, restrictions on cigarette 
advertising—even up to total bans—present an easy case. First, 
they are not driven by a purpose in suppressing information “to 
keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipu-
                                                                                                                       
285. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
286. Lorillard Tobacco is inconclusive because it turned (as Justice O’Connor’s authorship 
might have led one to predict) on Central Hudson’s fit prong, which is necessarily highly fact-
bound. Id. at 561. In this light, it is especially significant that Massachusetts defended the geo-
graphical restrictions on tobacco advertising only by reference to a state interest in protecting 
minors from the advertising’s baleful effects. Had the state banned all outdoor advertising of 
tobacco products as a way to protect adults and minors alike from demand-inducing advertising, 
the ban would no longer be overinclusive. At the same time, of course, the substantiality of the 
state’s interest would be put back in play. But as I have suggested, it is hard to imagine how a 
majority of the Court—especially a majority that often rails against judicial subjectivity—could 
hold the state’s interest in protecting even adults from tobacco advertising is not substantial 
given, among other things, the number of adults who die from tobacco use each year and the fact 
that the state is constitutionally empowered to prohibit adults from engaging in all sorts of con-
duct for essentially paternalistic reasons. 
287. Id. at 2427. 
288. Id. at 2446-47 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
289. Id. at 2431-40 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
290. Id. at 2430 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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late their choices in the marketplace,”291 nor are they animated by 
concern that the advertising might “persuade” listeners to act in 
harmful ways. Tobacco advertisements are virtually devoid of in-
formation292 and do not proceed by means of the rational persuasion 
that the persuasion principle is designed to safeguard. Hostility to 
tobacco advertising is based not on such advertising’s capacity to 
inform or persuade, but rather on its ability to manipulate and se-
duce. That does not mean, to reiterate, that the First Amendment 
does not protect such communication. It might well mean, though, 
that advertising restrictions do not infringe the First Amendment 
by virtue of their purposes. 
Second, tobacco advertising restrictions are not coercive. 
Such regulations should be understood as offers conditioning per-
mission to sell dangerous products that the state could prohibit 
upon the seller’s waiver of her First Amendment right to stimulate 
additional demand through public advertising. Such a middle 
ground between cigarette prohibition and the status quo has much 
to recommend it, or so legislators might think. A prohibition on to-
bacco products would sacrifice the liberty interests of persons who 
exercise (relatively) affirmative and autonomous choice in deciding 
to smoke. But the status quo sacrifices the health interests of such 
persons, as well as the interests of persons who would like to quit 
(or not to start) but smoke mostly out of weakness of will. Permit-
ting the product on the condition that it not be advertised might 
seem the best way to accommodate both sets of persons. If a ciga-
rette manufacturer refuses to comply with the condition, however, 
thereby forcing the state to choose between (a) barring the cigarette 
sales; and (b) permitting sales and their advertisement, that the 
state would not legitimately prefer the former is logically possible 
and empirically plausible. In short, if the purpose for attaching the 
condition is to reduce the risk that the vice at issue will be indulged 
in to excess, then carrying out the threat is likely to be supported 
by paternalistic purposes that present constitutional doctrine 
                                                                                                                       
291. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
292. See, e.g., Collins & Skover, supra note 191, at 737 (“Entire categories of commercial 
communication are essentially bereft of any real informational content. For cosmetics, fra-
grances, alcohol, tobacco, clothes, and other products, billions of advertising dollars say much 
about image and little about information.”); Law, supra note 22, at 931 (“As with most adver-
tisements in general, the majority of tobacco and alcohol advertisements do not convey informa-
tion, but rather create an image, invoke a mood, appeal to emotion, and associate the product 
with a vision of the good life.”). Of course cigarette ads are not wholly noninformational. Ines-
capably, they convey the information that the manufacturer wants to associate its product with 
whatever particular images the advertising exploits. But this is trivial. 
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deems permissible. And if the conditional offer does not reveal that 
carrying out the act threatened—barring the transaction—would be 
a penalty, then the proposal itself is not coercive.293 
Third, a tobacco advertising ban should satisfy any sensible 
effects-oriented balancing test with ease. On one hand, the ban 
would significantly advance weighty state interests in protecting 
public health. The audience interests on the other side of the scale 
are, if not de minimis, awfully close. Surely little of constitutional 
value is lost if consumers are made unaware or less aware that 
smokers of Newport cigarettes are “Alive with Pleasure,”™ or that 
Marlboros are associated with images involving cowboys. True, a 
complete advertising ban might make it somewhat more difficult for 
consumers to learn which brands are marginally less dangerous 
than others (“Carlton is Lowest”™), but this information will be 
available on the cartons themselves as well as from third parties 
such as the government and Consumer Reports. Which set of inter-
ests exceeds the other is not a close call. 
It is with respect to bans on tobacco advertising, in sum, that 
the greater/lesser intuition of Posadas has such powerful force and 
that its categorical rejection is so tragic. Of course a ban on ciga-
rette advertising is paternalistic. But so would be a ban on cigarette 
sales. And not only would that pass constitutional muster, under 
existing constitutional doctrine it would not even provoke height-
ened scrutiny. Consequently, the Court ought to revisit with 
greater respect the instinct underlying Posadas that a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality must attend a law that simultane-
ously imposes such a ban and exempts manufacturers and retailers 
on the condition that they not promote their dangerous products in 
specified ways.294 
                                                                                                                       
293. Presumably the proposal would be coercive if brand advertising for cigarettes affected 
only market share, not overall consumption. Were that the case, then barring a single manufac-
turer that insists on advertising from selling its product would have no effect on public health 
because other manufacturers would simply take over the barred product’s market share. In fact, 
though, advertising does increase overall demand (for example, by continually attracting new 
consumers), not just market share. See Halberstam, supra note 22, at 863 & n.407. 
294. Thirty years ago, a three-judge district court upheld against First Amendment challenge 
a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) rule prohibiting cigarette advertisements on any 
medium of electronic communication subject to FCC jurisdiction. Capital Broad. Co. v. FCC, 333 
F. Supp. 582, 586 (D.D.C. 1971). Although that court’s reliance on “[t]he unique characteristics of 
electronic communication,” id. at 584, though consistent with Supreme Court precedent, was 
likely misguided, see supra note 280 and accompanying text, the holding was probably right.  
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c. The Wide Middle Ground 
Most commercial activities are neither constitutionally pro-
tected (like providing abortions and contraceptives) nor involve be-
haviors (like gambling, prostitution, alcohol, and drug use) that so-
ciety often considers harmful to the health or morals of its partici-
pants and which, therefore, the state sometimes prohibits entirely. 
How does the analysis developed here apply to laws that restrict 
advertising for activities that occupy the broad middle ground be-
tween constitutional rights and “vices”? 
Consider this illuminating hypothetical crafted by William 
Van Alstyne.295 Believing that motorcycle sales have been eating 
into their own business, car dealers in Virginia lobby the state leg-
islature to ban motorcycles from the state. Failing that, they pro-
pose other measures, such as a severe limitation on the number and 
location of authorized cycle dealers, a thirty-percent sales surtax on 
motorcycles, a rigorous training program imposed as precondition 
for receipt of a motorcycle license, and raising the minimum age for 
a motorcycle license to twenty-one. When the legislature rejects 
each of these proposals, the car dealers propose that the state sim-
ply forbid motorcycle dealers from advertising. A law doing pre-
cisely that is promptly passed. 
On the surface, this advertising prohibition seems similar to 
bans on casino or tobacco advertising already considered. It quite 
possibly does not run afoul of the ignorance or persuasion princi-
ples: the state could plausibly argue that motorcycle ads, like casino 
and tobacco ads, provide little in the way of information and oper-
ate mostly by seducing potential customers with images of fast and 
sexy bikes.296 Again like the casino and tobacco examples, the mo-
torcycle advertising ban would not be coercive on the theory that 
the state is willing to tolerate a limited number of motorcycle sales, 
and a limited amount of motorcycle use, but no more. If manufac-
turers or retailers refuse to refrain from seeking to grow demand 
via advertising, the state would withhold permission to engage in 
the business at all in order to ensure that motorcycle use (or pur-
chase) not exceed the maximum acceptable level. Carrying out the 
threat, accordingly, would not constitute a penalty, and the regula-
                                                                                                                       
295. Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 505-14. In the essay, Professor Van Alstyne modestly 
conceals his authorship of the tale, suggesting instead that it is a true story. 
296. This would be more plausible if the legislature barred advertisements by manufacturers 
rather than by dealers. You might prefer to suppose, then, that the statute barred advertising by 
manufacturers and dealers both. 
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tion is therefore not coercive. The motorcycle advertising ban does 
not look quite so good, however, on the dimension of effects. First, 
motorcycle ads may contain more information of value to the poten-
tial consumer than do cigarette ads (though perhaps less than ca-
sino ads), in which case the corresponding advertising causes the 
audience greater harm. More significantly, the government inter-
ests at stake—mostly, protecting car dealers from economic compe-
tition—are quite weak. As a result, the motorcycle advertising ban 
seems more likely to fail an effects-oriented balancing test than 
should many restrictions on the advertising of what are conven-
tionally termed vices. 
Admittedly, this is not a slam dunk argument for the uncon-
stitutionality of the Virginia ban on motorcycle advertising. I an-
ticipate that many readers will feel that the motorcycle advertising 
ban is so obviously unconstitutional that an approach that yields a 
conclusion this tepid must be wrong. If you fall into this category, I 
would ask you to reflect on how you would view the ban on motorcy-
cle sales that the Virginia car dealers originally proposed and that 
the legislature first contemplated. One might think that this is 
quite an outrageous, illiberal thing to do. One might think, further, 
that the Constitution ought to be interpreted in such a way as to 
subject a ban of this sort to some form of heightened scrutiny.297 
That is, the threatened action should be subject to more searching 
scrutiny than contemporary doctrine provides. And were the Con-
stitution so interpreted, then the advertising ban might turn out to 
be coercive, and thus subject to heightened scrutiny on the ground 
that the governmental action that the advertising restriction 
threatens on failure of offerees to comply with the no-advertising 
condition would itself prove unconstitutional. In short, insofar as 
my analysis confers inadequate protection against advertising re-
strictions, it might be precisely because the Constitution has been 
construed (rightly or wrongly) to confer inadequate protection 
against a wide variety of straightforward commercial restrictions. 
In assessing this proposed reformulation of First Amendment doc-
trine (or any other one for that matter), then, we should be mindful 
of what Laurence Tribe has called the topology of constitutional 
law,298 and what Frederick Schauer has referred to as its architec-
                                                                                                                       
297. There is no shortage of constitutional provisions—most notably, the Due Process, Equal 
Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, and the Ninth Amendment—from which 
such a rule could be read. 
298. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1995). 
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ture.299 Schauer observed the “unfortunate frequency” with which 
“particular legal approaches to particular social concerns remain 
imprisoned in their particularism, ignoring the extent to which spe-
cific rules or principles may affect other rules and principles located 
some doctrinal distance away.”300 To the extent restrictions on 
commercial speech should be assessed in greater/lesser terms, we 
should not take for granted the precise contours of existing consti-
tutional doctrine governing the state’s “greater” power to make 
commercial activities illegal. 
2. False and Deceptive Advertising 
In his broadside against judicial doctrine that accords sec-
ond-class First Amendment status to truthful commercial advertis-
ing, Michael Gartner, onetime president of NBC News, accepted as 
unproblematic restrictions on false advertising.301 But, as has often 
been remarked, this is not such a comfortable position to occupy.302 
Because government enjoys no special latitude when regulating 
noncommercial speech by claiming, or even demonstrating, that it 
is false, it seems that critics of reduced protection for commercial 
speech would have to bite the bullet and agree that regulations of 
false (not to mention “deceptive”) commercial speech must always 
be subjected to strict scrutiny too. I am aware of no commercial 
                                                                                                                       
299. See Schauer, supra note 56, at 1181. 
300. Id.  
301. See GARTNER, supra note 22, at 2 (“This paper seeks to explore and explain commercial 
speech. . . . False commercial speech, although an exceedingly important topic, is not examined 
here because the law and logic in this area are well established. Under the law, false commercial 
speech can be regulated or prohibited because, as the Supreme Court has stated, the First 
Amendment does not afford protection to illegal conduct in which speech is incidentally em-
ployed. . . . [S]ince deception in a commercial transaction constitutes fraud, deceptive speech can 
be prohibited even though truthful commercial speech is protected.”). But Gartner seems to miss 
the point, which is not whether false or deceptive commercial speech is different from truthful 
nondeceptive commercial speech (surely it is), but whether regulations of false or deceptive com-
mercial speech should be scrutinized under more forgiving constitutional standards than regula-
tions of false or deceptive noncommercial speech. The present doctrinal answer is “yes,” an an-
swer that Gartner cannot concede is well established in logic, so long as he insists that the com-
mercial/non-commercial distinction carries absolutely no weight with respect to truthful nonde-
ceptive speech, unless he provides reason for distinguishing the two contexts. And the fact that 
“deception in a commercial transaction constitutes fraud” does not provide adequate grounds for 
distinction insofar as the nub of the matter really becomes why deception in a noncommercial 
matter cannot also be made illegal—under the caption “fraud” or anything else. 
302. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 22, at 444 (“Perhaps the most persistent concern” mili-
tating against full First Amendment protection for commercial speech is that it “would impair 
the legitimate efforts of the states to protect consumers against false advertising.”). See generally 
Howard, supra note 240. 
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speech enthusiast who accepts this horn of the dilemma and none 
who offers a persuasive argument that would avoid it.303 
The approach outlined here, however, demonstrates how one 
can reject a special tier of scrutiny for commercial speech and yet 
reach the intuitively compelling conclusion that regulations of false 
and deceptive commercial speech (including laws that mandate dis-
closures deemed necessary to prevent deception) can stand even if 
not demonstrably necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest. Although the analysis changes a little 
when we move from regulations of factually false speech to regula-
tions of merely deceptive speech, the bottom lines remain the same. 
Start with regulations that apply to false commercial speech. 
First, it is a permissible governmental purpose to suppress false 
statements. Second, laws regulating false speech appear not to be 
coercive. If “there is no constitutional value in false statements of 
fact,”304 it would very probably follow that there is no constitutional 
right to lie,305 in which case punishments for doing so are not “pen-
alties” in the constitutional sense.306 Third, and for a similar rea-
son, the effects-based balancing test also appears to be satisfied: 
                                                                                                                       
303. I have already commented on Gartner’s failure fully to appreciate the problem. See su-
pra note 301. Other critics of the commercial/noncommercial distinction grasp the issue better, 
but offer no more satisfactory way out. Kozinski and Banner, for example, argue that “a simple 
consumer fraud statute prohibiting false representations about a product” is a content-neutral 
regulation, hence appropriately subjected to intermediate scrutiny, because “[t]he governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; the seller is free to say whatever he likes 
about the product, true or not, as long as he doesn’t induce sales in reliance on what he says.” 
Kozinski & Banner, supra note 22, at 651. But under this analysis, the same would be true of 
regulations of campaign speech: the state could prohibit and punish false and deceptive political 
speech, subject only to the content-neutral test of United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), 
because the speaker “is free to say whatever he likes about [a candidate], true or not, as long as 
he doesn’t induce [votes] in reliance on what he says.” Id. at 377. Indeed, it would seem even to 
demand a radical dilution of First Amendment doctrine concerning libel. If, as Kozinski and 
Banner would have it, First Amendment doctrine ought not distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial speech, the justification they advance to uphold consumer fraud statutes would 
appear to dictate that a newspaper publisher may publish whatever it likes, but only so long as it 
does not thereby induce people to alter their opinions of anyone in reliance on what the newspa-
per says. Yet New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), confers much greater protec-
tion than this. See id. at 283. In short, Kozinski and Banner’s effort to preserve existing low-level 
review of false and deceptive commercial regulations relies upon an implausibly narrow concep-
tion of what constitutes content-based speech regulation. For somewhat similar observations, see 
Halberstam, supra note 22, at 804-05, 827 n.237.  
304. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
305. I do not think this is inconsistent with Justice Scalia’s claim in United States v. 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), that “the Court has viewed the importation of ‘chill’ as itself a 
violation of the First Amendment,” as opposed to a judge-made prophylactic rule. Id. at 459 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
306. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. 
784 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:693 
 
the audience suffers little or no harm in being deprived of false 
communications. 
So far, of course, I have said nothing to distinguish the com-
mercial context from the noncommercial. That is, this analysis 
would seem to permit laws prohibiting false noncommercial speech 
as much as false commercial speech. Here, though, is where a con-
cern about chilling effects enters. Chilling-effect analysis is always 
sensitive to the value of the speech chilled, as the Court made clear 
in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., when holding 
that heightened protection for defamation defendants applied only 
to “speech on matters of public concern that is at the heart of the 
First Amendment’s protection.”307 But if determinations of constitu-
tionality may depend upon the judiciary’s empirical judgments 
about the likely amount of speech that a given regulation (or type of 
regulation) will chill, and on its evaluative judgments about the 
constitutional value of the speech chilled, and if the Court is consti-
tutionally authorized to implement these judgments partly via ex 
ante rules instead of being compelled to rely upon wholly ad hoc 
assessments—even though such rules will inevitably correspond 
imperfectly to their underlying considerations308—it is hard to see 
why the Court may not draw the rules it does formulate either ex-
plicitly in commercial/noncommercial terms or at least in a fashion 
that comes close to tracking just a distinction. This is enough to 
explain why regulations of false commercial speech enjoy greater 
constitutional latitude than do regulations of false noncommercial 
speech. It is not because commercial speech receives a lesser degree 
of First Amendment protection categorically, but because regula-
tions of false speech—commercial or noncommercial—can run afoul 
of the First Amendment only on chilling-effects grounds, and be-
cause there is reason to believe that (by and large) such regulations 
will chill more speech (and, arguably, more speech that approaches 
“the heart of the First Amendment’s protection”) when applied to 
noncommercial speech than commercial speech.309 
                                                                                                                       
307. 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
308. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44 (“Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing in-
terests at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general 
application. Such rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving differences as well as simi-
larities. Thus it is often true that not all of the considerations which justify adoption of a given 
rule will obtain in each particular case decided under its authority.”). 
309. As Justice Stewart explained in Virginia Pharmacy: 
In contrast to the press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts 
from sketchy and sometimes conflicting sources under the pressure of publica-
tion deadlines, the commercial advertiser generally knows the product or ser-
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When we turn to regulations of deceptive speech, the analy-
sis remains much the same with respect to purposes and effects, 
including chilling effects. The state’s purpose in preventing decep-
tion is permissible, the effects of curbing deception are largely un-
problematic, and the regulation’s chilling effects on nondeceptive 
communication can perhaps be accommodated in a way that distin-
guishes between commercial and noncommercial contexts. The coer-
cion analysis, however, might be different. Even if, per Gertz, “there 
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact,”310 there may 
be constitutional value in speech that is strictly truthful, albeit po-
tentially deceptive. More to the point, speakers may have a consti-
tutional right to engage in deception. If this is true, it would seem 
that regulations of speech that is deceptive but not false violate the 
speakers’ interests, rendering such regulations coercive in commer-
cial and noncommercial contexts alike. 
In fact, though, greater/lesser reasoning once again applies 
in a way that both (a) permits regulations of commercial speech; 
and (b) does so in a way that effectively distinguishes commercial 
and noncommercial contexts. A state might actually prefer (indeed, 
very likely will prefer) that a would-be seller not be allowed to ply 
her trade unless she agrees to comply with whatever rules the state 
sets forth to guard against commercial fraud and deception, includ-
ing rules governing warning labels and mandatory disclosures that 
might otherwise run afoul of constitutional doctrine disfavoring 
prior restraints. In that event, regulations of deceptive speech in 
the commercial context might again be viewed as noncoercive condi-
tional offers. That alone does not make them constitutional. It does, 
however, when added to the conclusions already advanced: that a 
state purpose in preventing fraud and deception is permissible, that 
the speech directly suppressed is of little or no constitutional value, 
and that laws regulating false and deceptive commercial speech are 
likely to chill little truthful and nondeceptive speech. 
                                                                                                                       
vice he seeks to sell and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual rep-
resentations before he disseminates them. The advertiser’s access to the truth 
about his product and its price substantially eliminates any danger that gov-
ernmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will 
chill accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression. There is, therefore, lit-
tle need to sanction “some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.” 
425 U.S. 748, 777-78 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341). 
This is not an adequate reason for relegating commercial speech to an entirely different tier 
for all First Amendment purposes. It is adequate, however, for the limited purpose to which I put 
it in text (though “substantially eliminates” is surely an overstatement). 
310. See supra text accompanying note 304. 
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3. Compelled Speech 
Recall the two “compelled commercial speech” cases intro-
duced earlier: Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,311 and United 
States v. United Foods, Inc.312 In Glickman, the Court upheld the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulations that assessed 
payments from growers, handlers, and processors of California tree 
fruits, which funds were used to pay for generic product advertis-
ing. Four years later, in United Foods, the Court struck down simi-
lar USDA advertising assessments levied on mushroom handlers. 
Oddly, though, instead of overruling the previous case, the United 
Foods Court distinguished it on the ground that the assessments on 
mushroom handlers suffered from the constitutional defect of not 
being part of a “more comprehensive program restricting marketing 
autonomy.”313 This proffered ground of distinction ringing hollow,314 
the cases cry out for reexamination. 
Two steps of the three-dimensional analysis are passed with 
ease. Surely the government’s purpose in imposing the assess-
ments—to augment demand for the produce at issue, and thereby to 
improve the economic position of growers—is constitutionally un-
problematic, as are the assessments’ effects—to encourage consum-
ers to believe that nectarines, plums, peaches, and mushrooms are 
tasty and healthful.315 The seemingly more difficult question is 
whether the regulatory assessments are coercive. 
To answer this question it will be helpful to explicitly recon-
ceive the regulations at issue in conditional-offer terms. Much sim-
plified, the assessments challenged in Glickman. look something 
like this: you may sell nectarines in interstate commerce if and only 
if you pay n% of your nectarine-related revenue into a fund that 
                                                                                                                       
311. 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
312. 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
313. Id. at 410. 
314. Justice Breyer made this same argument in his United Foods dissent. See id. at 419-24 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
315. Any objection that the assessments produce a constitutionally problematic effect be-
cause, by compelling producers to pay for generic advertising, they eat into funds the producers 
might have used for brand-specific advertising, thereby reducing the amount of information 
available to the public is untenable. The Court properly rejected this contention, observing that 
it would prove far too much for the same is true of “assessments to cover employee benefits, 
inspection fees, or any other activity that is authorized by a marketing order.” Glickman, 521 
U.S. at 470. In fact, the infirmity of this objection is even more profound: every governmental 
policy that directly or indirectly increases the producers’ operating costs or reduces their revenue 
would have a like effect on the producers’ advertising budget, and thus on information available 
to consumers. See supra note 264. 
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will be used to purchase advertising encouraging nectarine con-
sumption. When Wileman Bros. refuses to pay its assessment, the 
government’s only reason for carrying out its threat is to deter 
other growers from refusing the assessment too. That makes impo-
sition of the threatened sanction a penalty and the threat coercive. 
To be sure, government has a pretty good reason for threatening 
this penalty: the growers face a classic collective action problem 
that can be overcome only by effectively preventing free riding. But 
that is an argument aimed to justify the use of coercion in this case, 
not a reason to conclude that the sanction is something other than a 
penalty or that the threat is something other than coercive.316 And 
unfortunately for the government, its interest in overcoming a col-
lective action problem so as to promote the financial interests of 
nectarine producers does not look sufficiently important to satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny, let alone the strict scrutiny that I have been 
assuming (arguendo) should govern coercive speech regulations. 
If the analysis proposed in Part VII.A is basically sound, 
then, it seems that the agricultural assessments at issue in Glick-
man and United Foods violate the First Amendment. Of course, all 
this assumes that the growers have a cognizable First Amendment 
interest in not paying into an advertising fund. After all, if the as-
                                                                                                                       
316.  This distinction—between rebutting the existence of coercion and justifying it—
provides the best way to make sense of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), 
and its progeny. In Abood, the Court held that the state could require public-sector employees 
who chose not to join the employees’ union to pay to the union a service fee equal in amount to 
union dues, but that such fees could not be used for expressive purposes not germane to the 
union’s responsibilities as collective-bargaining representative. Id. at 217; see also, e.g., Lehnert 
v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 514 (1991) (holding that union may not use compulsory 
dues for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 6 
(1990) (prohibiting use of compulsory state bar dues to finance activities that are not “necessarily 
or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality 
of legal services”). 
Often, a germaneness test is properly employed to help determine whether a particular con-
ditional proposal is coercive. If the offeree’s compliance with the government-imposed condition 
would serve a purpose related to the purpose that would be served by denying the offered benefit 
on failure of the condition, then denial of the benefit is more likely not to be penalty, rendering 
the proposal not coercive. See Berman, supra note 55, at 112. Indeed, the Court used germane-
ness in essentially this way in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 
although it wrongly transformed an inferential relationship into a necessary one. See supra text 
accompanying notes 152-54. Cases like Abood and Keller, however, seem pretty clearly to involve 
coercion. The laws at issue conditioned, respectively, a public-sector job or a license to practice 
law, on payments that infringed the offerees’ expressive interests, in circumstances where denial 
of the offered benefit on failure to comply with the condition seems to amount to a penalty. In 
these cases, though, the Court seems to be saying that where the funds thereby extracted are 
used for purposes germane to the fundamental purposes of the union or the integrated bar, then 
use of coercion is constitutionally justifiable (i.e., the constitutional “infringement” does not 
amount to a “violation”) as a means to prevent free riding.  
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sessments are not speech then the government may compel growers 
to pay them without engaging in constitutionally proscribed coer-
cion.317 And it is this assumption, I think, that demands greater 
scrutiny. 
Start with the fact that government uses tax revenue to fa-
cilitate the communication of all sorts of messages with which indi-
vidual taxpayers might strenuously disagree. For example, when 
holding in Wooley v. Maynard that New Hampshire violated the 
First Amendment by enforcing criminal sanctions against motorists 
who, due to ideological objections, covered that part of their state-
issued license plate that bore the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” 
the Court expressed no disagreement with then-Justice Rehnquist’s 
view, in dissent, that no constitutional difficulty would arise “were 
New Hampshire to erect a multitude of billboards, each proclaiming 
‘Live Free or Die,’ and tax all citizens for the cost of erection and 
maintenance . . . .”318 Consequently, Rehnquist reasoned, “[f]or First 
Amendment principles to be implicated, the State must place the 
citizen in the position of either apparently or actually asserting as 
true the message.”319  
Rehnquist seemed to attract a majority of the Court to that 
view three years later when, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins, the Court held that a provision of the California Constitution 
that required owners of private shopping centers to allow orderly 
speech and petitioning by others did not violate a property owner’s 
First Amendment right “not to be forced by the State to use his 
property as a forum for the speech of others.”320 Writing now for the 
majority, Rehnquist identified as the “most important” considera-
tion that “[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing 
out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition . . . will not likely 
be identified with those of the owner.”321 
Something like this “traceability” test322 seems sensible, 
though it might be appropriately expanded to recognize First 
                                                                                                                       
317. See supra text accompanying note 148. The state is constitutionally entitled to “penal-
ize” conduct (including inaction) that does not amount to a constitutional right. It may therefore 
threaten such a penalty without engaging in “coercion” in the specific sense of committing a 
prima facie constitutional wrong. 
318. 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
319. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
320. 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980). 
321. Id. at 87. 
322. James B. Lake, Note, Lawyers, Please Check Your First Amendment Rights at the Bar: 
The Problem of State-Mandated Bar Dues and Compelled Speech, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1833, 
1852 (1993). 
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Amendment interests where the plaintiff himself can reasonably 
view what he must submit to as an affirmation of belief, even in 
circumstances where ordinary members of the audience would not 
infer any such affirmation.323 And under either variant, Wileman 
Bros. seemed to make out a colorable claim. Though the company 
objected to various aspects of the USDA-administered program,324 
its core complaint seemed to be that the advertising portrayed all 
California nectarines as essentially equal, and that this was a view 
with which they fervently disagreed.325  
The crux of the Court’s response, then, was to deny that the 
assessments could “engender any crisis of conscience” because the 
growers could not in fact have “political or ideological disagreement 
with the content of the message” that the assessments financed.326 
This is perhaps true, but the air of ipse dixit is disquieting. As an 
empirical matter, that Wileman Bros. really was motivated by ideo-
logical objection does seem unlikely. The Court’s assertion, how-
ever, reads like a statement of conceptual truth, and that cannot be 
right. People subscribe to all sorts of unusual beliefs. It is hard to 
imagine what definitions of “political” or “ideological” must be in 
play in order to preclude the possibility that some growers’ dis-
agreement with the advertisement’s message of a fundamental fun-
gibility among California nectarines qualifies. 
For this reason, the Glickman Court’s ideological/non-
ideological gloss on the traceability test seems misguided. And if 
that is so, then the compulsory assessments at issue in United 
Foods and Glickman probably did coerce producers to relinquish 
First Amendment rights not to “speak,” and warranted heightened 
scrutiny. 
This should not, however, sound the death knell for efforts 
by the USDA to assist growers. A simple solution would be to sup-
plement the advertising program with a separate program that is 
designed to stimulate demand through some nonexpressive means, 
say, by researching possible new markets, or new uses, for the pro-
duce. Growers could then be compelled to pay into one of the two 
                                                                                                                       
323. See David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Ex-
pression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1010-14 (1982). 
324. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 468 n.11 (1997).  
325. That this was a significant part of the company’s objection emerges with reasonable 
clarity from oral argument, see Oral Argument, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 1996 
WL 700569 (Dec. 2, 1996), at 29-57 (argument of Thomas E. Campagne), a presentation that was 
much ridiculed. See, e.g., Steve Lash, Justices Hear First Amendment Challenge to Government-
Required, Industry-Wide Agricultural Ads, West’s Legal News, 1996 WL 687547 (Dec. 3, 1996). 
326. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 472. 
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segregated funds—one for advertising, the other for purposes that 
do not implicate First Amendment interests. Presumably, if adver-
tising is more effective at increasing demand for nectarines, than is, 
say, a market survey of the prospects for exporting nectarines to 
Southeast Asia, then the only growers who choose to contribute to 
the latter rather than the former will be those who have genuine 
expressive objections to being associated with a particular mes-
sage—just as Wileman Bros. claimed to have. This solution would 
keep the judiciary from having to rule on whether growers like 
Wileman Bros. did in fact harbor the Maynard-esque sort of objec-
tion to compelled payments that the First Amendment ought to be 
concerned about, or alternatively are simply trying to exploit the 
First Amendment as a way to free ride.  
4. Issue and Image Advertising 
Consider one final set of problems that has frequently vexed 
commercial speech commentators, matters sometimes filed under 
the headings of image advertising, issue advertising, and corporate 
commentary,327 and perhaps better introduced by examples than by 
definition. Here are some of the more commonly discussed ones: 
The Mobil Oil Corporation has long placed “advertorials” in the 
New York Times staking positions on various issues of foreign and 
domestic U.S. policy. The Philip Morris Company, the world’s larg-
est manufacturer of cigarettes, commemorated the bicentennial of 
the Bill of Rights by running a multimedia campaign celebrating 
our constitutional liberties and offering a free copy of the Bill of 
Rights to anyone who requested one. Each advertisement promi-
nently displayed the Philip Morris logo. The National Commission 
on Egg Nutrition, an egg industry association, claimed in adver-
tisements that there existed no scientific evidence that eating eggs 
increases the risk of heart disease. Unifying these somewhat dispa-
rate cases is a commercial entity’s purchase of advertising space to 
influence public debate on matters of particular importance to the 
                                                                                                                       
327. While the problem is addressed throughout the commercial speech scholarship, com-
mentaries focused specifically on the subject include Howell A. Burkhalter, Comment, Adverto-
rial Advertising and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861 (1990); 
Robert B. Holt, Jr., Comment, Corporate Advocacy Advertising: When Business’ Right to Speak 
Threatens the Administration of Justice, 1979 DET. C. L. REV. 623; C.C. Laura Lin, Note, Corpo-
rate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1988); and Mark D. 
Lurie, Note, Issue Advertising, Commercial Expressions, and Freedom of Speech: A Proposed 
Framework for First Amendment Adjudication, 28 B.C. L. REV. 981 (1987). 
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entity, or to cultivate the image of the entity or its products, but 
without describing or purporting to promote its products or ser-
vices. These cases, and others like them, are often cited to demon-
strate how tenuous the line is between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech.328 That may be, but recall that the approach I propose 
here does not rely on any such distinction. 
Proper treatment of the Mobil advertorials is clear-cut. Were 
the government to try to ban the practice, it would almost certainly 
be animated by a purpose that runs afoul of the ignorance and per-
suasion principles; the effects of the ban would raise considerable 
difficulties under an effects-oriented balancing; and the policy 
would seem to be coercive for threatening a penalty.329 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the government has not, as far as I am 
aware, ever tried to curb the practice. 
The Philip Morris case is more intriguing, though again it is 
instructive that, although eyebrows were raised at the time, no 
branch of government sought to prohibit the ads or the give-
aways.330 Clear thinking on the problem begins, as Kozinski and 
Banner do, by pondering why Philip Morris started the campaign. 
Is Philip Morris running the commercials, at considerable expense to its share-
holders, simply as a public service? Or is there a hidden agenda? . . . [T]he Philip 
Morris ads allow the company name to reach the favorable attention of millions of 
potential consumers. These same consumers may well remember the name when 
they shop for cigarettes and be induced to buy Philip Morris rather than brand 
X.331 
Well, so what? Maybe there is just something unseemly 
about Philip Morris exploiting the Bill of Rights to increase its prof-
its from tobacco sales. And if this nearly aesthetic objection were 
enough to motivate the government to prohibit the practice, the ig-
norance and persuasion principles would apparently not be vio-
lated, making the prohibition permissible on the dimension of pur-
pose. An effects test could, I suppose, go either way, as the out-
comes of balancing tests are often hard to predict. But that should 
not matter, for the prohibition is likely to prove unconstitutional 
because of its coerciveness. It seems unlikely that the ads would 
generate increased demand for cigarettes, serving instead, as Koz-
inski and Banner suggest, merely to increase Philip Morris’s mar-
ket share. And that means the government has no legitimate inter-
                                                                                                                       
328. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 22, at 641-46. 
329. This is for reasons discussed earlier in the context of First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See supra text accompanying note 162. 
330. Relevant history is traced in Stern, supra note 86, at 122-23. 
331. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 22, at 645-46. 
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est in barring Philip Morris’s products, just because they run the 
Bill of Rights ads, while permitting sales of their competitors’ prod-
ucts.332 
Of course, perhaps Kozinski and Banner misapprehend the 
true purpose behind the ads. The ads might be better understood as 
a tactic in the company’s fight against prohibition, not its fight for 
market share. The intended audience, then, are not potential con-
sumers but potential voters. However, the government could not 
easily make use of this hypothesis to rebut the above conclusion 
that a ban on such ads (which is to say, an offer to allow an entity 
to sell cigarettes on the condition that it not run such ads) would be 
coercive. The underlying logic of a ban on the Bill of Rights ads 
would then be expressed as a governmental policy to allow the sale 
of cigarettes only by those who do not try to encourage the elector-
ate to believe that the sale of cigarettes should be allowed. It is 
unlikely that such a policy reflects even a legitimate governmental 
interest. 
Last, consider one case in which the government did indeed 
intervene. Determining that it was false and misleading to claim 
“that there is no scientific evidence that eating eggs increases the 
risk of . . . heart and [and circulatory] disease,” the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) ordered the National Commission on Egg Nu-
trition (“NCEN”) to cease disseminating such claims, and the Sev-
enth Circuit upheld the action.333 
This is an important case because it raises challenging ques-
tions about the appropriate standard of proof to which government 
should be held when trying to establish falsity and deceptiveness. 
No doubt courts should give weight to “the principle of epistemo-
logical humility.”334 But so long as the concept of falsity serves a 
function within First Amendment jurisprudence,335 courts must not 
assume a posture of thoroughgoing agnosticism. And one might 
conclude that both the FTC and the Seventh Circuit played their 
roles responsibly. Neither labeled as “false” the assertion that egg 
consumption was healthy. Rather, the FTC concluded, and the court 
                                                                                                                       
332. See supra note 293. 
333. Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 165 (7th Cir. 1977). A similar 
question arose when R.J. Reynolds ran an advertisement claiming that a government study 
suggested that cigarette smoking did not cause heart disease. After a dispute over FTC jurisdic-
tion, see In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539 (1988), the FTC secured the company’s 
agreement to withdraw the advertisements. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 113 F.T.C. 344 
(1990). 
334. See Redish, supra note 80, at 1443-44. 
335. See, e.g., supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
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agreed, “that, impossible though it may be to determine whether 
consuming eggs in fact increases the risk of heart and circulatory 
disease, it is possible to determine the existence and amount of evi-
dence on that issue”336—as well, one might add, as whether such 
evidence satisfies the methodological criteria that permit the desig-
nation “scientific.” What was false in the NCEN materials, then, 
was just the claim that there existed no scientific evidence that eat-
ing eggs increases the risk of heart and circulatory disease. 
The egg case, in short, poses concededly important questions 
of doctrinal fine-tuning. But it does not, it seems to me, challenge 
these basic observations made earlier: that government does not act 
coercively when offering to allow businesses into the stream of 
commerce only on condition that they refrain from deceiving their 
actual or potential customers; that government’s purposes in mak-
ing such an offer are constitutionally permissible; and that the judi-
ciary should remain vigilant to ensure that the policy not be im-
plemented in such a way as to bar or chill too much valuable ex-
pression. In all, there does not yet appear reason to fear that the 
existence of issue and image advertising will present insurmount-
able obstacles to an effort to revise existing doctrine in the direction 
to which the body of this Article points and which Part VII.A 
sketches—namely, to abandon the separate doctrinal category of 
“commercial speech,” while reshaping general First Amendment 
doctrine to take into serial account considerations of coercion, pur-
poses, and effects. 
CONCLUSION 
The body of this Article has focused on a single commercial 
speech case, the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Posadas de 
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company.337 There is reason for 
the relative narrowness of that focus, for Posadas—or, more pre-
cisely, the rejection of Posadas—has played a pivotal role in the de-
velopment of contemporary commercial speech doctrine. 
The story of commercial speech jurisprudence to date might 
reasonably be written in three chapters. By conventional wisdom, 
the story begins with the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen, and 
the Supreme Court’s flat refusal to recognize commercial advertis-
ing even as speech, blithely asserting “that the Constitution im-
poses no such restraint on government as respects purely commer-
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cial advertising.”338 Chapter one, then, tells the tale of the Court’s 
gradual abandonment of that view, leading through the explicit re-
jection of Valentine in Virginia Pharmacy,339 and culminating in 
commercial speech’s assumption of intermediate-value status, as 
represented by the Central Hudson decision of 1980.340  
  Chapter two, retreat, is, in large part, the story of Posa-
das.341 Through its watered down application of the four-part Cen-
tral Hudson test and, especially, through its embrace of the argu-
ment that the greater power to ban an activity includes the lesser 
power to permit the activity while banning its advertisement, Posa-
das threatened even a return to Valentine. That Posadas’s author, 
then-Justice Rehnquist, had dissented in Virginia Pharmacy342 
made the threat seem real. 
The threat, however, proved illusory; chapter three, accord-
ingly, is a tale of rejuvenation.343 From the vantage point of 2002, 
the prospects for robust constitutional protection of commercial 
speech have never looked brighter. The Court having repudiated 
Posadas a half-dozen years ago, the question for Court-watchers 
now is not whether the Court will back off from the intermediate 
protection commercial speech has enjoyed for the better part of two 
decades, but whether it will resist elevating all of commercial dis-
course, including commercial advertising, to the ranks of “full 
value” speech, protected by strict scrutiny. Justice Thomas is ex-
plicitly committed to this view, while Justices Scalia and Kennedy 
have increasingly expressed their sympathy. Justice Stevens would 
also reject the categorical approach of Central Hudson, applying 
strict scrutiny unless the given commercial speech regulation is 
supported by a state interest in preventing deception or protecting 
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340. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).  
341. See, e.g., Symposium, The Supreme Court and Local Government Law, 7 TOURO L. REV. 
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342. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781-90 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). 
343. See Stern, supra note 86, at 116 (describing the Court’s commercial speech decisions of 
the 1990s as “signal[ing] a ‘remarkable revival’ of the protection of commercial speech in the 
wake of the ominous implications of Posadas”). 
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the consumer from inaccurate or incomplete information.344 The 
remaining five members of the Court345 have resisted abandoning 
Central Hudson, but have been unable to furnish a coherent de-
fense for it, or even to persuasively rebut Thomas’s repeated calls to 
embrace strict scrutiny. 
This is unfortunate, because the intuition that much of what 
passes under the loose description of commercial speech is different 
from the speech that should enjoy full First Amendment protection 
is a sound one. An advertisement for cigarettes (or motorcycles) 
should not garner as much constitutional protection as should, say, 
political campaign materials or Huckleberry Finn. That is, the First 
Amendment should not be interpreted to place as heavy a burden of 
justification upon government when it seeks to regulate the former 
as the latter. Perhaps these things differ in “First Amendment 
value.” But, in any event, there is another reason: the state is not 
constitutionally compelled to allow the sale of cigarettes or motor-
cycles. If it has reasons to allow the sales but with misgivings, and 
if speech by the seller could exacerbate those legitimate governmen-
tal concerns, the state might reasonably think to offer permission to 
sell the product on condition that the seller not engage in the dam-
aging speech. 
This is the core insight behind the Court’s assertion in Posa-
das that “the greater power to completely ban casino gambling nec-
essarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gam-
bling.” And while this is a gross overstatement, the post-Posadas 
Court has erred by throwing out the baby with the bathwater. In-
stead of repudiating this insight entirely, the Court should have 
sought to correct it. It might be truer, for instance, to say that a 
power to withhold legal authority to engage in a particular sort of 
commercial transaction entails the power to permit such transac-
tions on the condition that the participants not promote the trans-
action in specified ways, so long as the purpose for imposing the 
speech-restrictive condition is the same as the purpose the state 
would have for barring the transaction entirely, and so long as im-
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posing the speech-restrictive condition does not unduly harm inter-
ests of the speech’s audience. 
Certainly, this formulation might be improved upon.346 But it 
is far closer than the Court came when simply rejecting “the 
‘greater-includes-the-lesser’ argument . . . for the . . . important 
reason that it is inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doc-
trine.”347 We can put this point another way by reexamining the 
Court’s decision in Lorillard Tobacco. The majority, recall, held 
that Massachusetts’s ban on tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet 
of schools and playgrounds failed Central Hudson; Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have remanded the question 
for trial. In advocating remand, however, Justice Stevens empha-
sized that he shared the majority’s concerns on the question of fit, 
insisting “the state cannot by fiat reduce the level of discourse to 
that which is ‘fit for children.’ ”348 Perhaps, though, the ban on to-
bacco advertising does not proceed “by fiat” at all. Perhaps the un-
derlying logic of the ban is more faithfully rendered as an offer to 
allow the sale of dangerous products in the commonwealth condi-
tioned on a limited waiver of manufacturers’ and retailers’ First 
Amendment rights.349 As I have emphasized, this re-articulation 
does not entail that such a ban is necessarily constitutional, all 
things considered. But a noncoercive offer is not a command, and a 
sensible First Amendment doctrine must start by recognizing the 
difference. 
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